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The present study grew out of my dual interest in literature and 
mathematics. Though literature, mainly German, is my principal 
field of endeavor, I have, as an adventure in thought, and in search 
for basic methods and principles, successfully completed a dozen 
advanced courses in mathematics within the Canadian honors 
program. 
Although interest in Novalis' fragments, and in other early 
Romantic fragments, is growing steadily, Novalis' fragments on 
mathematics have, apart from Kate Hamburger's basic study, been 
treated in the most sciolistic manner, for two obvious reasons. First, 
many mathematicians who are not also historians of mathematics, 
limit their attention to contributions advancing the formal science 
of mathematics. Novalis made no such contribution. Second, many 
literary critics and scholars are either not qualified to deal with the 
subject, or are prejudiced against mathematics, which they vaguely 
associate with computation and technology. While mathematics is 
indeed highly applicable in these fields, most pure mathematicians 
regard this useful aspect of mathematics as an incidental and 
accidental feature that does not concern them, just as the literary 
writer would view the use of his medium of expression in, say, 
advertising. Mathematics, on the proper level, is a magnificent web 
of thought expressed in a subtle net of symbols, affording, if one is 
willing and able to master it, aesthetic experiences of the same order 
as those afforded by music and poetry, opening to the imagination 
vistas as bold and colorful and exciting as in the most Kafkaesque 
work of literature. Many prominent literary figures have been 
aware of the aesthetic and thought-challenging qualities of mathe-
matics. Novalis was one of them. He devoted himself intensively to 
this science throughout his brief adult life. Yet critical opinion on 
the exact relationship of Novalis to mathematics, as much as there 
is of it, has fluctuated from one extreme to the other, from de-
scribing Novalis' fragments on mathematics as manifestations of a 
morbid mind to detecting in them an adumbration of the theory of 
relativity. This state of opinion, though steadily moving toward 
mature evaluation, demands an elucidation of the relationship of 
Novalis to mathematics. That is the purpose of the present study. 
The first version of this study was presented in 1956 to the 
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of the University of Cincinnati 
as a doctoral dissertation under the title "The Relation of Novalis 
to Mathematics." Since then I have learned a great deal more about 
the subject, especially from research conducted in the M.I.T. and 
Harvard Libraries during 1956-1958. Hand in hand with this study, 
a cognate monograph entitled "Goethes geistige Welt im Lichte der 
Mathematik" is nearing completion. Essential results of the latter 
were published in two American journals: "Goethe's Views on Pure 
Mathematics," Germanic Review, XXXI (1956), pp. 49-69, and 
"Goethe's Thought in the Light of His Pronouncements on Applied 
and Misapplied Mathematics," Publications of the Modern Language 
Association of America, LXXIII (1958), pp. 505-515. On the basis 
of these endeavors the dissertation was re-written. 
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of the book. 
I also wish to acknowledge my debt of gratitude to the Libraries 
of the Universities of Manitoba, Cincinnati, Harvard, and of 
Michigan; of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; to the 
Cincinnati and New York Public Libraries; and to the Library of 
Congress. 
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Novalis, a man of the most indisput-
able talent, poetical and philosophi-
cal; whose opinions, extraordinary, 
nay altogether wild and baseless as 
they may often appear, are not without 
a strict coherence in his own mind, 
and will lead any other mind, that 
examines them faithfully, into endless 
considerations; opening the strangest 
enquiries, new truths, or new possi-
bilities of truth, a whole unexpected 
world of thought, where, whether for 
belief or denial, the deepest questions 
await us (Critical and Misc. Essays, 
London, 1847, p. 5). 
THOMAS CARLYLE, 1827 
1. THE PROBLEM 
When Novalis, the German Romantic poet and philosopher, whose 
real name was Georg Friedrich Philipp von Hardenberg, died in 
1801, not quite twenty-nine years old, there was left among his 
papers a large number of notes on philosophy, literature, religion, 
medicine, mathematics, engineering, the natural sciences, and many 
other branches of knowledge. These notes were either not intended 
for publication or were to be revised and reorganized before publi-
cation. They are usually referred to as "fragments" (Fragmente) or 
"aphorisms" (Aphorismen). The term fragments is preferred by 
those who, like the author, believe that the notes form part of a 
whole. The designation aphorisms is favored by those who regard 
the notes as spontaneous, incoherent utterances. We shall call 
them fragments. Research on these fragments has led scholars to 
the most diverse conclusions about them. Some of the fragments 
are lecture notes. Critics concluded that most of them are. Some 
fragments are excerpts from the works of contemporary philosophers 
and scientists, or are closely related in subject matter to such works. 
On that basis some critics claimed that all the fragments lack in 
originality and are half-digested gleanings from the works of these 
philosophers and scientists. These generalizations contain a grain 
of truth, but as they stand they are untenable because they are not 
borne out by facts. 




statement we do not mean that the fragments on mathematics 
constitute the largest portion, for they amount to only about five 
percent of the hitherto published quantity. It is the importance of 
these pronouncements as co-ordinates revealing the cohesion of, and 
permitting reference within, his thought in the kaleidoscope of his 
fragments, that accords them precedence over the others. During 
the one hundred and fifty years of N ovalis research, especially 
during the first one hundred, it was customary to minimize the 
significance of these fragments. The main reasons for such treatment 
have been the following: 
(1) Novalis scholars, who were usually not conversant with 
mathematics, did not know what to do with the fragments on this 
subject, and hence did not publish a fair amount of them in pro-
portion to the share the fragments on mathematics occupy within 
the entire collection. Only the most irrational and abstruse fragments 
on mathematics were published by the earlier editors as elegant 
variations of the pronouncements of a mystical poet. 
(2) Since Tieck's rhapsodical and obscuring presentation (see 
below) of N ovalis, the latter has become so enshrouded in nebulous 
mysticism that it is now almost impossible to dispel the magical 
aura that surrounds him, and to see him as he really was. He has 
become the epitome of romanticism, and what seems on the surface 
to be more opposed to mathematics? He has been portrayed as the 
apostle of night and death, and who would expect such a poet to 
utter anything sensible on mathematics? He has been placed in the 
great tradition of mysticism along with Eckhart and Bohme, and 
what other association with mathematics could be more irksome to 
a mathematician? 
We have set ourselves the task of examining Novalis' fragments 
on mathematics and elucidating every aspect of them. This task is 
carried out partly for the benefit of those students of Novalis who 
are not mathematicians but notice that Novalis wrote notes couched 
in mathematical terms and think that they must make sense from 
the strictly mathematical point of view, merely because they have 
been set down. The study is partly undertaken for the benefit of 
those professional mathematicians who may have occasion to 
inspect Novalis' fragments and discover that mathematical concepts 
are applied, or misapplied, to subject matter which is not usually 
treated mathematically and which does not fit into the established 
mathematical systems, and who therefore conclude that these 
fragments cannot possibly make sense. We may state from the 
outset that Novalis' fragments on mathematics are philosophical 
and not technical. From the point of view of the strict mathe-
matician they are unrigorous and arbitrary, and contribute nothing 
to the technical aspects of the science of mathematics. No sooner 
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has Novalis entered the magnificent edifice of mathematics, than 
he has already transgressed its boundaries into the jungle of 
philosophical ideas, into which no mathematician in his capacity as 
a mathematician will follow him for fear that he may find the ground 
too slippery and prove defenceless among the strange untamed 
animals that inhabit these dark regions. 
In the present study we shall endeavor to follow the flights of 
N ovalis' thought with due regard to the official, generally accepted 
results of the disciplines he enters, but, in evaluating his thought, 
we shall not use these official standards as measuring rods with 
absolute and exclusive validity. If he associates mathematics with 
religion, or with magic, or with any other branch of knowledge, 
which has not yet developed, and perhaps never will develop, into a 
systematic science, we shall try to find out why his thoughts strayed 
off, as it may seem, to such unusual associations of ideas, how such 
"mnemonic irrelevances" crept in, and what he attempted to say. 
It will be seen that he is exceedingly consistent within his own 
embryonic system of thought, although he is not bound by the 
shackles of any formal discipline. We shall experience the flux of 
ideas in an original mind, against the fixity of established facts and 
theories in the background. In his seemingly fantastic ideas on 
mathematics there will be discernible a deep insight into the nature 
of this science. 
2. THE SOURCES 
A considerable amount of Novalis' fragments has been published, 
bit by bit, in small doses whose composition depended on the 
editors' inclinations and their prescriptions for the readers. How-
ever, a large number of them, in fact the largest part, has not been 
published to this day. 
The first edition of the works of Novalis was brought out in two 
volumes by Ludwig Tieck and Friedrich Schlegel in 1802, and 
reprinted in 1805, 1815, 1826 (in an enlarged edition), and in 1837. 
Volume II of this edition contains fragments. These fragments 
constitute only fourteen percent of those contained in the Kluck-
hohn-Samuel edition, the standard and, with minor exception, 
largest edition to date.1 However, since the Kluckhohn-Samuel 
edition presents only a "limited selection" of the fragments on 
natural sciences and mathematics (cf. III, 10), because "die voll-
standige Veroffentlichung dieser Studien und Notizen wiirde aber 
mehrere Bande erfordern," the fragments published by Tieck and 
1 Novalis' Schriften (Leipzig & Berlin, 1929). In the present study, Roman 
and Arabic numerals in parentheses following quotations from Novalis' 
works, refer to volume and page, respectively, of this edition. 
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Schlegel in 1802 cannot amount to more than three to five percent 
of N ovalis entire literary estate. The following passages in the 
Tieck-Schlegel edition (we are using the fifth, i.e., slightly enlarged 
edition of 1837) deal with mathematics: II, 115, lines 6-7, 16-17; 
119, lines 1-2 from below; 145, lines 5-14; from 145, line 20 to 149, 
line 2 (which includes the "hymns to mathematics," as W. Dilthey 
called them); 197, lines 2-4, 17; 199, lines 16-27; 200, lines 12-16; 
202, lines 2-5; 250, line 14. 
The bulk of this very small selection of Novalis' pronouncements 
on mathematics consists of "hymns to mathematics," to use Dilthey's 
expression, such as: "Echte Mathematik ist das eigentliche Element 
des Magiers," "Das hochste Leben ist Mathematik," "Reine Mathe-
matik ist Religion," "Zur Mathematik gelangt man nur durch eine 
Theophanie." These few are the most enigmatical and inexplicable 
pronouncements of Novalis on mathematics and differ radically in 
content from, for example, "Mathematisches Heft" (III, 17-20), or 
"Arithmetica universalis" (III, 23-25), both first published in 1929. 
Yet for over a century of Novalis research the "hymns to mathe-
matics" had been the basis for the evaluation of Novalis' thought 
on the subject, and it is not surprising that such evaluation resulted 
in an incomplete and distorted presentation of N ovalis' views. The 
question naturally arises what impelled Schlegel, who selected, with 
the exception of those that had appeared during the poet's lifetime, 
the fragments from Novalis' unpublished papers for the first edition, 
to make such an arbitrary and non-representative selection of 
mathematical fragments for this edition? Schlegel's procedure is 
partly explained by the attitude of Tieck, his co-editor, the origi-
nator of the Novalis legend.1 Tieck seized upon every incident in 
the life of Novalis that lent itself to mystification and built a legend 
around it. While he extolled Novalis' intellectual powers occasion-
ally, it is clear that he did it merely to enhance him as a mystic. 
The kernel of the legend is, as is well known, the death of N ovalis' 
fifteen-year old bride Sophie von Kuhn on March 19, 1797, and his 
ensuing emotional crisis, during which he wrote that he wanted to 
join her in the Hereafter. Tieck writes about Sophie: "Alle die-
jenigen, welche diese wundersame Geliebte unseres Freundes gekannt 
haben, kommen darin uberein, dass es keine Beschreibung aus-
drucken konne, in welcher Grazie und himmlischen Anmut sich 
dieses tiberirdische Wesen bewegt. .. Novalis ward zum Dichter, 
sooft er nur von ihr sprach" (IV, 451). Further, we read in the 
1 See Edwin H. Zeydel, Ludwig Tieck, the German Romanticist (Princeton, 
1935), p. 127; see also J. F. Haussmann, "German Estimates of Novalis from 
1800 to 1850," Modern Philology, IX, p. 404, and Eduard Havenstein, 
Friedrich van Hardenbergs asthetische Anschauungen, Palaestra, LXXXIV 
(Berlin, 1909), p. vii. 
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preface to the third (1815) edition of N ovalis' works: "So kann uns 
sein Leben selbst mit Recht wunderbar erscheinen, und ein sonder-
barer Schauer, wie bei einem Marchen, erfasst uns, wenn wir horen, 
dass jetzt von seinen vielen Geschwistern nur noch zwei Briider 
leben" (IV, 456). It cannot be denied that Sophie's death was the 
deepest experience, or "Urerlebnis," in Novalis' life, nor can it be 
disproved that Novalis himself, under the immediate impact of her 
death, ascribed supernatural powers to her and fancied to com-
municate with her spirit. However, a line must be drawn between 
a temperate critical assessment of a poet with mystical propensities 
and a mystical presentation of mysticism, i.e., mysticism to the 
second degree, which obscures rather than illuminates the thought 
of a poet. Tieck disregards this line. His impressions about "iiber-
irdisches Wesen," "sonderbarer Schauer," etc., have had such 
mythopoeic effect that a sober approach to Novalis was for a long 
time out of the question. 
In selecting the fragments for publication, Schlegel, no doubt in 
close consultation with Tieck, sought to emphasize those pronounce-
ments which at first glance seem paradoxical and absurd, because 
they have the greatest semblance of originality. It is understandable 
that under such conditions the imperspicuous hymns to mathematics 
were selected, and that the more lucid pronouncements on mathe-
matics did not have much of a chance to be included. We also know 
about Friedrich Schlegel's mastery in concocting fragments. He is 
said to have gone over Novalis' or his own notes on sundry subjects 
and to have selected some striking sentences and deliberately 
obscured them by dissolving them from their contexts (see editor's 
preface, Novalis Schriften, ed. J. Minor, I, xlii). 
In 1846 Tieck and Eduard von Biilow published a third volume 
of Novalis' writings. This volume contains a selection of Novalis' 
diaries, letters, poems, fragments, and a biography by Tieck. It 
brought the amount of Novalis' published fragments to 32% of the 
fragments contained in the Kluckhohn-Samuel edition, which again 
constitutes a much smaller portion of the entire literary estate of 
N ovalis. The following fragments contained in Volume III deal 
with mathematics: pp. 61, line 6; 121, lines 14-20; 184, lines 1-19, 
line 22; 245, lines 5-14; 246, lines 10-26; 284, lines 7-12; 296, lines 
10-15; 313, line 23. Although some of these observations on mathe-
matics are important, one gets the impression that they were 
included by chance rather than by design. Tieck's preface tends to 
mystify rather than clarify the meaning of the fragments. His 
concluding words are the following: "Mit Wehmut und nicht ohne 
eine Art von Andacht iibergebe ich nach fast fiinfzig Jahren diese 
Reliquien eines edlen und grossen Geistes den Freunden der echten 
Mystik" (Novalis Schriften, ed. Tieck & Biilow, Berlin, 1846, p. vi). 
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Such a preface is not conducive to an objective evaluation of Novalis' 
observations on mathematics. Bulow tells us in the preface to this 
volume that he did most of the work in preparing it, but the selection 
indicates that he hardly deviated from the principles laid down by 
Tieck. 
The next important edition of Novalis' works is the one published 
by Ernst Heilborn in 1901.1 He made an attempt to arrange the 
fragments chronologically, in the hope that such an arrangement 
would clarify those of the fragments which seemed contradictory to 
him. To Heilborn Novalis' thought is haphazard: "Novalis dachte 
in Gedankenspriingen: um so interessanter, diese lockeren und oft 
ganz zufalligen Ideenassoziationen zu verfolgen" (Ibid., I. Teil, x). 
His edition contains 62% of the amount of the fragments in the 
Kluckhohn-Samuel edition. While there is some increase in the 
number of fragments relating to mathematics, Heilborn did not 
publish the following manuscripts with mathematical content. The 
listing here includes brief descriptions of the contents of the manu-
scripts, as given by Heilborn in his edition of Novalis' works 
(II. Teil, 2. Halfte, pp. 682ff.): 
"Die in den Text nicht aufgenommenen Manuskripte. 
Mz. 1 Bl. folio, bez. Nr. XLII (1 u. 2) "Meine l?.emerkungen." Uber Zahlen 
und Rechnen."Rechnen und Denken ist eins." Uber mathematisches Genie. 
"Genie ist das synthesierende Prinzip; das moralisierende, transsubstan-
tiierende Prinzip." 
Mk. 4 Bl. quart, bez. Nr. LII (1-4). "Mathematisches Heft." Zahlensystem 
ist Muster eines Sprachzeichensystems. Antithetischer (todter) und syn-
thetischer (lebendiger) Zustand jeder Substanz. Organisches Leben ist 
Produkt beider. Die Naturals Mathematiker. Uber Friktion. 
Ta "Logologische Fragmente." -
Tb folio 15. Auszug aus astronomischen Werken. 
Of. Kategorien .... - Uber die Mathematik ... 
Oh (pag. 56-59 der Handschrift 0). Uber Wesen und Eigenschaft. "Gott 
und Welt, wie Natur und Geist." Uber den Begriff des Zahlens ... 
Pc (pag. 1 und 2 der Handschrift P). Ausziige aus Gehler iiber Unendlich-
keitsrechnung; aus Hemsterhuis ... 
1 Novalis' Schriften. Kritische Neuausgabe auf Grund des handschriftlichen 
Nachlasses von Ernst Heilborn, 3 Teile (Berlin, 1901). This edition was 
severely criticized by J. Minor, Anzeiger fur deutsches Altertum, XXVIII, 
82ff., Oskar Walzel, Euphorion, IX, 456ff., and A. H. von Hugenstein, 
Euphorion, XIII, 79ff., 515ff. Despite its philological shortcomings, and 
partly because of them, this edition is important as it served as a basis for 
much scholarly work. Other less important editions prior to Heilborn's 
were: Werke, e<l. J. Dohmke (Leipzig, 1892), Schrijten, ed. Carl Meissner 
(Leipzig, 1898). 
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Pd (pag. 4-9 der Handschrift P). Mathematisches. Uber unendliche Reihen, 
exponentielle Grossen, Differentialcalciil. Die Theorie des Infinitesimal-
calciils. Unterschied der Methode zwischen gemeiner und hoherer Mathe-
matik. Algebra und Analysis. D_~e verschiedenen Siitze der Mathematik 
(Axiom, Postulat, Theorem usw.) Uber die Theoreme. 
- Uber Mathematik und Philosophie. Worte und Figuren bestimmen sich 
in bestandigem WechseL Figurenworte. - Axiome und Postulate der 
Arithmetik. 
Pe (pag. 12 der Handschrift P). Die Frage nach der Weltsubstanz, eine 
antinomische ... " 
"Salinenschriften. 
10. 2 BL folio. Mathematische Arbeiten (zur geom. Progression). 
11. 2 BL folio. Mathematische Arbeiten (Logarythmen, Wurzeln, arith-
metische Progressionen). 
12. 2 BL folio. Mathematische Arbeiten (Zur elementaren Geometrie. 
"Kastners Analysis.") 
23. 2 BL folio. Notizen iiber vorzunehmende Arbeiten, darunter Mathematik 
doppelt unterstrichen. 
24. 4 BL quart. "Principes pour la r6solution des triangles rectangles." -
" Trigonometrie Spheriq ue." 
31. 1 BL folio. Kosten- und Gewinnberechnung a) der Freibergischen 
Schmelzarbeiten b) der Amalgamirarbeiten an der Halsbrii.cke." 
In 1907 Jakob Minor published an edition of Novalis' works in four 
volumes (N ovalis Schriften, Jena, 1907). In addition to the fragments 
published in the Tieck-Schlegel-Bulow edition, Minor included in 
his edition the fragments published for the first time in the Heil-
born edition. The number of fragments published by Minor consti-
tutes 59% of the amount contained in the Kluckhohn edition. The 
passages referring to mathematics are found on the following pages: 
Vol. II, pp. 18, 88, 107, 172, 178, 183, 208, 251, 253£., 259, 
262-269, 286. 
Vol. III, pp. 9, 19, 36, 38, 42, 82£., 95, 104; the following were 
reprinted from the Heilborn edition: 167, 173, 181, 206, 213, 249£., 
268, 277, 285, 291, 294£., 297, 318, 325, 333££., 339£., 342, 347, 373. 
Vol. IV, pp. 246, 255. 
The standard and essentially most complete edition of Novalis' 
writings was published by Kluckhohn and Samuel in 1929.1 The 
1 See footnote 1. E. Kamnitzer in his edition of the Fragmente (Dresden, 
1929). and E. Wasmuth in his editions of Briefe und Werke (Berlin, 1943), 
and Werke, Briefe, Dokumente (Heidelberg, 1954ff.) have added a few odd 
fragments to the collection contained· in the Kluckhohn-Samuel edition. 
Carl Seelig's edition, Novalis, Gesammelte Werke, 5 vol.s (Herrliberg-Zii.rich, 
1945£.), brings no new material. During the interval between Minor's (1907) 
and the Kluckhohn-Samuel (1929) editions there appeared Werke, ed. 
H. Friedmann (Berlin, 1913) and Samtliche Werke, ed. E. Kamnitzer (Munich, 
1924), neither of which improved on Minor. 
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edition includes previously published material and a number of 
unpublished writings. The following fragments on mathematics 
were published here for the first time (cf. list III, 399-402): 
III, 17, line 17 to III, 20, line 7 Hs. MLII "Mathematisches Heft" 
III, 23, lines 10-23 Aus Hs. MXLVIII "Algemeine Naturlehre oder 
algebraische Physik." 
III, 23, lines 24-26 Aus MXLVI "Physikalische Fragmente." 
III, 23, line 27 to III, 25 Hs. MXLII "Arithmetica Universalis." 
III, 52, lines 1-3 Hs. MXL 
II, 106, lines 8-9 Hs. ohne Signatur. Dberschrift "Hauptregel," 
Blatt 1-4 
II, 122, lines 21-24 Hs. K Blatt 49-52 
II, 127 Hs. "Hauptregel" Blatt 5-14 
II, 141, lines 7, 15-19 Hs. 0 113-116 
II, 160, lines 13 through bottom of page Hs. K44 
II, 188, line 27 Hs. N 1-4 "Grundsatze der Algebra angewandt 
auf Metaphysik." 
II, 214, lines 4-6 Hs. 0 95-102 
II, 249, line 10 Hs. 0 23-32 "Algeber - Schicksal. Rhapsodik." 
II, 252 Hs. 0 23-32, 37-40 "Geometrie" 
II, 253, lines 24-36 Hs. M xxxiv, Blatt 3, 4 
II, 260, line 23 Hs. Beilage zu N 1 
II, 264, lines 8-9 Hs. 0 84-89 
II, 267, lines 2-3 Hs. 0 33-36 , 
II, 269; 280, lines 15-16 Hs. K 15, 16 
II, 284-286 Hs P 1, 2 (Ausziige aus Gehler, Hemsterhuis, Dumas) 
II, 289 Hs. MV (Ausziige aus Hemsterhuis iiber Mathematik und 
Wissenschaft) 
II, 304, line 8 Hs. D 1, 2 
Two publications by Richard Samuel inform us best about the large 
number of hitherto unpublished fragments and other materials of 
the literary estate of Novalis: Novalis (F. v. Hardenberg). Der hand-
schriftliche N achlass des Dichters. Versteigerungskatalog (Berlin, 
1930) and "Zur Geschichte des N achlasses Friedrich von Harden bergs 
(N ovalis)," J ahrbuch der deutschen S chillergesellschaft, ed. F. Martini, 
H. Stubenrauch, and B. Zeller (Stuttgart, 1958), II, 301-347. The 
fate of the largest portion of unpublished materials that concern us 
here is described by Samuel on p. 344 of the latter publication: 
"Am Ende der zwanziger Jahre dieses Jahrhunderts sah sich die 
Familie Hardenberg genotigt, den in Oberwiederstedt verbliebenen 
Nachlass abzustossen. Verhandlungen, den Gesamtbestand durch 
amtliche Stellen, z.B. das damalige Reichsarchiv in Potsdam, zu 
erwerben, scheiterten an der Beschaffung der notwendigen Mittel. 
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So wurde am 20. Dezember 1930 der grosste Teil des Nachlasses, der 
<lurch den Verfasser katalogisiert wurde, versteigert. Der Haupt-
kaufer war der Handschriftensammler und Verleger Herr Salman 
Schocken, der nach 1933 Deutschland verliess. In seinem Besitz 
sind die wichtigsten Tagebiicher und die Hauptmassen der Frag-
menthandschriften." I was unable to obtain photostats of hitherto 
unpublished fragments in this collection. 
3. CRITICAL DISCUSSION 
OF PREVIOUS STUDIES ON THE SUBJECT 
The only previous study exclusively devoted to Novalis' relation to 
mathematics is Kate Hamburger's article "Novalis und die Mathe-
matik, eine Studie zur Erkenntnistheorie der Romantik," Romantik-
F orschungen. Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift fiir Literaturwissenschaft 
und Geistesgeschichte. Buchreihe. 16. Band (Halle, 1929), pp. 115-
184. Other authors merely offer incidental comments on this 
problem within the framework of studies devoted to more general 
subjects. In our discussion, we shall proceed chronologically. 
It will be convenient for the present purpose to divide the century 
and a half of research on N ovalis since his death into three periods: 
(1) The first period, 1802 to 1901, during which the Tieck-
Schlegel-Biilow editions of Novalis' works, or reprints of them, 
were used; 
(2) The second period, 1901 to 1929, during which the Heilborn 
and Minor editions, and reprints from them and from the editions 
of the first period, were used; 
(3) The third period, 1929 to the present, during which the 
Kluckhohn-Samuel edition was and is standard. 
(4) A fourth period will set in with the publication of the numer-
ous unpublished fragments that are presently practically inaccessible 
to scholars. 
During the first period of N ovalis research the few arbitrarily 
chosen observations on mathematics and related fields available to 
scholars were regarded as intentionally mystical and were read for 
their aesthetic value rather than consistent meaningfulness. An 
exception to this general attitude was Adam Muller's conviction in 
his V orlesungen uber die deutsche Wissenschaft und Literatur (1807), 
p. 73, that Novalis was an ideal intermediary between scientific 
endeavors in Germany and the other countries (see J. H. Haussmann, 
Mod. Philol., IX, 6). 
Wilhelm Dilthey,1 who, again, was acquainted only with the few 
1 "Novalis," Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, 10th ed. (Leipzig & Berlin, 
1929). First book edition, 1905. Article first appeared in Preussische Jahr-
bucher, 1865. 
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fragments on mathematics selected by non-mathematicians for their 
literary value alone, does not attach any significance to Novalis' 
thought on natural philosophy and science. "Die Hymnen auf die 
Mathematik sind schliesslich unfruchtbar. Ja Novalis spielt mit 
dem mystischen Begriff einer echten Mathematik, die im Morgen-
lande zu Hause sei, in Europa aber zur blossen Technik ausgeartet 
sei" (p. 304). He thus selects one of the most difficult passages and 
bases such a strong generalization on it. In his notes to the 1905 
and subsequent book editions of his essay on Novalis, Dilthey 
admits that in 1865, when he wrote the essay, the only sources at 
his disposal had been the Tieck-Schlegel-Bulow editions of Novalis' 
works, i.e., that he was acquainted with fewer than 10% of Novalis' 
fragments on mathematics, which, moreover, were the most 
difficult ones. However, despite his acquaintance with the contents 
of the Heilborn edition, he maintains his earlier stand in the 
evaluation of the fragments. He draws support for his claim from 
Olshausen's study on Novalis' relation to the natural sciences in 
which the author, not unlike Dilthey, perceives in N ovalis' fragments 
on science "the sporadic volatility of a morbid mind" and becomes 
convinced that Novalis was not destined to be a philosopher or 
scientist. (Friedrich von Hardenbergs Beziehungen zur Naturwissen-
schaft seiner Zeit, Diss. Leipzig, 1905, p. 70). 
Rudolf Haym's remarks on Novalis' fragments on mathematics 
are biased and exaggerated (Die romantische Schute. 4th ed., Berlin, 
1920, first publ. 1870). He does not think much of Novalis' origin-
ality as a philosopher and therefore judges Novalis' thought by the 
measure of its coincidence or deviation from Kant's and Fichte's 
systems. Noting that, on one occasion, Novalis had expressly 
voiced his adherence to Kant's "Kritizismus," Haym then finds in 
Novalis' fragments "ein ziemlich laxer Kritizismus, und in der Tat: 
auch da, wo er auf die einfachsten und bewiesensten Grundlagen des 
Kritizismus zurtickgeht) tiberspannt er dieselben sofort zum 0-ber-
springen durch die Intensitat seines Enthusiasmus" (p. 418). One 
such allegedly infallible basic assumption of Kant's philosophy is 
that the laws of mathematics are the laws of our minds, and that as 
such they have absolute validity and applicability in the realm of 
"aussere Erscheinungen," because these, in turn, are known to us 
only as they impinge on our minds. This view has been discarded by 
mathematicians long ago (see, for example, M. Kline, Mathematics 
in Western Culture, New York, 1953, p. 251), but to Haym it was 
one of the "bewiesenste Grundlagen," an infallible truth by which 
he measured Novalis' thought. Haym further simply accords 
validity to those of N ovalis' fragments which agree with Kant 
(p. 418), and dismisses those in opposition to Kant as nonsense: 
"Novalis wird tiber jener Kantschen Lehre zum Zungenredner" 
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(p. 418). He continues: "Dber der Wahrnehmung jedoch, dass die 
Mathematik in der Musik 'als Offenbarung, als schaffender Idealis-
mus' erscheine, kommt ihm alsbald alle Besonnenheit abhanden. 
Echte Mathematik wird nun fur 'das eigentliche Element des 
Magiers' erklart, die Mathematiker heissen ihm die einzig Gltick-
lichen, das Leben der Gotter soll Mathematik, reine Mathematik soll 
Religion sein, und was der wunderlichen Behauptungen mehr sind" 
(p. 419). It is evident that Haym was the victim of the Tieck-
Schlegel-Biilow non-representative selections of Novalis' fragments, 
and that he knew little about the problems of the relation of mathe-
matics to other fields of Novalis' time. 
Ricarda Huch, in her treatment of Novalis' relation to mathe-
matics in her work Die Romantik (Vol. I, Blutezeit der Romantik, 
Vol. II, Ausbreitung und Ver/all der Romantik, 14th ed., Leipzig, 
1924, first publ. in 1899), concentrates, like Dilthey and Haym, on 
Novalis' hymns to mathematics. "Nicht nur, <lass er mit Eifer 
Mathematik studierte, er poetisierte sie wie alles, womit er sich 
beschaftigte, durchdrang sie mit seiner lebendig warmen Seele; man 
Iese nur seine Hymnen an die Mathematik" (II, 68-69). Like Dilthey 
and Haym, she selects the most inscrutable observations of Novalis 
on mathematics, mainly because they were the only fragments 
accessible. Hence she fails to recognize Novalis' consistent effort to 
explore mathematics as a foundation for an all-inclusive system of 
thought. However, she makes a valuable contribution to our 
problem with her discussion of Wilhelm Butte's Grundlinien einer 
Arithmetik des menschlichen Lebens (Landshut, 1811) and Giovanni 
Malfatti's Studien iiber Anarchie und Hierarchie des Wissens (Leipzig, 
1845), in which the authors deal with the Romantic conception of 
number. Butte held that mathematical numbers were dead shadows 
of the eternal, living numbers which originally had physical and 
philosophical connotations. Fragments of the ancient conception 
of numbers, Butte reminds us, came down to us through Pythagoras. 
Butte believed that the time of the revival of the original meaning 
of numbers was at hand, and that Novalis pointed in this direction. 
Then Huch discusses the mystical connotations of various numbers, 
in connection with Novalis' interpretations of 0, 1, and infinity. 
Ernst Heilborn spent two years exploring the literary estate of 
Novalis at Oberwiederstedt. Yet in the chapter "Die Welt der 
Fragmente" of his book Novalis der Romantiker (Berlin, 1901), pp. 
149-171, he fails to mention mathematics. Surely he must have had 
the numerous fragments on mathematics in his hands. However, 
he found it more convenient not to deal with them. 
Egon Friedell's study Novalis als Philosoph (Munich, 1904) marks 
the beginning of the second period of N ovalis research. It is charac-
terized by a greater appreciation of, and a steadily increasing insight 
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into, the fragments, coupled with the realization of the importance 
of mathematics to N ovalis. Although he still describes the fragments 
in the hasty manner of his predecessors as "bunt aneinandergereihte 
Gedanken," he assures us, somewhat exaggeratedly, that truth is re-
vealed to us through the intellect rather than through brooding fancy 
or wayward imagination (pp. 24, 44). Friedell is aware that Novalis 
regarded mathematics as the ideal of all knowledge. However, he 
concludes his comments on Novalis' relation to mathematics with 
the general statement that Novalis etherealizes and romanticizes 
the essence of mathematics. 
A year before Friedell's book appeared, E. Spenle had presented 
a doctoral dissertation on Novalis at the Sorbonne: Novalis, essai 
sur l'idealisme romantique en Allemagne (Paris, 1903). He writes 
about N ovalis' relation to mathematics: "L'univers se presente a 
lui comme une vaste equation algebrique. Il s'agit, par une reduc-
tion graduelle, de determiner les termes inconnus en fonction des 
termes connus. Mais comment formuler des a present ces termes 
inconnus? Le philosophe inventera un systeme de notations tout-
a-fait arbitraire, tire uniquement des profondeurs de son esprit, 
qu'il substituera audacieusement a la realite empirique, de meme 
que l'algebriste designe des grandeurs inconnues par des lettres 
arbitrairement choisies" (p. 139f.). "Ce qu'il s'agit de decouvrir 
c'est done une mathematique dynamique universelle ou les Nombres 
seraient eux-memes des pensees actives. Cette mathematique 
nouvelle Novalis crut la trouver dans Fichte" (p. 142). In his few 
comments on Novalis and mathematics, Spenle oversimplifies our 
problem, but nonetheless appreciates these fragments in the proper 
context and perspective. 
Heinrich Simon is the first to explore the symbolic significance 
of mathematics to N ovalis and its relation to magic idealism in his 
study Der magische Idealismus (Heidelberg, 1906), p. 24. Eduard 
Havenstein in his presentation of "Friedrich von Hardenbergs 
asthetische Anschauungen," Palaestra (Berlin, 1909), LXXXIV, 
pp. 1-30, takes great pains to show that the Romanticists, including 
Novalis, suffered from a weakness of will and intellect (p. 24), that 
N ovalis had read Kant very superficially and had not read much 
generally (p. 29), and that he never was seriously concerned with 
philosophy (p. 30). But then he admits: " ... muss jedoch gleich 
gestehen, dass ich alles das, was ausschliesslich fachmannisch iiber 
Mathematik, Physik, Chemie etc. handelt, von meinen Unter-
suchungen ausgeschlossen und (nach der bisherigen Ordnung) in 
einer mit M bezeichneten Mappe vereinigt habe; denn erstens bin 
ich diesen naturwissenschaftlichen Problemen nicht gewachsen, und 
zweitens glaube ich nicht, dass sie zur Erkenntnis des tiefsten und 
innerlichsten Novalis etwas Wesentliches beitragen" (p. 3). Haven-
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stein's attitude is characteristic. First he admits that he is unable 
to deal with, and hence also unable to judge, Novalis' writings on 
natural science and mathematics, and then he volunteers the remark 
that it would be of little use anyhow to our knowledge of "des 
tiefsten und innerlichsten Novalis." Thus, in Havenstein's own 
narrow mental domain there is no room for the comprehension of 
the grandeur and universality of Novalis' thought. 
Karl Theodor Bluth's Jena dissertation Philosophische Probleme 
in den Aphorismen Hardenbergs (Jena, 1914) devotes much of its 
third chapter to Novalis' fragments on mathematics (pp. 26-40). 
Bluth is fully aware of the importance of these fragments within 
Novalis' thought, "offenbart sich doch in solcher Auffassung der 
Mathematik die ganze Tiefe von Hardenbergs philosophischem 
Denken. Fast erleben wir den Eindruck, als ob in diesen Problemen 
sein Geist das Hochste und gleichsam Unerhorteste erreichen durfte. 
Mehr geahnt, mehr angedeutet als scharf und offen gesichtet" 
(p. 27). His discussion revolves about three aspects of Novalis' 
mathematical thought: mathematics as rhythm, as a free creation, 
and as a synthetizing transcendental construction. He considers 
Novalis' associations of the first aspect with music, of the second 
with poetry, and of the third with the magical "Weltanschauung." 
Bluth also recognizes Novalis' conception of the second aspect, i.e., 
of mathematics and poetry as free creations, as the basis for the 
latter's magical world view. "Die Behauptung, dass die trans-
zendentale Einbildungskraft mit der produktiven Einbildungskraft 
des Dichters identisch ware, weil sie eben beide in der Mathematik 
ihr Wesen hatten, bildet die Grundlage von Hardenbergs Welt-
anschauung" (p. 35). Bluth's claim that Novalis abandoned mathe-
matics during the decisive years of his life is untenable. His evidence 
is discussed elsewhere in this book. 
Ludwig Kleeberg ("Studien zu Novalis," Euphorion, XXIII, 
1921, pp. 635££.) discovers a close relation of Novalis' fragments on 
the magic of numbers to similar observations in Volume 4 of Karl 
von Eckartshausen's Aufschlusse zur Magie aus gepruften Erfahrun-
gen uber verborgene philosophische Wissenschaften und entdeckte Ge-
heimnisse der Natur (Munich, 1788-1791), 4 vols. Like Novalis, 
Eckartshausen held that mathematics was the most sublime 
science; that it should be the basis of all other sciences; that magic 
and mathematics are interrelated. Kleeberg points out that a 
concordance of similar mathematical passages in the works of the 
two authors could be set up. 
F. Imle in her study N ovalis: seine philosophische W eltanschauung 
(Paderborn, 1928), pp. 41-42, is anxious not to underestimate the 
significance of Novalis' fragments on mathematics. She states that 
Novalis failed in his attempt to increase the number of categories, or 
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to reduce them to a single "Urkategorie," or to a single psychic 
function. However, in the process of searching for such a reduction 
of the categories, Novalis gained important insights into mathe-
matics: "Hierher gehi:irt, was Novalis iiber die methodische Be-
deutung der Mathematik und ferner iiber die erkenntnisbildende 
Tatigkeit der Phantasie sagt. Beides ist auf den ersten Blick so 
iibertrieben, dass der wissenschaftliche Kritiker nur zur Ablehnung 
gestimmt wird, hat aber bei griindlicherer Betrachtung ... immerhin 
den Wert einer beachtenswerten Abschleifung der Kanten des 
Kantischen Nur-Rationalismus" (p. 41). Imle recognizes that to 
N ovalis mathematics was a universal tool of all arts and sciences, 
"Welterkenntnisschliissel." She points out that to Novalis mathe-
matics is the "Ur- und Hi:ichstform alles Denkens." However, like 
most previous critics of Novalis' relation to mathematics, lmle 
merely rephrases some of the poet's most striking observations on 
mathematics and attaches value judgments to them, yet within her 
treatment of Novalis' philosophy her comments on mathematics 
are incidental. 
When through the publication of the Kluckhohn-Samuel edition 
of N ovalis' works in 1929 much additional material became available, 
scholars suddenly realized how N ovalis had been misjudged in 
previous evaluations of his fragments. Hence they set out to 
explore them anew. This third stage of Novalis research is marked 
by the first systematic investigation of the fragments, and also the 
first realization of the significance of mathematics in Novalis' 
thought. . 
Kate Hamburger undertakes the first and to date only study of 
the relation of Novalis to mathematics (see above). She proposes 
to show that while Novalis was not a creative mathematician, he 
nevertheless grasped the theoretical foundations of mathematics, 
mostly intuitively, "aber mit einem geradezu erstaunlichen logischen 
Instinkt" (p. 118). She further states: "Wir finden bei N ovalis eine 
geradezu philosophische Bemiihung um die Grundlagen der von 
Leibniz und Newton begriindeten neueren Mathematik" (p. 118). 
Hamburger then sets out to show the symbolical meaning of 
mathematics in Novalis' Romantic philosophy of life. The hymns 
to mathematics are explained in conjunction with Novalis' magic 
idealism, Kant's concept of synthesis and synthetic judgments, and 
Ernst Cassirer's ideas on the affinities between magic and scientific 
thought, as set forth in Philosophie der symbolischen Formen; II. 
Teil, Das mythische Denken (Berlin, 1926), pp. 31ff. She interprets 
the transition from Kant's critical idealism to Novalis' magic 
idealism in such a manner "dass der auf die Spitze getriebene 
kritische ldealismus sozusagen umschlagt in ein vorwissenschaft-
liches, magisches Verhalten der Seele" (p. 119). 
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Hamburger points out the agreement between N ovalis' conception 
of the independence of mathematics from extra-mather11atical 
reality and similar views among pure mathematicians. According 
to Hamburger,. the central concern in Novalis' meditations on 
mathematics is his preoccupation with the logical and epistemo-
logical foundations of infinitesimal calculus. Here she points out 
parallels in the thought of Novalis and that of such modern philoso-
phers as Cohen, Natorp, Husserl, and B. Russell (p. 129). In con-
nection with calculus, and in the light of its interpretations by the 
above-mentioned authors, especially Cassirer (in particular, Sub-
stanz- und Funktionsbegriff, 2nd ed., Berlin, 1923) and Natorp 
(Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten W issenschaften, Leipzig, 1910), 
Hamburger deals with Novalis' conception of funotion, continuity, 
and infinity, but her discussion is somewhat removed from the more 
strictly mathematical framework for these concepts. Function, 
with its implications of flux, change, and growth, is a concept that 
must of necessity appeal to Novalis, the Romanticist. "Er ringt 
geradezu um den Begriff der Funktion, er spurt, dass das eigentliche 
'Sein' nicht durch den Substanzbegriff einer dogmatischen Ontolo-
gie, sondern vielmehr durch den Relationscharakter der Funktion 
charakterisiert werden muss" (p. 135). The mathematical concept 
of infinity was particularly attractive to Novalis. Hamburger 
explains that whereas Friedrich Schlegel, Holderlin, Tieck, and 
Schleiermacher mused over infinity in nature and in the universe 
as a postulate of metaphysics, Novalis sought to comprehend the 
methodical significance of infinity (p. 139). Hamburger then 
proceeds to explore Novalis' views on the crucial mathematical 
concept of continuity: "Der Gedanke der Kontinuitat als Ur-
sprungseinheit, d.h. als zugrundeliegende Allheit war also fur 
Novalis - mit genauer mathematischer Richtigkeit - der letzte 
Grund, <lurch den die Infinitesimalrechnung sich legitimiert" (p. 
165). The concept of continuity is significant in the philosophy of 
Leibniz, not only in his calculus, but also in his other writings. It 
was also of importance to Goethe, who regarded continuity as one 
of the characteristics of mathematics, especially mathematical 
method, which could be profitably employed also by the non-
mathematician. Hamburger summarizes: "Wir haben aufgezeigt, 
wie durch das Riistzeug der mathematischen Wissenschaft der 
Kontinuitatsgedanke bei Novalis aus der mystischen Intuition sich 
erhob in die Sphare begrifflicher Klarheit" (p. 165). 
In Novalis' reflections on time and space Hamburger detects an 
adumbration of the subsequent development of non-Euclidean 
geometry and even of Einstein's theory of relativity. She quotes 
Novalis' fragments "Raum und Zeit entstehen zugleich und sind 
wohl eins, wie Subjekt und Objekt. Raum ist beharrliche Zeit, 
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Zeit ist fliessender Raum ... " (III, 156) and "Jeder Karper hat seine 
Zeit - jede Zeit hat ihren Korper" (III, 254) and points to the 
abandonment of the concept of absolute time and space in the four-
dimensional continuum of the theory of relativity. Lest someone 
draw hasty conclusions about Novalis' prophetic instinct, she 
cautions: "Wir diirfen aus den abgebrochenen Ausspriichen des 
Novalis keine zu grosse Meinung uber eine vorahnende Erkenntnis 
der modernen Relativitatstheorie bei ihm gewinnen; sie sollen nur 
erweisen, dass gerade der Romantik, als deren konzentriertester 
Ausdruck die Personlichkeit des Novalis gelten kann, die kuhnsten 
Kombinationen des Gedankens, ohne die der Fortgang nicht 
moglich ware, besonders nahe lagen und dass sie vorzuglich den 
Novalis auf Ziele wiesen, die in der Tat das folgende Jahrhundert 
realisiert hat" (p. 184). 
To Hamburger goes the credit of having made the first investi-
gation devoted exclusively to Novalis' relation to mathematics. She 
deals at some length with his conception of function, continuity, 
infinity, time and space. However, in dealing with these concepts, 
she is unduly influenced by the philosophical distinctions of the 
Neo-Kantian school and hesitates to explore them from the more 
strictly mathematical point of view. She does not adequately 
represent the context of Novalis' fragments in the historical setting 
of N ovalis' time. She does not, or does only insufficiently, deal with 
Novalis' pronouncements on definition, axiom, theorem, proof, and 
many other mathematical concepts which N ovalis discusses, and 
which need elucidation. Nor does she deal with the relation of 
mathematics to religion, language, literature, and music. 
Walter Silz in his study Early German Romanticism (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1929) is one of the first critics to note the fact that the early 
German Romanticists were "men of intellect, of supreme intelligence 
and extraordinary analytical power" (p. 11). He fails "to gain from 
the perusal of Novalis' writings the impression of formlessness, 
haziness, and confusion, which is alleged to be so typical of Romantic 
literature. In his fragments and letters one finds lucidity and reason, 
and not only the flash, but the steady glow of intellect" (p. 133). 
He states that Novalis was well versed in mathematics (p. 134). 
However, he does not deal with this subject, because it is outside 
the scope of the task that he has set himself, viz., H. Kleist's 
position in early German Romanticism. 
In his book Unendliche Sphare und Allmittelpunkt. Beitrage zur 
Genealogie der mathematischen Mystik (Halle, 1937), Dietrich 
Mahnke states that Novalis subdivided his "mystische Mathematik" 
into two main branches: "Magie der Zahlen" and "mystische 
Geometrie" (see Novalis' fragments, II, 333; III, 18, 337, 248). In 
the latter branch, Mahnke investigates N ovalis' conception of an 
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important dyad in the history of ideas, infinite sphere and center 
of the universe, tracing this dyad through the Middle Ages to 
Plotinus, Plato, and the Pythagoreans. 
Lydia Elisabeth Wagner attempts "a full presentation of Novalis' 
relation to all the science of his time throughout his brief life, 
excepting mathematics, which has been fully covered by Kate 
Hamburger" in her dissertation The Scientific Interest of Friedrich 
von Hardenberg (Novalis) (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1937). This latter 
statement is false. Hamburger, as we stated above, selects only a 
few aspects of Novalis' relation to mathematics and hardly deals, 
for example, with the relation of N ovalis' fragments on mathematics 
to his time. Such comments by Wagner that Novalis carried his 
train of thought in certain mathematical fragments "too far" 
(p. 158), are of little value in the elucidation of N ovalis' views on 
mathematics. The formulation of her dissertation is much too 
broad. Numerous special fields of science in the conception of 
Novalis need to be explored in detailed ground work, before "a full 
presentation of Novalis' relation to all the science of his time" can 
be undertaken. 
In her book Die Fragmente des Novalis (Basel, 1939), Anni 
Carlsson fails to recognize the fundamental importance of mathe-
matics in Novalis' thought, although she remarks that Novalis' 
fragments on mathematics have frequently been considered from 
too narrow a point of view (p. 184). She deals with mathematics 
only in a one-page subsection "Magie und Mathematik" (p. 26) and 
the three-page section "Die Produkte des freien Denkens und der 
freien Einbildungskraft: Mathematik und Dichtung" (pp. 183-185). 
She essentially ignores those of Novalis' fragments on mathematics 
and philosophy that were first published by Kluckhohn and Samuel 
in 1929. 
In 1941 Alexander Gode- von Aesch published his Columbia 
University dissertation Natural Science in German Romanticism 
(New York, 1941). In relating the concept of infinity to the histori-
cal mathematical contexts, he presents some facts from the history 
of mathematics, but does not enter into mathematical detail. 
Instead of evading the issue, as L. E. Wagner did, he frankly admits: 
"The interpretation of this aspect of our problem must be left to a 
competent mathematician" (p. 136). Otherwise his treatment of 
Novalis and mathematics is limited to the remark that Novalis 
imparts metaphysical validity to his metaphor "through his peculiar 
philosophy of mathematics" (p. 180). 
Louis Locher-Ernst quotes some of Novalis' hymns to mathe-
matics in his discussion of the relation of mathematics to religion 
and music in the collection of papers entitled Mathematik als Vor-
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schule zur Geist-Erkenntnis (Zurich & Kreuzlingen, 1944), pp. 11, 
12, 15, 16, 24. 
Maurice Besset throws some light on the interrelations of mathe-
matics and mysticism in his study N ovalis et la pensee mystique 
(Paris, 1947). He is unwilling to accord to Novalis' "speculation 
(on est tente de dire: ses jongleries)" (p. 104) any validity except in 
contexts of mystical thought. 
Edgar Hederer in his book on Novalis (Wien, 1949), esp. pp. 
213-217, that emphasizes such facets as "Schicksal und Gemiit," 
"Magie," "Der Weg ins Innere," and "Christus und Sophie," 
concludes categorically and significantly: "Harden bergs Fragmente 
iiber die Mathematik enthiillen die letzte Absicht seines Denkens 
und seiner Wissenschaft'' (p. 214). But he treats only those passages 
on mathematics that fall within the domain of N ovalis' meditations 
on magic idealism. 
As research progresses, more and more significance is being 
attached to Novalis' fragments on mathematics. Friedrich Riebel 
in his study N oval is: der Dichter der blauen Blume (Bern, 1951), is 
more concerned with N ovalis' poems and novels than with his other 
fragments. Yet he is aware of our problem: "Bei Goethe waren 
Philosophie, Mathematik und Musik Welten, welche ihn nur von 
aussen und an der Peripherie seines Weltbildes zu bewegen ver-
mochten, fiir N ovalis aber waren sie Ausgangspunkte und Leitsterne 
seiner inneren Orientierung" (p. 73). However, the second part of 
his following claim is perhaps somewhat exaggerated: "Seine mathe-
matischen Fragmente zeigen eine solche Originalitat, <lass sogar die 
heutige Novalisforschung ihn auch darin Pionierforschung leisten 
sieht" (p. 150). Like Gode- von Aesch, he admits in his following 
remark in a footnote that he cannot deal with mathematics in the 
framework of his study: "Die wesentlichen Fragmente des Novalis 
iiber Mathematik finden hier keinen besonderen Raum der Er-
wahnung und Darstellung" (p. 319). 
Mention should be made of Ewald Wasmuth's article "Novalis' 
Beitrag zu einer 'Physik in einem hoheren Sinne,' "N eue Schweizer 
Rundschau, Neue Folge, XVIII (1950-51), pp. 533-546. Wasmuth 
discusses the application of the concept of "Potenz" to a "higher 
physics." 
Theodor Haering's monograph Novalis als Philosoph (Stuttgart, 
1954) is the first comprehensive presentation of Novalis' philosophy. 
He deals with mathematics mainly in the twelve-page Exkurs 
"Novalis und die Mathematik" (pp. 541-552). He states somewhat 
apologetically that he will attempt to deal with this problem, but 
hastens to add that he does so with no claim to finality or con-
clusiveness. He rejects Kate Hamburger's identification of Novalis' 
conception of mathematics and physics with that of modern mathe-
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matics and physics. He draws a line between Novalis' higher 
"dialectic" mathematics and the conventional "rational" mathe-
matics, a separation which, in this extreme form, is not justifiable. 
Haering makes Novalis appear too much as a critic of conventional 
mathematics. The difficult hymns to mathematics are not ex-
plained, but referred to N ovalis' "higher, dialectic" mathematics 
(see the author's review article on Haering's book in Comparative 
Literature, VIII (1956), 264-268). 
Thus N ovalis' fragments on mathematics have been described by 
the various scholars at the various stages of research as utterances 
of a juggler of mystical concepts (Dilthey, Besset), as sporadic 
articulations of a morbid mind (Olshausen), as curious assertions of 
a person not in control of his reasoning powers (Haym), as peculiar 
(Gode- von Aesch), as going too far (L. E. Wagner), but also as 
pioneer work in modern mathematics (Hamburger, Riebel), as 
revelatory of the ultimate goal of Novalis' thought (Hederer, 
Riebel). Some authors prefer to ignore the problem (Heilborn, 
Havenstein), some state that for various reasons they are unable or 
unwilling to deal with it (Gode- von Aesch, Riebel, Wagner), or are 
not yet ready to deal with it (Haering). This state of research with 
its conflicting opinions calls for an investigation of Novalis' relation 
to mathematics. It was demanded by Kluckhohn twenty-seven 
years ago (III, 10), and also by Samuel (Der handschr. Nachlass ... , 
pp. 3, 44). 
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CHAPTER II 
THE IMPACT OF MATHEMATICS ON NOVALIS 
1. SOME ASPECTS OF THE HISTORY 
OF MATHEMATICS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
Unfortunately, the mechanical way in 
which calculus is sometimes taught fails 
to present the subject as the outcome 
of a dramatic intellectual struggle 
which has lasted for twenty-five 
hundred years or more, which is deeply 
rooted in many phases of human 
endeavor, and which will continue as 
long as man strives,, to understand 
himself as well as nature (foreword, 
Carl Boyer, The Concepts of Calculus, 
New York, 1949). 
R. COURANT, 1949 
We noted in the preceding chapter that Novalis' observations on 
mathematics are philosophical, and, from the strictly mathematical 
point of view, unrigorous. We should also note, however, that a 
distinction must be made between the strictly mathematical point 
of view of the twentieth-century mathematician and the looser and 
more experimental attitude toward mathematics of his eighteenth-
century predecessor. A mathematician may grant the appropri-
ateness of this distinction and yet be inclined to ask why Novalis 
studied the works of such relatively unknown mathematicians as 
Burja, Busch, Rehbein, Topfer, Hindenburg, and Kastner, as a list 
of books in his possession indicates (see Section 4). Why did he not 
concentrate on such mathematical giants as Euler, Lagrange, 
Laplace, Jacob and Johann Bernoulli? The answer lies partly in the 
fact that many papers of the latter mathematicians were buried in 
such ponderous publications as the Acta Eruditorum, a journal 
published 1682-1782 in Leipzig, and the memoirs of the Academies 
of Science in Berlin and St. Petersburg. There is evidence that 
Novalis was acquainted with some of Euler's work (see Section 4), 
although in N ovalis' published fragments there is only one specific 
reference to him in a general context (III, 67). Most great mathe-
maticians in the eighteenth century were engaged in research at the 
Academies of Science and not teaching in universities. Two ex-
ceptions were the University at Gottingen and the Ecole Poly-
technique. At these institutions the study of mathematics became 
prominent toward the end of the eighteenth century. However, 
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Novalis studied at the Universities at Jena, Leipzig, Wittenberg, 
and at the Mining Academy at Freiberg. In contradistinction to the 
greater mathematicians, such lesser mathematicians as Burja, 
Biisch, and Rehbein published watered-down and popularized 
versions of the results obtained by the former group of mathe-
maticians. A similar procedure is followed today. In France, more 
texts were published by the greater mathematicians. We find in 
N ovalis' possession copies of Lagrange's Theorie des fonctions 
analytique(l 797) and Laplace's popular, non-mathematicalExposition 
du systeme du monde (1796), both in German translation: Theorie 
der analytischen Funktionen, in welcherdieGrundsatzeder Differential-
rechnung vorgetragen werden. Aus dem Franzosischen von Gruson 
(Berlin, 1798), 2 Bande; and Darstellung des Weltsystems. Aus dem 
Franzosischen von J. K. F. Hauff (Frankfurt, 1797-98), 2 Bande. 
The inaccessibility of the results of current research in mathematics 
at the time of Novalis is also accentuated by the fact that the first 
German mathematical journal in continuous existence, the Journal 
fur reine und angewandte Mathematik (Berlin & Leipzig), was founded 
by A. L. Crelle in 1826, i.e., twenty-five years after Novalis' death 
(see Wilhelm Lorey, "August Crelle zum Gedachtnis," Journal fur 
die reine und angewandte Mathematik, Vol. 157 (1926), p. 3). The 
only regularly published mathematical journal that Novalis could 
have consulted is the Journal de l'Ecole polytechnique, founded in 
1794. Novalis' mathematics teacher in Leipzig, K. F. Hindenburg, 
founded with Johann Bernoulli in 1786 the Leipzig er M agazin fur 
reine und angewandte Mathematik, but the undertaking failed after 
three years of publication. Only a popular mathematical journal 
like The Ladies Diary or the Woman's Almanac, containing many 
delightful and entertaining particulars, peculiarly adapted for the use 
and diversion of the fair sex, published since 1704, managed to 
survive for over a century. 
With regard to the lack of rigor and the mingling of philosophy 
with mathematics in the thought of Novalis, it should be pointed 
out that in the eighteenth century "there was general doubt as to 
the nature of the foundations of the methods of fluxions and the 
differential calculus" (Boyer, p. 224). "The whole question of the 
foundation of calculus remained a subject ·of debate and so did all 
questions relating to infinite processes. The 'mystical' period in the 
foundation of mathematics itself provoked a mysticism which 
occasionally went far beyond that of the founding fathers" (Dirk 
J. Struik, A Concise History of Mathematics, New York, 1948, II, 
176). Novalis also grappled with the concept of infinity (see 
Chapters III & IV) and spoke of mystical (II, 333) and magical 
(III, 295) mathematics. 
The philosophical setting of the mathematical achievements in 
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the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries may be best illustrated by 
the figure of Leibniz, one of the founders of calculus. He searched 
for a "scientia generalis" and made discoveries in mathematics. He 
searched for a "characteristica generalis" and was led to permu-
tations, combinations, and to plans for a theory of mathematical 
logic. "His invention of the calculus must be understood against his 
philosophical background; it was the result of his search for a 
"lingua generalis" of change and of motion in particular" (Struik, 
II, 156). He was stimulated by the study of Descartes and Pascal. 
Descartes' results in the analytic geometry were only an illustration 
of his new method, of his search for a "mathesis universalis" that 
would encompass all knowledge. Novalis' "Arithmetica universalis" 
(III, 23-25) is intended as a direct continuation of Descartes' 
"mathesis universalis" and Leibniz' "scientia generalis." Novalis 
pursued the original goals of these philosopher-mathematicians. 
Guided by their grand aims, he set out to mathematize all branches 
of knowledge. His efforts were directed toward a rough outline of a 
universal encyclopedia in which all knowledge was to be integrated 
into a unified mathematical pattern. He had no intention to 
confine himself to the more limited sphere of mathematics proper, 
and therefore it is unfair to evaluate his thought on mathematics in 
strict mathematical terms. N ovalis' pronouncements on calculus 
are vague from the modern point of view, but so were many of 
Leibniz' and Newton's (Struik, II, 158). A new basis of differential 
calculus was offered by Euler in his Institutiones calculi differentialis 
(1755), the most widely used text in calculus before the publication 
of Lagrange's Theorie des fonctions analytiques (1797). However, 
Struik reminds us: "It is instructive to point out not only some of 
Euler's contributions to science but also some of his weaknesses. 
Infinite processes were still carelessly handled in the eighteenth 
century and much of the work of the leading mathematicians of that 
period impresses us as wildly enthusiastic experimentation. There 
was experimentation with infinite series, with the use of symbols 
such as 0, oo, y-1, ... " (II, 175). In a similar fashion, Novalis 
experimented with the symbols of 0 and oo (see, for example, III, 
36, 102, 247). Struik further points out that we cannot follow 
Euler when he writes 
and 
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1 - 3 + 5 - 7 + ... = 0, or when he concludes from 
n + n2 + ... 
1 1 





that 1 1 1 2 -0 ... + 2 + -+ + n + n + ... - . n n 
Moreover, Struik calls attention to the defects of Euler's way of 
basing the calculus on the introduction of zeros of different orders. 
"An infinitesimally small quantity, wrote Euler in his Institutiones 
calculi differentialis, in 1755, is truly zero" (Struik, II, 176). 
Novalis associates mathematics in various manners with religion. 
This seems strange and irrelevant today, but was common in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Most of the great mathe-
maticians of that time were religious, for example, Newton, the 
Bernoullis, and Euler. They did not hesitate to relate mathematical 
concepts to religious problems. To cite an extreme yet characteristic 
example, Jacob Bernoulli noticed that a certain spiral always 
regained its original shape by various geometric transformations. 
Thus the spiral became to him a symbol of resurrection and he had 
it put on his tombstone (see Otto Spiess, Leonhard Euler, ein 
Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte des achtzehnten J ahrhunderts, Frauenfeld 
& Leipzig, 1929, p. 20). Leibniz remarked that all numbers could 
be represented by the two digits O and 1 in the binary system of 
notation and thought of the creation of the world by God (1) from 
Nothing (0) (Ibid.) A similar "mathematical" description or "ex-
planation" of God's creation was offered by Guido Grandi, a monk 
and professor at Pisa, known for his study of rosaces (r = sinn0) 
and other curves resembling flowers. He considered the formula 
½ =1-1+1-1+1- ... 
. = (1 - 1) + (1 - 1) + (1 - 1) + ... 
0 + 0 + 0 + ... 
as the symbol of creation from Nothing. He obtained the result½ by 
considering two sons who inherit a gem from their father. Each 
may keep it for one year in alternation, hence each possesses half of 
it, or each possesses it half the time (Struik, II, 177). Novalis, 
likewise, speaks of "Schopfung ex nihilo et ex aliquo" (III, 226). 
Newton devoted himself to theology and considered such pursuit 
to be more important than his scientific achievements. Toward the 
end of his life he attempted to prove that the prophecies of Daniel 
and the poetry of the Apocalypse made sense. He also tried to 
harmonize the dates of the Old Testament with those of history (see 
Morris Kline, Mathematics in Western Culture, New York, 1953, 
p. 260). He argued for the existence of God along the lines that the 
well-ordered universe implies a creator (Kline, p. 260). 
J. F. Montucla in his Histoire des mathematiques, 2nd ed. (Paris, 
1799), I, 35-36, discusses the application and misapplication of 
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mathematics to theology in his age. After ridiculing a certain 
Caramuel de Lobkowitz who wrote a Mathesis audax in which he 
attempted to elucidate through mathematics the most abstruse 
problems of metaphysics and religion, Montucla states in a footnote, 
in an obvious attempt to avoid incurring the displeasure of the 
theologians: "Nous remarquons, cependant, que quelques auteurs 
ont travaille d'une maniere plus judicieuse a faire voir l'usage de 
mathematiques dans l'etude de la theologie et de l'ecriture sainte." 
Then he proceeds to list various mathematical works relating to 
theology, such as Georg Arnold's Sacra mathesis (Altorf, 1676), 
L. C. Sturm's Mathesis ad sacrae scripturae interpretationem applicata 
(1710), J. J. Schmid' s Biblischer mathematicus seu illustration sacrae 
scripturae ex mathematicis scientiis (1736), and others. 
Montucla also deals with books purporting to mathematize medi-
cine. He writes: "Le fameux medecin ecossois [ Archibald] Pitcairn 
a aussi entrepris, dans un de ses ouvrages, d'elever la medecine a la 
certitude mathematique (Elementa medicinae physico-mathematica. 
London 1717)" (I, 37). A similar attempt was made by Novalis in 
a fragment under the heading "Mathematische Physiologie" (III, 
129-132) and in other fragments dealing with "medizinische Algeber 
oder Analysis" (III, 233) and "Regeln der physiologischen Algeber" 
(III, 90). 
In the eighteenth century mathematics was also applied to ethics. 
Maupertuis, a mathematician of high rank, who was appointed by 
Frederick the Great to direct the Academy of Science in Berlin, 
designated the good as a positive quantity, and evil as negative. 
The distribution of good and evil in human society is to him a huge 
algebraic equation, and it is the task of the governments to make 
the positive prevail (see H. E. Timerding, Die Verbreitung mathe-
matischen Wissens und mathematischer Auffassung, Berlin & 
Leipzig, 1914, p. 104). In a similar manner, Compte de Buffon 
offered a "moral arithmetic" in his Essai d' arithmetique morale 
(1777) as a supplement to his work on natural history (see F. Cajori, 
A History of Mathematics, 2nd ed., New York, 1929, p. 243). 
Condorcet made a mathematical inquiry into the credibility of 
extraordinary historical facts. Condillac wrote in 1798 that all 
mental activities of man are an operation for certain sensations, 
and in his philosophy he attempted to extend mathematical symbols 
to all thinking (Timerding, pl. 104). La Mettrie claimed to have 
discovered the calculus of the human mind, and the French econo-
mist Francois Quesnay announced equations for economic and 
social life (Kline, p. 238). These endeavors reveal the forces of 
Rationalism and Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. "It 
seemed only a matter of time before all phenomena, natural, social 
and mental, would be reduced to mathematical laws" (Ibid). "The 
24 
chief characteristic of this new approach to knowledge was un-
bounded confidence in reason and the validity of the extension of 
mathematical methods throughout the physical and formal sciences 
and beyond them to all fields of knowledge" (Kline, p. 239). It is 
against this background that Novalis' seemingly fantastic plan to 
mathematize all branches of knowledge and to unify them in a 
universal encyclopedia must be considered. Abraham Gotthelf 
Kastner, Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, Goethe, Herder, and a 
number of Romanticists are among prominent eighteenth-century 
figures concerned with the union of the most disparate branches of 
knowledge, for example, the physical sciences and the humanities 
(see, for example, the present author's studies "Goethe's Views on 
Pure Mathematics," Germanic Review, XXXI, 49-69 and "Goethe's 
Thought in the Light of His Pronouncements on Applied and Mis-
applied Mathematics," PMLA, LXXIII, 505-515). For general 
discussion of science in German Romanticism the reader is referred 
to W. Bietak, editor, Romantische Wissenschaft (Leipzig, 1940) and 
A. Gode- von Aesch, Natural Science in German Romanticism (New 
York, 1941). 
2. NOVALIS' STUDY OF MATHEMATICS 
AND HIS ACQUAINTANCE WITH MATHEMATICIANS 
After this brief portrayal of the position of mathematics in some 
general cultural contexts of eighteenth-century Europe, and before 
discussing Novalis' fragments on mathematics in detail, we shall 
consider how much mathematics Novalis actually knew, and when, 
where, and under whom he studied this subject. 
Novalis was born on May 2, 1772, at Oberwiederstedt (or Wieder-
stedt), southeast of the Harz mountains in central Germany. He 
was a fragile and passive child until the age of nine, when a serious 
illness transformed him into an alert and gifted boy who was eager 
to learn as much as he could (see Paul Kluckhohn, "Friedrich von 
Hardenbergs Entwicklung und Dichtung," I, 11 *. Most biographical 
data will be taken from this standard study). He entered the 
"Prima," i.e., the uppermost form, of the Luthergymnasium at 
Eisleben on June 17, 1790, but left the institution on October 5 of 
the same year, after the death of the rector of the school, David 
Christian Jani, the famous Horace scholar who had been the main 
attraction of the school. One can hardly speak of mathematical 
instruction at such Gymnasien in the eighteenth century (Timerding, 
p. 108). In 1735 no examination in mathematics was required at the 
"Abiturientenexamen," the final comprehensive high school exami-
nation, in Prussia, and only on July 12, 1810, i.e., nine years after 
Novalis' death, was legislature introduced in Prussia to give the 
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mathematics teacher full and equal status in the high schools. 
Similar conditions prevailed in other parts of Germany. Previously, 
attempts to teach mathematics, as distinct from the rudiments of 
arithmetic, in high school had been sporadic. In 1812 the Prussian 
School Decrees required that an examination be given in the 
following mathematical subjects at the "Abiturientenexamen:" 
elementary arithmetic and algebra, equations of the first and second 
degree, logarithms, elementary geometry as contained in books 1-6, 
11, 12 of Euclid's Elements, plane trigonometry, and the use of 
mathematical tables (Timerding, p. 114). However, for a lack of 
teachers and the lofty contempt for mathematics on the part of 
some teachers of classics who still held sway over the high schools, 
these official requirements were not met. Since N ovalis' few months 
of high school attendance fall into the year 1790, it is very unlikely 
that any knowledge of mathematics beyond the level of elementary 
arithmetic and geometry had been expected of him at this time. 
On October 3, 1790, Novalis was matriculated at the University 
at Jena, where he stayed to the end of September 1791. He was 
officially registered in the faculty of law, but devoted himself 
mainly to the study of literature and philosophy. Notable teachers 
were Reinhold, the expositor of Kantian philosophy, and Schiller, 
then professor of history at Jena. On October 5, 1791, he wrote to 
Reinhold from Goseck: "lch werde in drei W ochen nach Leipzig 
abgehen und nach einer ganzlich veranderten Lebensordnung zu 
leben dort anfangen. Jurisprudenz, Mathematik, und Philosophie 
sollen die drei Wissenschaften sein, denen ich diesen Winter mich 
mit Leib und Seele ergeben will und im strengsten Sinne ergebe. 
lch muss mehr Festigkeit, mehr Bestimmtheit, mehr Plan, mehr 
Zweck mir zu erringen suchen, und dies kann ich am leichtesten 
<lurch ein strenges Studium dieser Wissenschaften erlangen. Seelen-
fasten in Absicht der schonen Wissenschaften und gewissenhafte 
Enthaltsamkeit von allem Zweckwidrigen habe ich mir zum 
strengsten Gesetz gemacht" (IV, 26). He arrived in Leipzig the 
same month and enrolled in the famous university of that city. As 
in Jena, his formal intent was the study of law, but he also attended 
lectures on mathematics and the natural sciences. 
The study of mathematics at German universities was very 
sporadic and unorganized in the eighteenth century. It improved 
during the middle of the century at Helmstedt and Gottingen. At 
the University at Jena, for example, the level remained low for a 
long time. The following announcement of courses for the winter 
semester 1802/3 illuminates this point: Introduction to the Study 
of Mathematics; Theoretical and Practical Arithmetic; Popular 
Astronomy, and so on. The level of instruction in these courses was 
lower than in the upper forms of a modern German high school. 
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When Goethe, like Novalis, came to Leipzig as a law student in 
1765, i.e., twenty-six years earlier, he attended the lectures in 
"mathesis pura," required at that time of all students entering the 
higher faculties (see Wilhelm Lorey, "Goethes Stellung zur Mathe-
matik," Goethe als Seher und Erforscher der Natur, ed. Johannes 
Walther, Weimar, 1930, p. 133). Novalis possibly had to comply 
with the same requirement. Whatever the case may be, his letter 
quoted above indicates his intention to study mathematics at 
Leipzig. The study of mathematics as a major subject, the "Fach-
studium," began in Germany around 1800, although a course on the 
integral calculus had been announced at the University of Leipzig 
by Professor Bortz as early as 1777 (see Wilhelm Lorey, Das Studium 
der Mathematik an den deutschen Universitaten seit dem Anfang des 
neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Leipzig & Berlin, 1916, p. 24). On the 
other hand, K. B. Mollweide whose teaching career in mathematics 
at the University at Leipzig began in 1804, and whom Gauss 
regarded as a thorough mathematician, was convinced that higher 
mathematics could not be taught in a class room because it involved 
too much writing on the blackboard. 
At the time of Novalis' stay in Leipzig, Karl Friedrich Hindenburg 
(1741-1808) taught mathematics at the university. There can hardly 
be any doubt that Novalis attended his lectures. Olshausen states 
that Novalis' serious study of mathematics probably began later at 
Freiberg, but that "schon in Leipzig hatte er Gelegenheit gehabt, 
den Mann zu horen, <lessen Ideen, und noch mehr die seiner Schule, 
ihn jetzt stark zu bewegen begannen: Hindenburg, den systema-
tischen Ausgestalter der kombinatorischen Analysis und <len Be-
griinder der kombinatorischen Schule" (Olshausen, p. 52). Hinden-
burg had attended the Gymnasium at Freiberg and come to the 
University at Leipzig in 1757, where he, not unlike Novalis, "in 
buntem Gemisch Arzneikunst und Philosophie, alte Literatur und 
Physik, Mathematik und Aesthetik studierte" (see Cantor's article 
in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XII). Hindenburg had studied 
under the poet Gellert in Leipzig and the poet-mathematician 
Kastner in Gottingen. Hence Novalis must have found a congenial 
mind in him. Hindenburg obtained his master's degree in Leipzig in 
1771 and became in 1781 extraordinary professor of philosophy at 
the same university- another reason why his broad education must 
have appealed to Novalis. Hindenburg had first devoted himself to 
philological studies and had published two treatises on this subject 
in 1763 and 1769. In 1785 he applied for a professorship of Greek 
and Latin which had become vacant in Leipzig, again displaying a 
versatility and universality of interest similar to Novalis' wide 
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range of endeavor. He did not get the position, but filled a vacancy 
in physics in 1786. He held this post until his death in 1808, but 
taught and published mainly in the field of mathematics. N ovalis 
came to Leipzig in 1791 and very probably was in personal contact 
with Hindenburg. Novalis had among his books Hindenburg's 
Novi Systematis permutationum, combinationum etc. primae lineae 
(Leipzig, 1781) and Der polynomische Lehrsatz (Leipzig, 1796) as 
well as Kastner's Anfangsgriinde der Analysis des Unendlichen 
(Gottingen, 1760, 3. Aufl. 1799) (see IV, 476ff.). In the history of 
mathematics Hindenburg is known as the founder of the combi-
natorial school which concentrated on combinatorial analysis, a 
subject first treated coherently by Leibniz in his dissertation Ars 
Combinatoria in 1668. Olshausen traces this branch of mathematics 
further to the "ars magna" of Ramon Lull (c.1236-1315), the Catalan 
philosopher who set forth a method of expressing all knowledge by 
the manipulation of symbols. Such a manipulation of symbols 
resulted in various combinations and permutations of ideas and was 
expected to lead to new discoveries. It is to this origin, as well as to 
Leibniz' search for an "ars inveniendi" that Olshausen traces 
Novalis' identification of mathematical analysis with "Erfindungs-
kunst" (Olshausen, p. 53). The fragment in question is the following: 
"Die Analysis ist (die Divinations- oder) die Erfindungskunst auf 
Regeln gebracht. - Ihre mogliche Ausbreitung und Vervollkomm-
nung" (III, 162, Das allgemeine Brouillon, Nr. 567 [1798/99]). 
Another fragment reads: "So wie sich andere Grossen finden lassen -
so miissen sich auch Formeln berechnen lassen- Formelnerfindungs-
kunst. (Instrumentenerfindungskunst). Vielleicht will dies die kom-
binatorische Analysis tun. Dann ware sie sehr hoch. - Die kombi-
natorische Analysis der Physik ware die indirekte Erfindungskunst, 
die Baco gesucht hat" (III, 23). 
In Cantor's history of mathematics the aims of the so-called 
combinatorial school are described as follows: "Nach diesen Er-
gebnissen [i.e., after the results of the Bernoullis, Moivre, Euler] 
kommen wir zu einer merkwiirdigen Epoche, zu der sogenannten 
kombinatorischen Schule. Die ausgesprochene Absicht der sie be-
griindenden und fordernden Manner war, neben die gewohnlichen 
Operationen der Arithmetik, Algebra und Analysis die kombinato-
rischen Operationen als gleichberechtigt und gleichwertig zu stellen 
und fur sie das Biirgerrecht zu erwerben... Diese Schule fasste trotz 
ihrer grossen Ziele und Absichten nur in Deutschland Boden und 
trug auch hier nur bescheidene Friichte; von grossen F orschern im 
mathematischen Bereiche gehorte ihr keiner an ... das meiste von 
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dem, was sie brachte, sank so bald in eine nicht immer ganz gerechte 
Vergessenheit" (Cantor, IV, 201). 
One of Hindenburg's first mathematical treatises is the Be-
schreibung einer ganz neuen Art, nach einem bekannten Gesetze fort-
gehende Zahlen durch Abzahlen oder Abmessen bequem und sicher zu 
finden, published in 1776. In this treatise he attempts to employ 
the so-called sieve of Eratosthenes which enables one to read off the 
terms of an arithmetical series. Similar ideas are found in Novalis' 
fragments: "Wenige bekannte Glieder, <lurch die man instand ge-
setzt wird, eine unendliche Menge unbekannter Glieder zu finden, -
machen die Konstruktionsformel aus" (III, 38, Freiberger Studien 
[1798/99]). 
Some of Hindenburg's early works on combinatorial analysis, in 
particular the above-mentioned Der polynomische Lehrsatz, deal with 
the multinomial theorem, or, as it was called at that time, "die 
Potenzierung des Infinitinoms." N ovalis lists under "Materialien" 
for his "Arithmetica universalis": "Kliigel, aus dem 'Polynomischen 
Lehrsatz' von Hindenburg ... Hindenburgs Schriften und andere 
mehr" (III, 23). The high hopes that Hindenburg cherished about 
his combinatorial analysis were transferred by Novalis to his 
universal arithmetic. "Welche unerschopfliche Menge zu neuen in-
dividuellen Kombinationen liegt nicht umber! Wer einmal dieses 
Geheimnis erraten hat, der hat nichts mehr notig als den Entschluss, 
der unendlichen Mannigfaltigkeit und ihrem blossen Genusse zu 
entsagen und irgendwo anzufangen" (II, 326). He explicitly states 
in Das allgemeine Broitillon, Nr. 246 (III, 99): "Die kombinatorische 
Analytik gehort eigentlich zur universellen Arithmetik." KHigel, 
whom Novalis also mentions in his "Materialien" for the universal 
arithmetic, states in a contribution to Hindenburg's Der polyno-
mische Lehrsatz: "Die Analysis endlicher Grossen besteht aus zwei 
Hauptteilen, die zwar durch gegenseitige Hilflcistungen mit einander 
verbunden sind, aber nicht einer au£ elem anderen beruhen ... Diese 
beiden Teile sind die Algebra und die Analysis im engern Verstande" 
(p. 48). Similarly, Novalis states in connection with the combi-
natorial analysis and with this passage of Kliigel: "Sie, die Algebra 
und die sog(enannte) Analysis machen eine vVissenschaft aus" 
(III, 99). 
Hindenburg was the first to set up, in his works on combinatorial 
analysis, simple rules for the formation of tables of permutations, 
combinations, and variations, in order to prevent omissions or 
duplications in writing them. These rules were also meant to afford 
an easy transition from the combinations or permutations of n 
elements to a set of n + 1 elements. Here is one of Hindenburg's 
examples: 
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C b a 
4 3 
I 
2 1-½-a 4 3 1 
4 2 3 l b 
4 2 1 3 
4 1 3 2 
4 1 2 3 
3 4 2 1 
C 
3 4 1 2 
3 2 4 1 
3 2 1 4 
3 1 4 2 
3 1 2 4 (Cantor, IV, 209) 
N ovalis applies a similar rule in writing down all possible variants 
of a dialectic pattern of reasoning in order to make the reasoning 
complete and exhaustive (Theodor Haering would probably 
regard this as an instance of Novalis' "higher, dialectic mathe-
matics" - see Chapter I, Section 3). Novalis represents the terms 
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis as follows: 
a= a - These 
b = a - A ntithese 
c = a + b -Synthese (II, 156) 
Then he proceeds: 
"Die Synthesis kann nun 
1. von a (dem einen Gegensatze) zu b (dem anderen Gegen-
satze), von b zu c als dem Gemeinsatze und von c zu a gehen. 
2. von a zu c - von c zu b - von b zu a. 
3. von a zu b - dann von a zu c - dann von c zu b. 
4. von a - b + a - c + b - c 
5. a - c + a - b + b - c 
6. a - c + a - b + c - b 
7. c - a + a - b + b - c 
8. c - b + b - a + a - c 
9. c - a + c - b + a - b 
10. c - a + c - b + b - a 
11. c - b + c - a + a - b 
12. c - b + c - a + b - a " (II, 157) 
Other examples are found in II, 253 ff. In the above example the 
signs - and + do not denote the conventional "minus" or "plus," 
respectively, but serve as abbreviations of the copulae as defined in 
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1, 2, and 3. (cf. in this connection Chapter IV, Section "Mathe-
matics and Philosophy"). 
In 1791 there appeared in Halle a study entitled Theorie der 
Dimensionszeichen nebst ihrer Anwendung au/ verschiedene Materia-
lien aus der Analysis endlicher Grossen by Ernst Gottfried Fischer of 
the Academy of Science in Berlin. This study caused quite an uproar, 
because it reported the invention of combinatorial analysis, whereas 
actually it contained nothing more than Hindenburg's version of 
the subject disguised in different notation. Heinrich August Topfer, 
a student of Hindenburg's, set out to expose the supposed plagiator 
by exhibiting the priority of Hindenburg in the presentation of the 
subject matter, in his highly polemical book Combinatorische 
A nalytik und Theorie der Dimensionszeichen in P arallele gestellt 
(Leipzig, 1793). Fischer protested in 1794 that he had obtained his 
results independently. He was supported in his claim by Abel 
Burja, Professor of Mathematics at the Academie militaire in Berlin 
and a member of the Academy of Science. Novalis owned copies of 
both these works. Various other references indicate that he was 
familiar with the controversy. A year after Novalis' death, Fischer's 
independence from Hindenburg was conclusively demonstrated by 
Johann Friedrich Pfaff (under whom Gauss had completed his 
doctorate at the University at Helmstedt in 1799), then Professor 
of Mathematics at the University of Halle. 
Thus we have shown, among other things, that (1) circumstances 
in Leipzig indicate that Novalis must have studied mathematics 
under Hindenburg; (2) there are many points of contact between 
Hindenburg's combinatorial analysis and N ovalis' fragments on 
universal arithmetic; (3) Novalis puts Hindenburg's name at the 
head of the list of materials for his contemplated universal arithme-
tic; (4) he was in possession of Hindenburg's major mathematical 
works and other studies relating to the combinatorial school; 
(5) Novalis went to Leipzig with the stated intention of studying 
mathematics, in addition to law and philosophy; (6) Hindenburg 
taught the mathematics courses at Leipzig at the time of Novalis' 
study at this university. Hence we disagree with Olshausen's 
assumption that Novalis' serious study of mathematics began not at 
Leipzig, but four years later at Freiberg. There can hardly be any 
doubt that, before coming to Freiberg, he had already received a 
considerable grounding in this subject during his stay in Leipzig. 
On March 10, 1793, Novalis left Leipzig for Wittenberg, where he 
passed his law examinations at the university on June 14, 1794. 
From October 25, 1794 to February 6, 1796 he was engaged as a law 
clerk to the District Justiciary A. C. Just at Tennstedt. 
Soon after the appearance of Fichte's Grundlage der gesamten 
W issenschaftslehre in its first published version (1794), N ovalis 
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immersed intensively in the thought of this philosopher. Through 
Reinhold in Jena and Friedrich Schlegel in Leipzig he had become 
acquainted with Kant. Novalis' "Philosophische Studien 1795/97" 
(II, 103-308) reflect his intensive "Auseinandersetzung" with these 
two philosophers. A number of his fragments on mathematics 
resulted from his grappling with their ideas ( see Section 3 for details). 
In 1794 the twenty-two-year old Novalis was introduced to the 
twelve-year old Sophie von Kuhn at nearby Griiningen. They fell in 
love and became engaged on March 15, 1795. In the fall of the same 
year Sophie became ill; she died of consumption on March 19, 1797. 
During Sophie's long illness, Novalis turned to Spinoza, a philoso-
pher, who, like Novalis, had attempted to mathematize ethics in his 
Ethica ordine geometrica demonstrata (Amsterdam, 1677) by em-
ploying a systematic set of definitions, axioms, and theorems. 
During the few most trying weeks before Sophie's death, Novalis 
sought consolation in mathematics. This is clearly indicated by his 
notes in a copy of a calendar for the year 1797, as reprinted in 
IV, 377-8: 
Jan. 11, 1797 "Math(ematik). Phil(osophie) / Erzahlung ... " 
Jan. 12 "l\fath(ematik). Phil(osophie) ... " 
Jan. 13 "Math(ematik). Phil(osophie) ... " 
Jan. 14 "Math(ematik). Phil(osophie). / 'Pensees (of Pascal) .. " 
March 10 "Heute friih sah ich sie zum letzten Male." 
March 19 "Heute friih halb 10 ist sie gestorben. -
15 Jahr und2Tagealt.-geb.1782" 
The function of mathematics and other sciences as sources of 
solace and alleviation in his sorrow before and after Sophie's death 
becomes even more apparent from N ovalis' consolatory letter to his 
brother Erasmus at the time of the latter's illness: "Dein Ent-
schluss, Algebra zu studieren, ist gewiss sehr heilsam. Die Wissen-
schaften haben wunderbare Heilkrafte - wenigstens stillen sie, wie 
Opiate, die Schmerzen und erheben uns in Spharen, die ein ewiger 
Sonnenschein umgibt. Sie sind die schi::inste Freistatte, die uns 
gegonnt ward. Ohne diesen Trost wollt ich und konnt ich nicht 
leben. Wie hatt ich ohne sie seit anderthalb Jahren so gelassen 
S(ophiens) Krankheit zusehn und ausserdem so manchen Ver-
driesslichkeiten ausgesetzt sein konnen? Es mag mir begegnen was 
will; die Wissenschaften bleiben mir - mit ihnen hoff ich alles 
Ungemach des Lebens zu bestehn." This letter was written less 
than two months before Sophie's death, on February 26, 1797 
(IV, 177). On May 26, 1797, he noted in his diary: "Frtih Fichtes 
'Naturlehre.' - Spazieren - viel Gutes gedacht - Zu Hause traf ich 
Karolinchen krank. Sie besserte sich bald - Ich schwatzte abends 
viel von Chemie und Mathematik durcheinander" (IV, 390). Mathe-
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matics gave Novalis a firm prop to cling to, for he wrote: "Gegen 
Angstlichkeit, i.e., gegen willki.irliche Wahnbegriffe muss ich auf 
der Hut sein" (June 11, 1797, IV, 394). Novalis now wanted to join 
Sophie in the Hereafter. His love for Sophie merged with religion 
and philosophy. He took the word "philosophy" in its literal 
meaning: "love of Sophie." He mingled religion with mathematics. 
The entry of January 14, 1797 suggests that he turned once more to 
a philosopher-mathematician for consolation: Pascal's Pensee sur 
la religion. Pascal had juxtaposed mathematics and religion, 
Novalis attempted to fuse them (see Chapter IV, Section "Mathe-
matics and Religion"). After Sophie's death Novalis devoted 
himself with even greater fervor to the abstract sciences. August 
Wilhelm Schlegel wrote to Goethe about Novalis on September 24, 
1797, from Jena: "Seine Schwermut hat ihn mit doppelter Tatigkeit 
in die abstraktesten Wissenschaften gesti.irzt" (I, 25*). Novalis 
again devoted himself to philosophy, especially Kant and Fichte, 
and to mathematics. At this time he also delved into the works of 
the Dutch philosopher Franz Hemsterhuis (1722-1790), with whose 
thought he had already become acquainted in Leipzig. Although, 
on the whole, Hemsterhuis is an advocate of irrationalism, Novalis 
excerpted from his Lettre sur l'homme et ses rapports (Oeuvres philo-
sophiques, Paris, 1809, I, 135ff.) the following statements, trans-
lating them from the original French: "Die Volkommenheit unserer 
Wissenschaft wird nach ihrer Kapazitat fur Mathematik beurteilt" 
and "Objekt und Idee der Anschauung ist in der Mathematik eins" 
(II, 289) N ovalis comments on them as follows: "Die Wissenschaften 
sind nur aus Mangel an Genie und Scharfsinn getrennt - die Ver-
haltnisse zwischen ihnen sind dem Verstand und Stumpfsinn zu 
verwickelt und entfernt voneinander. Die grossten Wahrheiten 
unserer Tage verdanken wir solchen Kombinationen der lange 
getrennten Glieder der Totalwissenschaft" (II, 289). Novalis, 
although deeply concerned with the systematic presentation of the 
various branches of knowledge, never lost historical perspective, 
retrospectively or prospectively. He was convinced that at one time 
all sciences were united, but that it had become necessary to unite 
again the long separated members of the total science, which had 
drifted apart, because their relations had become too involved for 
our minds. From Hemsterhuis' Aristee (Oeitvres philos., II, 9ff.) 
Novalis translated the following observation on axioms: "Axiomen 
beruhn auf sinnlicher -Oberzeugung. Die kiinstliche, gemachte 
-Oberzeugung geht vom Axiom aus. Die letztere hat die erstere 
verdrangt" (II, 293). Hemsterhuis' observation is in agreement with 
N ovalis' pronouncement: "Die Mathematik ist echte Wissenschaft, 
weil sie gemachte Kenntnisse enthalt" (III, 270). Thus Novalis' 
thought was stimulated by some of Hemsterhuis' ideas. During this 
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time Novalis also studied Plotinus, Jakob Bohme, and Eckarts-
hausen. His "mystische Fragmente" originated on the basis of this 
study and of his experience of Sophie's death (I, 27*). 
From December 1, 1797 to Whitsuntide 1799 Novalis was a 
student at the famous Mining Academy (Bergakademie) at Freiberg 
in preparation for his intended career in salt works administration. 
The "koniglich Sachsische Bergakademie zu Freiberg" had been 
founded in 1766 by Friedrich Anton von Heynitz, an uncle of 
N ovalis. It was one of the first institutions in which the exact 
sciences were consistently applied to technology (see Die koniglich 
Sachsische Bergakademie zu Freiberg, Freiberg, 1904, p. 7). Novalis' 
most prominent teacher at Freiberg was Abraham Gottlob Werner 
(1750-1817), professor of mineralogy and mining engineering at the 
academy. One of the founders of the science of geology, he is known 
as the originator of the now obsolete Wernerian or "Neptunian" 
theory of the aqueous origin of the surface of the earth. He was the 
first to separate geology and mineralogy and to place geology on the 
basis of observation and experience. Some scholars trace Novalis' 
efforts toward systematization of all knowledge for his universal 
encyclopedia to Werner's systematization of geology in his own 
encyclopedia. This dependence is partial and indirect, despite 
Novalis' laudatory comments on Werner's encyclopedia (III, 188, 
201, 208, 302, and II, 428) (see Haering, p. 125). 
In addition to geology, mineralogy, and mining engineering, 
Novalis devoted himself to physics, mathematics, and chemistry at 
Freiberg. The last decade of the eighteenth century was a time of 
great discoveries and bold hypotheses in the natural sciences 
(I, 37*). Upon Priestley's discovery of oxygen the old phlogiston 
theory was discarded. Lavoisier elevated chemistry to the status of 
an exact science. Galvani's experiments with frogs led in 1789 to 
the discovery of "animal electricity." (see Wagner, p. 31). Novalis 
took a vital interest in these developments. He was fascinated by 
discoveries that turned alchemy into chemistry. If mere philo-
sophical speculation on the nature of the universe had developed 
into physics, alchemy into chemistry, quackery into medicine, 
astrology into astronomy, and, more generally, speculative branches 
of knowledge into systematic sciences with empirical bases or logical 
structures, why should it not be possible to continue this process of 
emancipation and mathematize religion, magic, music, or even 
poetry? Such thoughts crossed Novalis' mind. There was ex-
citement and expectation in the intellectual atmosphere of the time. 
No avenues were to be left unexplored. Novalis wrote to Friedrich 
Schlegel on November 7, 1798 from Freiberg: "Ich denke hier 
Wahrheiten und Ideen im grossen - genialische Gedanken - ein 
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lebendiges, wissenschaftliches Organon hervorzubringen - und <lurch 
diese synkretische Politik der Intelligenz mir den W eg zur echten 
Praxis - dem wahrhaften Reunionsprozess - zu bahnen" (IV, 204f.). 
Novalis noted the following in Freiberg during 1798/99: 
Gravitationslehre und Arithmetica universalis will ich zuerst durchgehen. 
Jener soll eine Stunde, dieser zwei Stunden gewidmet werden. Was mir 
nebenher einfallt, wird in das allgemeine Brouillon mit hineinge-
schrieben. 
Eine Stunde der Enzyklopadistik iiberhaupt. Di~se enthalt wissenschaft-
liche Algeber - Gleichungen - Verhaltnisse - Ahnlichkeiten - Gleich-
heiten - Wirkungen der Wissenschaften aufeinander. 
Die Revision des Wernerschen Systems und die Kritik meines Unter-
nehmens muss nun die erste Arbeit sein. 
(Bearbeitung der Logik - der Algeber etc. - gehort dann zur Tages-
ordnung). (IV, 399£.) 
Novalis must have written enthusiastically about these plans to 
A. W. Schlegel, and the latter, in his turn, must have expressed 
concern over N ovalis' apparent abandonment of literary pursuits 
and his intense immersion into mathematics and the natural 
sciences, for Novalis wrote to him on February 24, 1798 from 
Freiberg: "Dann will ich Sie von der Besorgnis befreien, <lass ich 
hier zu lauter a + b werde. Ich bin vielmehr wahrhaft entschlossen, 
die Mathematik kiinftig sehr verachtlich zu behandeln, weil sie 
mich wie einen Abcschiitzen behandelt" (IV, 228). This maybe the 
expression of a momentary spell of disappointment arising from a 
discrepancy between his ambitious plans and hard reality, but it is 
certainly not to be interpreted as Novalis' intention to embrace 
henceforth poetry exclusively and give up philosophy and science. 
This common reading is also rejected by Haering in his recent 
comprehensive monograph on Novalis' philosophy (p. 552). During 
the summer of the year 1800, i.e., less than a year before his death, 
Novalis made a note of a study plan for himself, with emphasis on 
the subjects rendered in spaced type in the Kluckhohn-Samuel 
edition of Novalis' works: "Studium der sachsischen Geschichte 
etc. Sachsens iiberhaupt. Mathematik. Astronomie. Physik 
... " (III, 336). Also, half a year before his death, on October 16, 
1800, N ovalis made this entry in his notebook: "Sonst reis ich viel 
mit dem Vater und bin fleissig in der Math(ematik) etc." (IV, 410). 
At this time Novalis became acquainted with the works of Franz 
von Baader (1765-1841), the mystic Catholic theosophist, who, like 
Hemsterhuis, was an irrationalist, but stimulated some of Novalis' 
thought on mathematics (see next section). What appealed to 
N ovalis in Baader was his search for a binding and unifying principle 
in the universe (I, 39*). Another congenial philosopher was 
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Schelling, whose ideas on the interrelation of nature and the spirit 
have points of contact with Novalis' "Realidealismus." 
In December 1798 Novalis became engaged to Julie, the daughter 
of Johann Friedrich W. von Charpentier (1728-1805), professor of 
mathematics and drawing at the Mining Academy at Freiberg and 
Novalis' teacher in these subjects. Charpentier, like Novalis and 
Hindenburg, was more than a mathematician. Like Novalis, he had 
studied law at the University at Leipzig. At the same time he had 
delved into mathematics and attained such proficiency in this 
subject that he was appointed professor of mathematics at Freiberg 
in 1767. He is not mentioned by such authors of standard histories 
of mathematics as Cantor, Cajori, or Struik, yet in the Allgemeine 
deutsche Biographie (Leipzig, 1876), IV, he is listed as "beriihmter 
Berg- und Htittemann," and the official publication, already 
referred to, Die koniglich Sachsische Bergakademie zu Freiberg, p. 8, 
lists him as one of the outstanding former teachers at the Academy. 
As the fiance of Charpentier's daughter, Novalis frequently visited 
his home and no doubt discussed mathematics with him. 
To supplement his formal lectures, Novalis received private 
instruction in mathematics from the French student Jean Fran<;ois 
Aubisson de Voisins (1769-1841); or, as Riebel puts it: "When he 
found the lectures of the mathematics instructors too tedious, he 
sought the study of higher mathematics by a private tutor" (Novalis, 
Engl. version, p. 39). We obtain this information from a letter of 
Novalis to his father, dated at Freiberg September 1, 1798, in which 
he accounts for his expenditures: "D'Aubisson bin ich jetzt zwolf 
Wochen schuldig. Ich kann nicht gut ihm die sechs Wochen ab-
ziehn, da ich entfernt war, besonders, da er es nicht einmal praten-
diert. Von ihm lern ich eigentlich Mathematik - und das Geld an 
Lempe ist weggeworfen. Ich lerne nichts bei ihm. Er gibt sich nicht 
die mindeste lVIiihe, seine Zuhorer wirklich weiterzubringen. Er liest 
ausserst unangenehm - lauft, was er kann und ist froh, wenn er uns 
sagen kann: ich habe gelesen" (IV, 237). Johann Friedrich Lempe 
(1757-1801) was professor of mathematics and physics at the Mining 
Academy from 1785 to 1801. D'Aubisson had studied mathematics 
at one of the French secondary schools that were the first in Europe 
to emphasize mathematics to the exclusion of some of the classical 
studies. He later gained renown as an engineer in France. Also, 
d' Aubisson came from the country of birth of modern chemistry and 
was eager to associate mathematics with this subject. Novalis 
jotted down the following note in his fragments: "D' Aubissons 
chemische Erlauterung der Buchstabenrechnung. Diese Zeichen 
schliessen nicht wie Zahlen ineinander, sondern man sieht noch in 
jeder Komposition der Elemente ihre Verhaltnisse und die Methode 
der Komposition. Ils s'associent, mais ils ne se confondent pas" 
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(III, 351). Apparently d'Aubisson had explained to Novalis the use 
of letters in algebra with an illustration from chemistry. We shall 
use modern chemical notation in reproducing d' Aubisson' s argument, 
although at that time a different notation was used. In the formula 
H2S04 both the qualitative and quantitative composition of the 
formula is indicated. Similarly, an algebraic expression, say, 
V a2 + b2 + c2, shows how the quantities a, b, and c have been 
composed, whereas the number 30 does not, as it stands, have to be 
necessarily regarded as the result of V 32 + 42 + 52, even if 
30 = V 32 + 42 + 52• 
Most of Novalis' fragments on mathematics were written at 
Freiberg, although some of them show connections with his sojourn 
in Leipzig. The published portion of these fragments is collected 
under the general heading A us den Freiberger Studienheften und 
-bliittern (1798/99). It contains the "Mathematisches Heft. 23 Junius" 
(1798) (III, 17 f.), "Mathematische Fragmente" (III, 20-23), 
"Arithmetica Universalis" (III, 23-25), "Aus den physikalischen 
Studienheften" (III, 26-45), and many other passages on mathe-
matics. There are references to mathematics on almost every page 
of Das allgemeine Brouillon (III, 63-275). The collection Fragmente 
der letzten J ahre (1799/1800) (III, 283-353) contains the so-called 
"hymns to mathematics," written mainly at Weissenfels, Novalis' 
residence from May 12, 1799 to his death on March 25, 1801. 
It is now possible to estimate the extent of Novalis' mathematical 
knowledge. We have seen that he studied mathematics at the 
University at Leipzig during his stay of a year and a half in that 
city, and for another year and a half at the Mining Academy at 
Freiberg. There can hardly be any doubt that in Leipzig he became 
acquainted with Hindenburg, the founder of the combinatorial 
school. At Freiberg he studied under Charpentier, and, being 
engaged to his daughter, had social contacts with him. He received 
additional private instruction in mathematics from d' Aubisson at 
Freiberg, and, above all, studied on his own. Persons who knew 
him testify that he was well versed in mathematics. His superior, 
District Inspector of Salt Mines August C. Just, stated after Novalis' 
death that the latter had already had "feine Vorkenntnisse" in 
mathematics before taking up study at Freiberg. Tieck wrote in his 
biography of Novalis (1815): "Seine Kenntnisse in der Mathematik 
sowie in den Kiinsten der Mechanik, vorzuglich aber in der Berg-
werkskunde waren ausgezeichnet" (IV, 457). Most Novalis scholars 
agree that he was well versed in mathematics. It would seem that 
Novalis was familiar with most results of mathematics generally 
known at his time. His knowledge of calculus reflects the phase in 
the development of this branch of mathematics as it is laid down in 
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Euler's Institutiones calculi differentialis (1755), Institutiones calculi 
integralis (1768-1770), and in part as presented by Lagrange in his 
Theorie des fonctions analytiques (1797) (See also Section 4). 
3. PHILOSOPHICAL SOURCES 
FOR NOVALIS' FRAGMENTS ON MATHEMATICS 
N ovalis' thought on mathematics shows points of contact with the 
works of various philosophers. We agree with Haering's viewpoint 
expressed in the chapter "Selbstandigkeit und fremde Einfliisse" of 
his recent study of Novalis' philosophy (op. cit., pp. 605-635), that 
"die vorgefasste Meinung und Legende, dass Novalis in allen seinen 
philosophischen Meditationen" reveals only "sklavische Dber-
nahmen und unselbstandige Reproduktionen Fichte-Hemster-
huisscher Gedanken" (p. 605), must be discarded. The influence of 
Plotinus, Baader, Bohme, Friedrich Schlegel, Ritter, Werner, 
Hiilsen, Spinoza has been of secondary importance. "Unendlich 
viel wichtiger als alle diese Beeinflussungen sind daher fiir die 
besondere philosophische Hal tung des N ovalis, wie sch on unsere 
Einzelausfiihrungen unzweifelhaft ergaben, diejenigen durch Fichte, 
Kant und Hemsterhuis gewesen" (p. 618). In the more specific range 
of Novalis' thought on mathematics Haering's contention is also 
valid. We shall now consider the various points of contact between 
the works of such philosophers as Kant, Fichte, and Hemsterhuis 
and N ovalis' fragments on mathematics separately. 
Kant. Kant's relation to mathematics has been frequently discussed. 
Oskar Becker, for example, summarizes in his book Mathematische 
Existenz (Halle, 1927): "Es ist bekannt, dass Kant die beiden mathe-
matischen Urdisziplinen Arithmetik und Geometrie den beiden 
Anschauungsformen Zeit und Raum zuordnet. Wie der reine Raum 
der Geometrie, so liegt die reine Zeit der Arithmetik zugrunde" 
(p. 213). Kant is convinced of the general and necessary validity of 
mathematical truths. However, this conception of mathematics has 
met with criticism in the light of modern geometrical considerations. 
"Wenn wirklich eine Anschauung a priori in seinem Sinn existiert, 
so kann sie nur eine einzige Form besitzen; es ist also auch nur eine 
Geometrie moglich, die zugleich in der empirischen Anschauung 
Bestatigung findet" (Voss, p. 94). Kant's theory of mathematical 
knowledge according to which only one, namely, Euclidean, 
geometry is possible, was refuted by the introduction of non-
Euclidean geometries. 
As a student at the University at Konigsberg, Kant devoted 
himself, among other subjects, to mathematics. From 1755 to 1760 
he lectured on this subject each semester (see Erich Adickes, Kant 
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als N aturforscher, Berlin, 1924, I, 5). Yet, according to Adickes, his 
purely and strictly mathematical writings as contained in the Lose 
Blatter aus dem Nachlass Kants (ed. Ricke, 1889, 1895, 1898) are 
of little significance to mathematics proper. However, from a more 
general point of view, Kant's views on mathematics have been very 
influential; in fact, mathematics is one of the main pillars of his 
philosophy. Some of N ovalis' fragments on mathematics are 
related to Kant's pronouncements on this subject in his Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft (1781), Prolegomena zu einer jeden kunftigen Meta-
physik (1783), and the M etaphysische A nf angsgriinde der N atur-
wissenschaft (1786). 
In the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Werke, 12th ed., Leipzig: 
Meiner, 1922, I, hereafter abbreviated KRV), some of the basic 
concepts in the analysis of pure reason are illustrated with examples 
from mathematics. Mathematical theorems are proof for the exist-
ence of necessary and generally valid a priori judgments (KRV, 
50). Kant makes the famous distinction between analytic (or 
explicative) judgments, in which the predicate is already tacitly 
contained in the subject, and synthetic (or ampliative) judgments, 
in which the predicate lies entirely outside the subject (KRV, 55). 
Within the framework of this distinction, Kant makes another 
important observation on the nature of mathematics: "Mathe-
matische Urteile sind insgesamt synthetisch" (KRV, 59). Mathe-
matical judgments are synthetic, and not analytic, or tautological, 
or identical, as Leibniz, d' Alembert, and Goethe held. Thus mathe-
matical judgments are (1) a priori, (2) synthetic. But since to Kant 
empirical judgments are synthetic ("Erfahrungsurteile als solche 
sind insgesamt,synthetisch," KRV, 56), someone may be tempted 
to reverse the orientation of the implication and think that mathe-
matical judgments are empirical. To prevent such possible mis-
conception, Kant divests mathematical judgments of all empirical 
connotations by restricting his argument to pure mathematics: 
" ... muss eigentlich bemerkt werden, dass eigentliche mathe-
matische Satze jederzeit Urteile a priori und nicht empirisch sind, 
weil sie Notwendigkeit bei sich flihren, welche aus Erfahrung nicht 
abgenommen werden kann. Will man aber dieses nicht einraumen, 
wohlan, so schranke ich meinen Satz auf die reine Mathematik ein, 
deren Begriff es schon mit sich bringt, dass sie nicht empirische, 
sondern bloss reine Erkenntnis a priori enthalte" (KRV, 60). The 
basic problem of pure reason in Kant's KRV is formulated as 
follows: "Wie sind synthetische Urteile a priori moglich ?" (How are 
a priori synthetic judgments possible?) (KRV, 63). Metaphysics 
cannot be said to exist, and therefore there is reason to doubt that it 
is possible at all. However, pure mathematics and pure physics 
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exist, hence we may ask whether they are possible. Now we already 
know that mathematics, and also physics (KRV, 64), contains 
synthetic a priori judgments. Therefore, the pivotal problem of 
pure reason, i.e., whether a priori synthetic judgments are possible, 
involves also the questions: "Wie ist reine Mathematik mi:iglich?" 
(How is pure mathematics possible?) and "Wie ist reine Natur-
wissenschaft mi:iglich?" (John Watson translates: How is pure 
physics possible?) (for this English version, see Benjamin Rand's 
anthology Modern Classical Philosophers, 3rd ed., Boston, etc., 
1936, pp. 366 & 379). 
Novalis takes up Kant's question whether synthetic a priori 
judgments are possible and adds other variants to it: "Kants 
Frage: Sind synthetische Urteile a priori mi:iglich, lasst sich auf 
mannigfaltige Weise spezifischer ausdrucken. Z.B. 
Ist die Philosophie eine Kunst (eine Dogmatik, Wissenschaft)? 
Gibt es eine Erfindungskunst ohne Data, eine absolute Er-
findungskunst? 
Lassen sich Krankheiten nach Belieben machen etc.? 
Lassen sich Verse nach Regeln und ein Wahnwitz nach Grund-
satzen denken? 
Ist ein perpetuum mobile mi:iglich etc. ? 
Ist ein Genie mi:iglich - liisst sich ein Genie definieren? 
Lasst sich der Zirkel quadrieren? 
Ist Magie mi:iglich? 
Liisst sich Gott, Freiheit und Unsterblichkeit demonstrieren? 
Gibt es eine Rechnung des Unendlichen? etc." (III, 230f.) 
At first glance we seem to have here a haphazard agglomeration of 
questions, but on closer examination they turn out to be valid 
variants of Kant's original question within N ovalis' thought. Kant 
states in the KRV that metaphysics is not a science, and that it has 
always suffered from an excess of dogma. N ovalis wonders whether, 
more generally, philosophy is an art, dogma, or a science. He 
further inquires: Is there an art of invention without data, an 
absolute art of invention? This is equivalent to asking whether 
synthetic a priori judgments are possible. Synthetic means non-
analytic, this accounts for Novalis' expression "Erfindungskunst"; 
a priori implies non-empirical, hence N ovalis states "without data," 
i.e., without empirical data. In his Ars combinatoria Leibniz had 
hoped to obtain new truths through various combinations of ideas 
and data. N ovalis wonders whether such an art is possible without 
data. Novalis further inquires whether "a genius is possible?" 
What is the relation of genius to "synthetic?" Simon shows that 
N ovalis regarded the synthetic function as an ideal function, and 
that the latter designated it by "genial" (Simon, p. 24). Hamburger 
takes up Simon's argument and declares that Novalis' variants of 
40 
Kant's question show "dass Synthesis for ihn die Bedeutung eines 
schopferischen Prinzips gewinnt, weil er die Frage nach der Mog-
lichkeit synthetischer Urteile in eine Reihe stellt mit der Frage 
nach der Moglichkeit des Genies und der Magie" (Hamburger, p. 
123). Thus she arrives, again in the footsteps of Simon, at a partial 
explanation of Novalis' hymns to mathematics. Novalis held that 
"synthetische Urteile sind genialische, nicht antinomische, ein-
seitige Urteile" (III, 180). The attribute of genius is to produce 
synthetic knowledge. For this reason Novalis asks whether genius 
is possible. Wherever empirical limitations or physical boundaries 
are imposed, Novalis wonders whether these limitations may be 
overcome. In this connection he considers such problems: Is magic 
possible? Is a perpetual mobile possible? etc. (see also Das all-
gemeine Brouillon, Nr. 1036, III, 259). Novalis also asks: Can (the 
existence of) God, freedom, and immortality be demonstrated? 
Kant had stated in his KRV, p. 52: "Die unvermeidlichen Aufgaben 
der reinen Vernunft sind Gott, Freiheit und Unsterblichkeit." But 
since they can neither be demonstrated nor disproved, Kant 
introduced them as postulates of practical reason in his Kritik der 
praktischen Vernunft. 
Another point of contact between Kant's and Novalis' conception 
of mathematics is found in the farmer's table of categories. This 













der Inharenz und Subsistenz 
(substantia et accidens) 
der Causalitat und Dependenz 
(Ursache und Wirkung) 
der Gemeinschaft 
(Wechselwirkung zwischen dem 
Handelnden und Leidenden) 
4 
Modalitiit 
Moglichkeit - Unmoglichkeit 
Dasein - Nichtsein 
Notwendigkeit - Zufalligkeit 
(We may interpret the first two 





there does not exist 
there exist some 
Inherence and Subsistence 
Causality and Dependence 
(cause and effect) 
Community 
(reciprocity between the 
active and the passive) 
Possibility - Impossibility 
Existence - Non-Existence 
Necessity - Contingency 
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Kant calls quality and quantity mathematical categories; relation 
and modality, dynamical (KRV, 133). Novalis comments: "Wir 
konnen die Einteilung in mathematische, die sich auf die Kausalitat 
des l3egreifens, die Anschauung, und in dynamische, die sich auf die 
Kausalitat des Fiihlens griinden, beibehalten" (II, 105). Novalis 
designates quantity as "die Form der Anschauung," quality as "die 
Form des Begriffs," relations as "die Form des Gefiihls," and 
modality as "die Form der Empfindung," so that "die mat.he-
matischen Kategorien sind die Formen der Anschauung und die 
Formen des Begriffs" (II, 106). In the eighteenth century such 
mathematicians as Euler defined mathematics as limited to quanti- 1 
ty, although in their actual mathematical work they transcended 
this category. Kant formally prepares the ground for an extension 
of mathematics from the category of quantity to the category of 
quality by classifying these two categories as mathematical. Simi-
larly, Novalis attempted to extend the validity of mathematics 
beyond the category of quantity into the ranges of the other three 
categories in Kant's system. The first step in this process was to 
eliminate the barrier between quality and quantity. Hence we find 
that N ovalis was preoccupied with "Obersetzung der Qualitat und 
Quantitat, und umgekehrt" (III, 248). Novalis wonders: "Sollaller 
Unterschied nur quantitativ sein? Selbst zwischen Gott und mir? 
Absolutierung der Mathematik" (III, 23). Mathematics is to be 
absolutized and generalized, i.e., extended from quantity to quality, 
and beyond that into the dynamical categories of relation and 
modality. "Wenn jene erste die quantitative, die zweite die qualita-
tive Mathematik ist, so ist die dritte die relative Mathematik - die 
in vier Gliedersystemen und einem Universalsystem erscheint. 
(Kategorien, Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre)" (III, 22). Of this pure, 
universal mathematics N ovalis then says: "Reine Mathematik hat 
nichts mit Grosse zu tun. Sie ist blosse Bezeichnungslehre - me-
chanisch gewordener, in Verhaltnissen geordneter Gedanken-
operationen" (III, 325). Thus Novalis boldly transgresses the 
boundaries of Kant's categories and uses them in extended form in 
his own thought. Applying the categories to geometry, Novalis 
finds in this branch of mathematics "allgemeine Gesetze der Ahn-
lichkeit (Qualitat), Gleichheit (Quantitat) und der Verhaltnisse 
(Relation) ... " (III, 29). 
Kant's references to mathematics in his transcendental aesthetic 
(KRV, 75-105) are further developed by Novalis. Kant starts out 
with a definition of intuition (Anschauung). Intuition is knowledge 
(Erkenntnis) which is in immediate relation to objects ("sich auf 
Gegenstande unmittelbar bezieht," KRV, 75) (for English formu-
lations see Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique 
of Pure Reason, 2nd ed., London, 1930, p. 79). The faculty of 
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receiving representations (Vorstellungen) according to the manner 
in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) 
(KRV, 75) (see also Max Muller, I. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 
transl. into English, New York, p. 15). Sensibility supplies us with 
intuitions. Time and space are introduced as the two forms of 
intuition. Time is the form of the inward sense, of the intuition of 
our self (KRV, 89). Space, as the pure form of outward intuition, 
is limited to outward phenomena. Time and space are, according to 
Kant, the logical foundations of mathematics. "Geometrie liegt die 
reine Anschauung des Raumes zum Grunde. Arithmetik bringt selbst 
ihre Zahlbegriffe <lurch sukzessive Hinzusetzung der Einheiten in 
der Zeit zustande" (Prolegomena zu einer jeden kunftigen M etaphysik, 
Werke, 12th ed., III, Section 10). Novalis observes in this context: 
"Nach Kant bezieht sich reine Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft 
auf die Formen der ausseren Sinnlichkeit. Welche \Vissenschaft 
bezieht sich denn auf die Formen der inneren Sinnlichkeit? - Gibt 
es eine aussersinnliche Erkenntnis? Ist noch ein anderer Weg off en, 
aus sich selbst herauszugehen und zu anderen Wesen zu gelangen 
oder von ihnen affiziert zu werden?" (II, 304). The science of 
inward sensibility is probably music. Novalis associates music with 
arithmetic and algebra. A very likely chain of associations in 
Novalis' mind is: music - arithmetic - inward sense - inward 
sensibility (see Chapter IV, section "Mathematics and Music"). 
After considering the two possibilities of outward and inward 
sensibility, Novalis logically asks the next question: Is there such a 
thing as extra-sensory knowledge? Is there another road which 
will lead us to other beings, or which will lead other beings to us? 
As in the case of Kant's categories, Novalis quickly conquers the 
domain of Kant's arguments, and then pushes further into the 
unknown. Since the first element in the sequence "outward sen-
sation, inward sensation, extra-sensory perception" was mathe-
matics, and the second element appears to be mathematized inward 
sensibility as revealed in music, N ovalis' next step would be to 
mathematize extra-sensory perception. Thus Novalis was led to 
"magische Mathematik" (See Chapter IV, Section "Mathematics 
and Magic"). 
Novalis owned a copy of Kant's Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der 
Naturwissenschaft (Riga, 1786; 2. Auflage, 1787) (Werke, 12th ed., 
VII, hereafter abbreviated MAN), and used some of the ideas set 
forth in this work as points of departure for his mathematical 
thought. A major hypothesis of the MAN is that natural sciences 
may be regarded as sciences only insofar as they contain mathe-
matics: "Ich behaupte aber, class in jeder besonderen Naturlehre 
nur so viel eigen tliche Wissenschaft angetroffen werden konne, 
als darin Mathematik anzutreffen ist" (MAN, 193). The reason for 
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this assertion was already given in the KRV and in the Prolegomena 
(33), where he states that mathematical knowledge is of apodictic 
certainty and absolute necessity. Also, mathematical knowledge is 
obtained a priori. "Nun heisst etwas a priori erkennen, es aus seiner 
blossen Moglichkeit zu erkennen" (MAN, 193) (For this reason 
Kant asks in the KRV whether mathematics is possible, although it 
actually exists). "Also wird, um die Moglichkeit bestimmter 
Naturdinge, mithin um diese a priori zu erkennen, noch erfordert, 
dass die dem Begriffe korrespondierende Ans ch au u n g a priori 
gegeben werde, d. i., dass der Begriff konstruiert werde. Nun ist die 
Vernunfterkenntnis durch Konstruktion der Begriffe mathema-
tisch" (MAN, 193). Similarly, Kant states in the Prolegomena, 
p. 18: "Das Wesentliche und Unterscheidende der reinen mathe-
matischen Erkenntnis a priori ist, dass sie durchaus nicht aus 
Begriffen, sondern jederzeit nur durch die Konstruktion dieser 
Begriffe vor sich gehen muss." In this context, Novalis observes in 
his "Arithmetica universalis": "Die Frage nach der Moglichkeit der 
Mathematik zerfallt in zwei Teile - 1. Ist sie moglich? 2. Wie ist sie 
moglich? (Kants Verfahren mit der Metaphysik - die ihm mit der 
Philosophie synonym ist. Seine beriihmte Frage) (Sie ist die Frage 
nach der Moglichkeit und Konstruktionsmethode des philosophi-
schen Genies). Grundproblem der Mathematik: Gibt es ein mathe-
matisches (Leben) Genie? Wie ist es moglich? Erstere Auflosung 
liefert den Satz - die andere den Beweis, die Konstruktions-
methode dazu)" (III, 25). Questions 1 and 2 refer to the funda-
mental question in the KRV: how are a priori synthetic judgments 
possible? The question about "Genie" as another variant of Kant's 
question was already discussed in the preceding. Novalis now 
equates the question about the possibility of genius with the 
question about the possibility of constructing mathematical 
concepts. 
Fichte, Baader, Hemsterhuis, and others. The general impact of 
Fichte on Novalis is discussed by Haering (pp. 618-626). He is 
convinced that N ovalis read, immediately upon publication, most 
of Fichte's works published within the poet's lifetime. Novalis 
specifically refers to the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre 
(1794 /95) (IV, 207; II, 159). 
While Fichte seldom deals with mathematics explicitly, there is 
in his works a mathematicity of a general nature that appealed to 
Novalis. Like Descartes and Spinoza, Fichte attempts to axiomatize 
his system of philosophy (cf. Ludwig Fischer, Die Grundlagen der 
Philosophie und Mathematik, Leipzig, 1933, p. 8). Fichte begins 
with a fundamental concept, the Ego (Ich), and three axioms: the 
principle of identity, the principle of contradiction, and the principle 
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of sufficient reason, or "thesis, antithesis, synthesis." The concept 
of Ego yields in conjunction with each of the three axioms suc-
cessively the propositions: Ich bin Ich (Ego is Ego); Ich bin Nicht-
Ich (Ego is Non-Ego); Ich bin zum Teil Nicht-Ich (I am in part 
Non-Ego), or, Nicht-Ich ist zum Teil Ich (Non-Ego is in part Ego) 
(see Grundlage der gesamten Wissenscha/tslehre, Fichte's Werke, 
Leipzig: Meiner, 1922, I, 285-519). The philosophy Fichte deduces 
from his premises is reflected in numerous passages of N ovalis' 
Philosophische Studien (1795/97) (II, 103-308). For example, N ovalis 
remarks: "Alle Wissenschaften ruhen auf der einfachen Wissen-
schaft, dem einfachen, synthetisierenden Satze - Ich" (III, 28). All 
sciences are based on the Ego. But since all sciences are to be mathe-
matized, and, moreover, Fichte's "Wissenschaftslehre" (science of 
knowledge) is based on the Ego, Novalis concludes: "Die Wissen-
schaftslehre muss die Mathematik begrtinden" (II, 269). Another 
influence of Fichte on Novalis' fragments on mathematics is pointed 
out by Dietrich Mahnke in his book Unendliche Sphare und 
Allmittelpunkt, p. 2, which we briefly mentioned in the introductory 
chapter. He traces the concept of sphere in Novalis' notes on 
"Spharoidik" or mystical geometry partially to Fichte's "Ich-
Spharen." 
Benedikt Franz Xaver von Baader (1765-1841), to whom Novalis 
refers with respect and enthusiasm (II, 324; IV, 241), wrote an essay 
entitled Uber das pythagoraische Quadrat oder die vier Weltgegenden 
(1798). Novalis read this essay and described it as "nichts wie 
derbe, gediegene Poesie" (IV, 261). It is a mystical essay with vague 
mathematical associations (see David Baumgart, Franz van Baader 
und die philosophische Romantik, Halle, 1927, p. 202). In his 
Beitrage zur Elementarphysiologie (1797) Baader exalts enthusiasm 
as a force in the advancement of knowledge at the expense of the 
mathematical approach. Novalis fused enthusiasm and mathe-
matics: "Der echte Mathematiker ist Enthusiast per se" (III, 296). 
In his Elementarphysiologie Baader also demanded a "lebendige, 
dynamische Arithmetik" instead of the "tote begriffslose Addition 
und Subtraktion" (see Baader, Samtliche Werke, Leipzig, 1852-57, 
III, 236). Similarly, Novalis sought to widen the domain of mathe-
matics from quantity and quality to the dynamical categories of 
relation and modality. 
We have already dealt with Hemsterhuis' influence on Novalis' 
mathematical fragments in Section 2 of this chapter. Among other 
philosophers whose works stimulated N ovalis' thought on mathe-
matics are Eckartshausen (1752-1803) (See Chapter I, Section 3), 
Pascal's Pensees, and Spinoza. From the Encyclopedie (Paris, 
1751-1772) Novalis excerpted the following passage: "L'arith-
metique est l'art de trouver d'une maniere abregee !'expression d'un 
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rapport unique, qui resulte de la comparaison de pluseurs autres. 
Les differentes manieres de comparer ces rapports donnent les 
differentes regles de l'arithmetique. Les formules algebraiques sont 
des calculs arithmetiques indiques." 
4. MATHEMATICAL SOURCES 
FOR NOVALIS' FRAGMENTS ON MATHEMATICS 
After N ovalis' death his brother Karl compiled a list of books 
found in Novalis' library. This "Verzeichnis der Bucher, so sich au£ 
der Stube des Salinenassessors von Hardenberg befinden" (IV, 
476-481) lists several mathematical texts, or books closely related in 
subject matter. They are listed below, preceded by the numbers 
in Karl's list : 
46. Abel Burja, Mathematische Wissenschaften. [I was unable to trace this 
book]. 
54. Pierre Simon de Laplace, Darstellung des Weltsystems. Aus dem Franz6-
sischen von J. K. F. Hauff (Frankfurt, 1797-98). 2 Bande. 
95. Johann Heinrich Erich Rehbein, Versuch einer neuen Grundlegung der 
Geometrie (Gottingen, 1795). 
108. Johann Georg Busch, Versuch einer Mathematik zum Nutzen und Ver-
gnugen des burgerlichen Lebens. 4. Auflage (Hamburg, 1798). 2 Abtei-
lungen. 
126. Karl Friedrich Hindenburg, Novi systematis permutationum, combina-
tionum etc. primae liniae (Leipzig, 1781). 
127. Konrad Dietrich Martin Stahl, Anfangsgrunde der Zahlenarithmetik und 
Buchstabenrechnung, zum Gebrauch bei Vorlesungen (Jena, 1797). 
128. J. L. Lagrange, Theorie der analytischen Funktionen, in welcher die 
Grundsdtze der Differentialrechnung vorgetragen werden. Aus dem 
Franzosischen von Gruson (Berlin, 1798). 2 Bande. 
129. Abel Burja, Der selbstlernende Algebraist oder A nweisung zur ganzen 
Rechenkunst (Berlin, 1786). 2 Bande. 
130. Abraham Gotthold Kastner, Anfangsgrunde der Analysis des Unend-
lichen (Gottingen, 1760; 3. Auflage, 1799). 
131. Karl Friedrich Hindenburg, Der polynomische Lehrsatz. Sammlungen 
kombinatorisch-analytischer Abhandlungen, Band 1 (Leipzig, 1796). 
132. Heinrich August Topfer, Kombinatorische Analytik und Theorie der 
Dimensionszeichen, in Parallele gestellt (Leipzig, 1793). 
133. Georg v. Vega, Logarithmisch-trigonometrische Tafeln (Leipzig, 1793; 
2. Auflage, 1800). 
A number of other books of more general content along scientific 
and philosophical lines in this list have bearing on mathematics. 
The mere fact that N ovalis was in possession of these books does not, 
of course, imply that he used any or all of them. However, his 
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fragments on mathematics reveal at least a general acquaintance 
with them in most cases, a more intimate acquaintance with the 
books by Hindenburg and Topfer, as we have already shown in 
Section 2 of this chapter. Some of the authors are specifically 
mentioned in the "Materialien" for Novalis' projected "Arithmetica 
Universalis" (III, 23). Despite this proximity in subject matter, a 
detailed comparison of these books with N ovalis' fragments on 
mathematics fails to turn any of the latter into excerpts of the 
former, and thus fails to support frequently made claims that 
NovcJ.lis' fragments utterly lack originality. 
We shall briefly point out some peculiar aspects of the more 
important of these books with a view to elucidating N ovalis' fragments 
on mathematics. From the viewpoint of mathematics proper, the 
most important text in Novalis' possession is Lagrange's Theorie des 
fonctions analytiques, first published in 1797. Joseph Louis Lagrange 
(1736-1813) was professor of mathematics at the Royal Artillery 
School at Turin before his twenty-year long association with the 
Academy of Science in Berlin. In his Theorie des fonctions analytiques, 
and also in his Lerons sur le calcul des fonctions (1801), he had 
attempted to "give a solid foundation to the calculus by reducing 
it to algebra" (Struik, II, 191). The derivatives/' (x), f" (x), etc. are 
defined by him as the coefficients h, h2
2
, ••• h~ in the Taylor ex-
n. 
pansion of / (x - h) in terms of h. He obtained the Taylor series 
itself by a purely algebraic process that turned out to be un-
satisfactory (Struik, II, 191). Lagrange's method and aims are 
succinctly summed up in the subtitle of his book, which reads: 
(Theorie des fonctions analytiques) "contenant les principes du calcul 
differentiel, degages de toute consideration d'infiniment petits, 
d'evanouissans, de limites et de fluxions, et reduits a l'analyse 
algebrique des quantites finies (see Nouvelle edition, Paris, 1813). 
Lagrange criticises his predecessors Leibniz, Bernoulli, !'Hospital, 
Euler, and d'Alembert for their indiscriminate use of infinitesimals 
and the shaky foundations of their calculus. His own attempt to 
develop calculus without using the concepts of "vanishing quanti-
ties" (i.e., infinitesimal quantities), "fluxions" (i.e., derivatives), 
and limits proved to be just as shaky as the foundations of his 
predecessors. Nevertheless Lagrange's texts were widely used 
before the appearance of Cauchy's Cours d'Analyse de !'Ecole Royale 
Polytechnique in 1821, which presented, for the first time, satisfactory 
definitions of the concepts of limit, continuity, and derivative. Thus 
Novalis' numerous queries and suggestions on the nature of infinite-
simal calculus reflect not only the romanticist's desire to widen and 
deepen the ranges of formal mathematics for his own world view, 
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but also the general confusion about the foundations of calculus and 
other branches of mathematics manifested by the works of the 
greatest mathematicians of the time. 
Next in importance among mathematical texts owned by N ovalis 
is Kastner's Anfangsgriinde der Analysis des Unendlichen, first 
published in 1760. Kastner, whom Gauss teasingly called the first 
poet among mathematicians and the first mathematician among 
poets, steps boldly from the realm of mathematics into the region of 
poetry if it is necessary to deal with the inexplicable (cf. Cajori, 
p. 435). Before presenting his theories, he intoxicates himself and 
the reader with the enigmatic nature of the concept of infinity: 
Geheimnisse miissen doch etwas sehr reizendes fiir den menschlichen Verstand 
sein, weil man selbst in derjenigen Wissenschaft dergleichen zu haben gesucht 
hat, die seit Tausenden von J ahren, ihrer Deutlichkeit und augenscheinlichen 
Uberzeugung wegen beriihmt gewesen ist. Man sieht ohne mein Erinnern, 
dass ich die Lehre vom Unendlichen in der Mathematik meine, wie sie von 
vielen Schriftstellern, selbst solchen die das Reich der vVissenschaften dadurch 
erweitert haben, vorgetragen wird. Grossen, die unterschieden sind und 
doch als gleich angesehen werden; unendlich grosse Dinge die in V ergleichung 
mit anderen nichts, und unendlich kleine die in Verglcichung mit anderen 
unendlich gross sind; krumme Linien, die aus geraden Teilchen bestehen, 
welche gerade Teilchen man nach Gefallen wieder kriimmt wie man will, 
und unzahlig andere solche Satze die wider die ersten Griinde aller mensch-
lichen Erkenntnis anzustossen scheinen, sollen von den Schiilern der Mathe-
matik als die erhabensten Lehren ehrfurchtsvoll angenommen werden. 
Konnte Aberglauben was mehr von seinen Anbetern fordern, wenn er nach 
Hallers Ausdrucke: mit Rauch die schimmernden Gewolber fiillt? 
(Kastner, Anfangsgrunde, p. iii). 
Then Kastner, professor of mathematics at the University at 
Gottingen, and Gauss' teacher, continues: "Wie sich der kiihne 
Ausdruck eines Dichters von dem vielleicht logisch richtigern, aber 
trockenen Vortrage unterscheidet, so ist ohngefahr die Rechnung 
des Unendlichen von den Beweisen der Alten unterschieden: auch 
hat das feste Land sie zuerst von einem Geiste gelernt, bei dem sich 
der Witz des Dichters, die Einsicht des Philosophen, die Griind-
lichkeit des Geometers und die Belesenheit des Polyhistors ver-
einigten" (Kastner, p. iv; he obviously refers to Leibniz). Thus 
Kastner juxtaposes the rigor of ancient geometry with the looseness 
of the calculus of his own age. Ancient geometry had dealt mainly 
with finite magnitudes. Modern calculus rests on the fundamental 
concepts of infinity and infinitesimals. Of the latter two, however, 
eighteenth-century mathematicians still had a dim and muddled 
conception. In the above passages Kastner points out some of the 
seeming paradoxes associated with the concepts. The infinite and 
infinitesimal, as upper and lower limits of expansion, spacial and 
temporal, physical and imaginary, were of particular interest to the 
early German Romanticists, notably Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel. 
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Both linked these concepts with mathematics. Even Kastner feels 
that the poetic boldness of the calculus based on these concepts 
compensates its lack of rigor. 
Kastner actually denies the existence of infinitely large and small 
quantities. To determine the differential, Kastner considers the 
function Z of the independent variable z. If z is given an increment 
e, Z will become Z + E. "If now e is indefinitely diminished, the 
limit which the ratio E : e approaches indefinitely, is called the 
ratio of the differentials of Zand z, and the infinitely small quantities 
e and E are called the differentials of z and Z" (Kastner, p. 10, as 
translated by Boyer, op. cit., p. 250). Thus Kastner does not 
distinguish between increments and differentials, yet he cannot 
avoid the use of infinitely small quantities in his discussion, despite 
his denial of their existence (cf. Boyer, p. 250 and Cantor, IV, 642). 
A mathematician will see how far removed Kastner was from a 
precise and satisfactory definition of the derivative and differential 
and realize the effect of arguments based on such insufficient 
definition on N ovalis' mind. 
Abel Burja's Der selbstlernende Algebraist, another text Novalis 
owned, is interesting and instructive as it illuminates eighteenth-
century groping for a foundation of calculus. In this book an 
attempt is made to pass over from the calculus of finite differences 
to differential calculus. A first difference is defined (II, 79) as 
Liz= L1 (xy) = yL1x + xL1y + L1xL1y, 
where z = xy 
the second difference as 
L1 2z = 2L1xL1y + yL1 2x + xL1 2y + 2L1xL1 2y + 2L1yL1 2x + L1 2xL1y 
Then he introduces the operator I: as the inverse of the L1 operator 
(II, 100, 101), so that 
I: (xL1y + yL1x + L1xL1y) = xy 
i.e. I: {L1 (xy)} = xy. 




Liz = y L1x + xL1y + L1xL1y, 
z = xy 
Burja then explains: "Sind nun L1x und L1y sehr klein in Ver-
gleichung mit x und y, so hat man beinahe 
(2) Liz = yL1x + xL1y." 
The expression (1) is called "vollstandige Differenz," (2) is called 
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"unvollstandige Differenz" or "Differential" (II, 141). Similarly, 
a transition is made from the operator .E to J. 
Burja's book Der selbstlernende Algebraist reveals once more the 
primitive conception of the basis of calculus in the late eighteenth 
century. Yet, as a professor of mathematics at the Academie 
militaire at Berlin, he must be regarded as a full-fledged mathe-
matician of his time. His algebra for self-study was widely used, 
especially among non-professional mathematicians. It is, therefore, 
of extreme importance to our evaluation of Novalis' fragments on 
mathematics. 
Novalis' fragments on mathematics contain casual references to 
the following mathematicians or physicists: Kliigel, Newton, Bezout, 
Vieth, Monch, Stahl, Kastner, Schulz, and others (for a few details 
see Hamburger, p. 117). 
Although Novalis' published fragments refer only once to Euler 
(III, 67; Euler's views on the nature of light), his fragments on 
mathematics indicate that he was directly or indirectly acquainted 
with Euler's Institutiones Calculi Differentialis (Auctore Leonardo 
Eulero. Impensis Academiae Imperialis Scientiarum Petropolitanae, 
1755; especially: Caput III: De infinitis atque infinite paruis, 
pp. 70-97), in particular, with Chapter III on infinity. Novalis or 
his teachers no doubt used also the German translation of this work by 
J. A. Ch. Michelsen, professor of mathematics and physics at the 
Berlinisches Gymnasium (Leonhard Eulers Vollstandige Anleitung 
zur Differential-Rechnung. Aus dem Lat. iibersetzt von Johann 
Andreas Christian Michelsen, Berlin & Libau, 1790, 3 Teile; 
especially 3. Kapitel: Von dem Unendlichen und dem unendlich 
Kleinen, pp. 71-100). In the preface to his Institutiones Calculi 
Differentialis Euler defines differential calculus as the method of 
determining the ratio between vanishing increments of the variables 
of a function: 
Und auf diese Art sind wir zu der Definition des Differential-Calciils gelangt, 
welcher nichts anderes ist, als die Methode, <las Verhaltnis der verschwin-
denden Incremente zu bestimmen, welche die Funktionen veriinderlicher 
Grossen bekommen, wenn die veriinderliche Grosse, wovon sie Funktionen 
sind, um ein verschwindendes Increment vermehrt worden. Dass diese 
Erkliirung die Natur des Differential-Calciils ausdrucke, ja sogar erschopfe, 
wird jeder einsehen, der in diesem Teile der hoheren Mathematik kein 
ganzlicher Fremdling ist. Es beschaftigt sich also die Differentialrechnung 
nicht sowohl mit diesen lncrementen selbst, denn diese sind Nullen; sondern 
vielmehr mit der Erforschung des Verhiiltnisses, welches sie zueinander 
haben: und da sich diese Verhaltnisse <lurch endliche Grossen ausdrucken 
lassen, so muss man auch eigentlich sagen, dass die Differential-Rechnung 
endliche Grossen zum eigentlichen Gegenstande habe. 
(Michelsen's transl., pp. liii-liv). 
Cantor summarizes Euler's position in the development of calculus 
as follows: "Er entfernt sich von Leibniz, indem er von dem Unend-
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lichkleinen nichts wissen will, er nimmt auch nicht mit Berkeley 
einander aufhebende Irrtiimer an, er verschmaht Newtons Grenz-
werte, er sieht in den Differentialen wirkliche Nullen, in den 
Differentialquotienten Briiche mit Nullen im Zahler und Nenner, 
welche aber gleichwohl einen endlichen Wert besitzen" (Cantor, 
III, 724). Joseph Ehrenfried Hofmann also declares that Euler's 
book "ist im Grundlegenden (die Differentiale werden als Nullen 
erklart) unbefriedigend" (Geschichte der Mathematik. 3 Teil: Von den 
Auseinandersetzungen um den Calculus bis zur franzosischen Revo-
lution, Berlin, 1957, p. 59; this volume is extremely enlightening 
with regard to the background of N ovalis' fragments on mathe-
matics). Euler's Institutiones Calculi Differentialis, the most im-
portant and influential study of differential calculus in the eighteenth 
century, reveals once again the fluctuating foundation of this 
subject at that time and the many points of departure, especially 
with regard to infinity and infinitesimals, for Novalis' fragments. 




NOVALIS' FRAGMENTS ON MATHEMATICS, PART ONE 
MATHEMATICS DISCUSSED PHILOSOPHICALLY 
Hardenbergs Fragmente iiber die 
Mathematik enthiillen die letzte Ab-
sicht seines Denkens und seiner 
Wissenschaft (p. 214). 
EDGAR HEDERER, 1949 
1. BASIC CONCEPTS 
Novalis gave much thought to mathematical method. He realized 
that if in a mathematical system certain rules were followed con-
sistently and persistently enough, more and more results could be 
obtained. The mere realization of this did not gratify his intellectual 
curiosity. He explored such basic mathematical concepts as 
definition, axiom, proof, and theorem for their validity and possible 
extension to other fields of knowledge. 
In this chapter we shall see how he enlisted the critical apparatus 
of fields of knowledge other than mathematics to elucidate and settle 
in his own mind the conceptual foundation of mathematics. In the 
next chapter we shall examine his employment of mathematical 
distinctions in branches of knowledge outside the domain of mathe-
matics proper and the physical sciences. 
In modern mathematics a distinction is sometimes made between 
object and syntax language. Mathematical symbols and formulae and 
their various combinations are in the first category; explanatory 
verbal remarks, in the latter. Object language is circumscribed by 
definition; syntax language is used to introduce and elucidate 
object language, and is then, if possible, discarded, because it 
smuggles in various nonmathematical, and hence disturbing and 
irrelevant, connotations. In such branches of mathematics as 
modern algebra and symbolic logic, attempts are being made to 
reduce all syntax language to object language, or, at least, to 
introduce the latter with a minimum of the former. For example, 
the expression "there exists" is replaced by the symbol 3 . This 
symbol is to prevent the student from obscuring the mathematical 
arguments, in a spontaneous overflow of emotions, or uninhibited 
lyrical response, by discoursing along the lines of "to be or not to 
be," or in terms of some metaphysical concept of existence, in the 
course of which the original "question" may elude him. P. Rosen-
bloom succinctly distills our distinction: "We use the object language 
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to talk within the science and the syntax language to talk about the 
science" (The Elements of Mathematical Logic, New York, 1950, 
p. iii). N ovalis and his contemporaries talked more about mathe-
matics than within it. Euler, for example, frequently dissertates 
broadly (the modern mathematician would be tempted to say: 
loosely) on his subject, and does not hesitate to use such words as 
"mysterious," or to make an occasional prophecy. In the third 
chapter of his Institutiones Calculi Differentialis, a work already 
mentioned in the preceding chapter, he claims distinction between 
zeros of various orders and predicts that henceforth there should 
be no doubt about the subject. However, this distinction soon 
proved erroneous. At the other extreme, the modern mathematician 
diligently and laboriously weeds out all traces of human effort and 
toil until he finally obtains an ethereal structure so impersonal and 
objective that one cannot possibly tell, nor does one desire to know, 
who obtained the result. Yet the structure is so lucid and compelling 
that each individual has the vague sensation that he may have 
composed it himself a long time ago. 
If we bear this distinction in mind, we will be better able to 
appreciate N ovalis' more impulsive and extemporaneous utterances. 
Novalis enunciates that the essence of mathematics resides in its 
method: "Die mathematische Methode ist das Wesen der Mathe-
matik. Wer die Methode ganz versteht, ist Mathematiker" (III, 
255). He who has completely grasped mathematical method is a 
real mathematician, and not the one that knows all results but 
cannot deduce them. He continues: "Sie ist als die wissenschaft-
liche Methode iiberhaupt hochst interessant und gibt vielleicht 
das richtigste Muster zur Einteilung des Erkenntnis- und Er-
fahrungsvermogens her" (III, 256). Moreover, mathematical 
method is perhaps the best tool to obtain knowledge and assimilate 
experience. This enunciation of Novalis' fundamental belief 
prepares us for his observations on more specific mathematical 
concepts. 
Definition. A mathematical system is usually initiated by 
definitions, even if the elements of the system are, by definition, 
undefined. N ovalis digs deeper and begins with a definition of 
definition: "Definitionen sind a us sere (Merkmalsverzeichnungen) 
oder innere (Elementenverzeichnungen) oder gemischte. Es sind 
Konstruktionsformeln" (III, 20). A definition may be external 
or internal, or mixed. External definitions are descriptive labels, 
internal definitions are prescriptive within the system of elements. 
He continues: "Indirekte Definitionen sind Rezepte. Zu den 
Rezepten gehoren die Experimentalvorschriften oder Beschrei-
bungen (Positive und negative Definitionen)" (III, 20). Definitions 
are construction formulae or recipes. N ovalis distinguishes between 
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positive and negative definitions. By the former he means defining 
an object in terms of what it is; by the latter, in terms of what it is 
not. The importance of adequate definitions is realized by N ovalis 
when he says: "Bessere Thesen (Definitionen) wiirden eine Menge 
Satze iiberfliissig machen" (III, 20). Better definitions would 
render many theorems or propositions superfluous. The validity of 
this assertion is demonstrated by the modern streamlining of mathe-
matics. Some of Euclid's definitions, e.g., that a point is that which 
has no part, have been eliminated as having no effect on the system, 
i.e., as not disturbing its consistency pattern, or as useless in formal 
proofs of theorems. Novalis also reflects on the problem of the 
relative priority of definitions and the results deduced from them. 
"Aber wie erfahren wir denn, was eine Theorie ist? Es muss die 
Lehre von den Gesetzen eines Dinges sein. Den Anfang muss die 
Definition des Dinges machen. Aber Definition ohne Gesetze? wie 
ist die anticipando moglich?" (II, 203). There is some doubt 
in Novalis' mind as to the actual order of precedence of definition 
and theory. 1 Do we really start out with arbitrary definitions in a 
mathematical system, or do we already have the results of the 
theory in mind and then fit the definitions to the theory? Logically, 
definition, i.e., the statement of first principles, comes first, but 
actually the historical development of mathematics shows numerous 
instances where a result was first obtained intuitively or empirically, 
and then placed on a substructure of definitions and axioms. One 
only need to consider the many definitions of number that have 
been offered at the various stages of the development of mathematics. 
Novalis further comments on definition: "Eine Definition ist ein 
realer oder generierender Name. Ein gewohnlicher Namen ist nur 
eine Nata... Die reale Definition ist ein Zauberwort" (II, 377). 
Also: "Definition ist ein Faktum. Die Bezeichnung dieses Faktums 
ist die gemeinhin sogenannte Definition" (II, 383). These fragments 
show that at the back of Novalis' mind there are Aristotle's "Real-
definitionen (Angaben des Wesens, Begriffskonstruktionen) und 
Nominaldetinitionen (Benennungen)" (these formulations are found 
in W. Dubislav, Die Definition, 3rd ed., Leipzig, 1931, p. 7). Novalis 
emphasizes the realness of definition. As soon as a detinition, no 
matter how arbitrary, is made, it becomes a fact. By definition we 
create and generate things and ideas. Novalis' conception of 
definition as a genetic notion parallels the concept or "schopferische 
Definition" in formal discussions of definition (see Dubislav, p. 59). 
Such a definition is like a magic word: if you want something, you 
define it, and it comes into existence. Novalis' magic idealism rests 
largely on this idea of creative, or genetic definition. The necessity 
for anticipation of the basic structure of a system, when making 
definitions to introduce the system, is stressed by Novalis in the 
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following fragment: "Einfache Definitionen gibts nicht zuerst - je 
mehr man zugleich definiert - desto richtiger wird jede einzelne 
Definition. Definieren en masse - Wissenschaft. Die Definition 
ist die Konstruktionsformel der Begriffe etc." (III, 161). The more 
definitions are made simultaneously, the better the chance is that 
they will be consistent. Somehow definition must be reduced to a 
universal principle. N ovalis weighs the possibility that God is the 
source of all definitions: "Definition und Klassifikation der Wissen-
schaften - notwendiges und vollstandiges Prinzip der Definition und 
der davon abhangenden besonderen Definitionen und Klassifi-
kationen. Das hi:ichste Prinzip ist der hi:ichste Grad. Dem hi:ichsten 
realen Grad entspricht der hochste ideale Grad. Sollte Gott das 
Ideal des Grades, und die Definition von Gott - der Keim 
aller Definitionen sein? Sollte die Definition Gottes und die 
Definition des Infinitesimalgrades unendlich sein, so mussen wir bei 
der Definition eines Mittelgrades id est eines endlichen Grades 
anfangen - oder mit der allgemeinen Definition des Grades iiber-
haupt" (III, 207). 
Axiom. Another crucial mathematical concept discussed by 
Novalis is axiom, or postulate. His preoccupation with this concept 
is also rooted in his time, during which the time-honored puzzle 
about one of Euclid's axioms began to resolve itself. Although 
Euclid's Elements had been accepted as valid for about two thousand 
years, there is one point in it that was challenged from the earliest 
times, namely, his parallelity axiom: "If a straight line falling on 
two other straight lines makes the interior angles on the same side 
of the line less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if 
produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which the angles are 
less than two right angles" (as quoted in L. R. Eisenhart, Coordinate 
Geometry, Boston, etc., 1939, p. 280). Since this axiom did not 
appear to be simple enough to be self-evident, attempts were made 
to convert it into a theorem by deducing it from the other axioms. 
In 1733 Saccheri tried to furnish the proof by a reduction to the 
absurd. He replaced the parallel axiom by an axiom contradicting 
it, in the hope of producing inconsistent conclusions. Instead of 
obtaining the contradictions, he laid the foundation for non-
Euclidean geometry. This branch was formally proposed by 
Lobachevsky and Bolyai around 1825 and proved in its consistency 
by Cayley in 1859. Novalis sensed the uneasiness about the founda-
tions of mathematics in his time and was induced to probe into the 
meaning of axiom. 
In the preceding chapter we already quoted Novalis' following 
translated excerpt from Hemsterhuis' Aristee: "Axiomen beruhn 
auf sinnlicher Dberzeugung. Die kunstliche, gemachte Dberzeugung 
geht vom Axiom aus. Die letztere hat die erstere verdrangt - Sie 
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ist so scharf umrissen - jene hingegen so einfach als moglich -
daher aber so unscheinbar - Sie ist auch mitteilbar, welches jene 
nicht ist" (II, 293). Novalis says with Hemsterhuis that axioms 
are based on "sensuous conviction." He is referring to geometrical 
axioms which originally were regarded as propositions obvious to 
the senses, in this case, to the sense of vision, whereas in modern 
mathematics all such considerations are regarded as irrelevant and 
superfluous. In Novalis' time, axioms were regarded as un-
provable propositions, the "truth" of which should be obvious to 
any person endowed with a normal and healthy dose of "common 
sense." In modern, formalistic treatment of mathematics, axioms 
are regarded as unprovable, or rather unproved, propositions with 
the only restriction that a given set of axioms shall not give rise to 
contradictory results. The modern mathematician does not rely on 
sense perception, or on some vague notion of obviousness, or of 
common sense. Novalis observes, in the passage just quoted, that 
once an axiom has been accepted, it generates artificial, make-
believe conviction ("kiinstliche, gemachte Dberzeugung"), i.e., 
more complicated results are not immediately, if they are at all, 
obvious to the senses. This is an important insight on the part of 
Novalis at a time prior to publication of non-Euclidean con-
siderations. Then N ovalis proceeds to state: "Die letztere hat die 
erstere verdrangt," i.e., the feigned or simulated conviction has 
superseded the sensuous conviction. N ovalis is thus aware of the 
gradual supersession of the empirical basis of mathematics by the 
postulational foundation. One of ancient axioms of geometry which 
states that there is one and only one line passing through any two 
distinct points was obvious to the sense of vision and therefore 
assumed the status of truth. Nowadays, axioms are simply assumed 
to be true, or just stated without reference to truth or falsity. How-
ever, as soon as propositions are made in terms of these axioms, the 
propositions may be regarded as true or false with respect to the 
axioms, or as deducible or not deducible from the axioms, or as 
consistent or inconsistent with the set of axioms. In the following 
excerpt from Dumas the emphasis is on the old conception of 
"absolute truth:" "Vollkommene Uberzeugung ist das Gefiihl von 
absoluter Wahrheit. Absolute Wahrheit fur uns ist Identitat der 
Ans cha u ung und des Wes ens eines Objekts. Jedes echte Axiom 
ist der Ausdruck eines solchen absolut Wahren" (II, 285). Two 
final comments of Novalis on the postulation of axioms will attest 
to Novalis' conception of axiom as independent of physical reality: 
"Voraussetzen bedeutet, vom Gegenstande gebraucht, eine Hand-
lung vor der Existenz, eine Antizipation - denn das Setzende wird 
erst moglich durch ein Setzen - dieses Setzen ist aber urspriinglich 
gleich - gegensetzen" (II, 132). "Axiome und Postulate bezeichnen 
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das theoretische (a) und praktische (b) Wissensvermi:igen uberhaupt. 
Aufgaben bezeichnen den Trieb. Auflosung und Beweis das ana-
lytische (ad a) und synthetische (ad b) Vermogen" (II, 256). 
Theorem. N ovalis distinguishes between what theorems are and 
what they should be. Like Leibniz, d' Alembert, and Goethe, he 
finds that most theorems are tautological, i.e., the conclusion of a 
theorem is merely a more succinct restatement of its hypothesis: 
"Die meisten mathematischen Satze gleichen alle dem Satz a= a. 
Jeder mathematische Satz ist eine Gleichung" (III, 21). However, 
in accordance with Kant's conception of a theorem as a synthetic, 
and not analytic, judgment, Novalis demands: "Lehrsatze mussen 
etwas N eues aussagen, etwas was nicht in der Definition (Be-
zeichnung der eigentumlichen N atur) begriffen ist. Sie mussen, 
nach der Kunstsprache, synthetisch sein" (III, 20). 
The specific theorems marginally annotated by N ovalis are the 
binomial (III, 37, 79, 201) and Pythagorean (III, 22) theorems. 
Proof. We have discussed Novalis' fragments on definition, 
axiom, and theorem. The concept linking and separating the three 
is proof, since theorems are proved in terms of definitions, axioms, 
and possibly other theorems. N ovalis observes: "Der Beweis ist 
eine indirekte Konstruktion - ein mathematisches Experiment -
ein Rezept" (III, 21). Also: "Grund problem der Mathematik. 
(Gibt es ein mathematisches (Leben) Genie? Wie ist es mi:iglich? 
Erstere Aufli:isung liefert den Satz - die andere den Beweis, die 
Konstruktionsmethode dazu)" (III, 25) (cf. also Chapter II, 
Section 3). Proof is an indirect construction of a theorem from 
definitions and axioms. Proof, furthermore, is a "mathematical 
experiment," i.e., obtained by experimentation with definitions and 
axioms. Proof is a "recipe," Novalis says, using his favorite medical 
metaphor. A recipe is a prescription, and proof, likewise, is a 
prescription of the steps leading to the establishment of a theorem. 
In order to extend the mathematical method of demonstration to 
a more general range, Novalis postulates an isomorphism between 
calculating and thinking: "Der Beweis ist die Rechnung, deren 
Resultat der zu beweisende Satz ist. Rechnen und Denken ist 
eins ... " (III, 24). However, as soon as this extension has taken 
place and the solid ground of mathematics has been abandoned, 
proof loses its attribute of absolute certainty, and on this state 
Novalis remarks in a Kantian vein: "Alles ist demonstrabel = 
alles ist antinomisch. Es gibt eine Sphare, wo jeder Beweis ein 
Zirkel - oder ein Irrtum - wo nichts demonstrabel ist -diesistdie 
Sphare der gebildeten goldenen Zeit" (III, 227). No sooner Novalis 
seems to attain for himself clarification of the nature of proof, when 
he already begins to cast doubt on its validity. He is reminded of 
the antinomy of pure reason, as presented by Kant in the Kritik der 
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reinen Vernunft, where first a thesis is proved, then the corre-
sponding antithesis (e.g., the world has a beginning in time; the 
world has no beginning). N ovalis is also reminded of the constant 
danger of getting entangled in a circular proof. He hopes that in 
some Utopia all proving will be superfluous, and hence circular, or 
circular, and hence superfluous. Perhaps a generalization of proof 
along the lines of Fichte's Science of Knowledge ("Wissenschafts-
lehre") would yield a science of knowledge of mathematics: "Ver-
such, das zu beweisen und aufzulosen - zu konstruieren, was die 
Mathematik nicht beweist oder auflost - Wissenschaftslehre 
der Mathematik. Applikatur der Aufgaben und Lehrsatze -
Verkniipfung derselben - Scientifizierung der Mathematik" 
(III, 257). 
2. GEOMETRY 
General Remarks. Novalis defines: "Die Mathematik der Krafte ist 
die Mechanik. Die Mathematik der Gestalten ist die Geometrie" 
(III, 17). ,,Krafte" is here not only used as "force" in the usual 
physical sense, but also as a potential, a function, something that is 
effective but intangible, an entity not unlike the monad of Leibniz. 
Mechanics is the mathematics of such forces, geometry is the mathe-
matics of shapes and figures. Mechanics is dynamic, geometry is 
static. Mechanics deals with inward elusive forces; geometry, with 
outward, visible characteristics. As the embodiments of the static 
and dynamic, geometry and mechanics become spiritual forces to 
Novalis. These forces are effective beyond their respective proper 
domains, as exemplified by the influence on philosophy and science 
of the atomistic and dynamic views of matter and energy and the 
various attempts to fuse them: "Die Verwandschaft der Geometrie 
und Mechanik mit den hochsten Problemen des menschlichen Geistes 
iiberhaupt leuchtet aus dem atomistischen und dynamischen Sekten-
streit hervor" (III, 229). 
To clarify further the distinction between geometry and me-
chanics, Novalis identifies geometry with "Plastik," mechanics with 
"Akustik." "Geometrie ist transzendentale Zeichenkunst -
Plastik. (Mechanik - transzendentale Akustik etc.)" (III, 160), or, 
"Geometrie und Mechanik verhalten sich wie Plastik und Musik" 
(III, 118). Thus geometry is also opposed to arithmetic, because 
Novalis links music with arithmetic (see Chapter IV, Section 7). 
Since geometry is related to "den hochsten Problemen des mensch-
lichen Geistes iiberhaupt," it should perhaps be treated in the most 
general theory of external characteristics: "Sollte die Geometrie zum 
Teil nach der Lehre von den ausseren Kennzeichen iiberhaupt 
behandelt werden konnen?" (III, 31). What does Novalis mean by 
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a general theory of external characteristics? An explanation of such 
a theory is suggested by certain developments in scientific methods 
of classification in the eighteenth century. The Linnaean system of 
classifying plants by their external characteristics had turned a 
seemingly chaotic agglomeration of plants into a vegetable kingdom 
ruled by law and order. Part of the classification was based on the 
number and geometric patterns of stamens and pistils. This method 
became definitive after the 1758 edition of the Systema naturae 
(1735) by Linnaeus, the well-known botanist of the time. Werner, 
Novalis' teacher, and the most authoritative geologist of the time, 
had raised mineralogy to the status of a science through his method 
of classifying minerals by external characteristics, and, in this 
connection, N ovalis speaks of the "Mathematizitat der oryktognos-
tischen Klassifikation" (III, 228). In exploring the mathematicity 
of Werner's classification, Novalis also weighed the possibility of 
determining the algebraic pattern of the theory of external charac-
teristics. For this reason he wonders in the following fragment: 
"Sollte die Geometrie zum Teil nach der Lehre von den ausseren 
Kennzeichen iiberhaupt behandelt werden?" (III, 31). Then he 
states more positively: "Allgemeine Oryktognosie - oder alge-
braische Oryktognosie. Grundsatze der Lehre von den ausse-
ren Kennzeichen iiberhaupt" (III, 30). As a final explanatory 
note on Novalis' preoccupation with a possible mathematical 
general theory of external characteristics we may again refer to 
Leibniz' search for a "characteristica generalis," which had led him 
to the mathematical theory of permutations and combinations. 
Geometry may, in the opinion of Novalis, begin either with real 
bodies, or with imaginary points: "Anfang der Geometrie mit 
wirklichen Korpern - Anfang mit Punkten. Figurensystem. -
Raumbegrenzungs- und Raumerfiillungssystem" (III, 151). Ele-
mentary geometry is higher than higher geometry, because the 
highest and purest is also the simplest. The more complicated and 
involved a science becomes, the more readily it loses its purity, 
N ovalis holds. "Das Hochste und Reinste ist das Gemeinste, das 
Verstandlichste. Daher ist auch die Elementargeometrie 
ho her als die ho here Geometrie. J e schwieriger und verwickelter 
eine Wissenschaft wird, desto abgeleiteter, unreiner und ver-
mischter ist sie" (III, 20). On this point Novalis is in agreement 
with Goethe. 
Point. Ever since Euclid had defined a point, philosophers have 
been endeavoring to define and interpret this concept in various 
contexts. Novalis adds his own comments to this discussion: "Der 
Punkt kann nicht als bewegt gedacht werden" (II, 192). "Philo-
sophie des Punkts-Seine Entstehung" (III, 151). Euclid's definition 
of a point as that which has no part had been repeated for two 
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thousand years, until Hilbert eliminated this definition as useless 
for strict mathematical argumentation. Hilbert introduces point, 
along with straight lines and planes, as undefined elements: "\Vir 
denken drei verschiedene Systeme von Dingen: die Dinge des 
ersten Systems nennen wir Punkte und bezeichnen sie mit 
A, B, C, ... ; die Dinge des zweiten Systems nennen wir Geraden 
und bezeichnen sie mit, a, b, c, ... ; die Dinge des dri tten Systems 
nennen wir Ebenen und bezeichnen sie mit a, ~' y; die Punkte 
heissen auch die Elemente der linearen Geometrie, die Punkte und 
Geraden heissen Elemente der ebenen Geometrie, und die Punkte, 
Geraden und Ebenen heissen die Elemente der rdumlichen Geometrie 
oder des Raums" (David Hilbert, Grundlagen der Geometrie, 7th ed., 
Leipzig und Berlin, 1930, p. 2). Points, lines, and planes are not 
defined, or are by definition undefined, because an explicit definition 
of these elements is not required for the system. However, pro-
positions made in terms of these elements, restrict their meaning 
and post-define them, as it were. Thus we are again reminded of 
Novalis exploration of the relative priority of definitions and the 
system resting on them. 
Line. The definition of a straight line has undergone a change 
similar to that of a point. Euclid defined it as length without 
breadth, which, again, is a definition useless from the mathematical 
point of view. Hilbert introduces it as an undefined element, as we 
have just seen. Novalis juxtaposes straight lines with curves 
(krumme Linien). To him straight lines symbolize the schematism 
and regularity of man's mind, whereas curves represent unpre-
dictable nature and organic life: "Krumme Linie - Sieg der freien 
N atur iiber die Regel" (III, 101). "Alle krummen Linien entstehen 
nur <lurch sich selbst, wie Leben nur <lurch Leben entsteht" (III, 
151). 
C£rcle. N ovalis states: "Simplizitat des Zirkels - seine leichte 
Konstruktion. Dbergange der Kegelschnitte ineinander. Ent-
stehung aus Gleichungen gerader, entgegengesetzter Linien" 
(III, 151). "Auch instinktartig ist der Zirkel der Figuren Kanon" 
(III, 251). To Novalis the circle is the canonical form of all geo-
metric figures, including the conical sections. However, at the 
bottom of the ancient problem of squaring the circle is the supposition 
that the square must be regarded as the protoform of all figures: 
"Anwendung der vorigen Bemerkung auf die Quadratur des Zirkels. 
Ihr liegt die Hypothese oder das Postulat zum Grunde, dass der 
Urtyp der Zirkelform das Quadrat sei. Das Problem des Zirkels 
ist also das Problem der Reduktion aller Figuren aufs Quadrat -
oder umgekehrt aller Figuren auf die Runde. Je grosser wir die 
Teilungszahl dieser Figur machen - eine desto genauere Auflosung 
erhalten wir. Eine unendliche Teilungszahl gibt uns eine unendlich 
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genaue Auflosung. Differential- und Integralrechnung" (III, 177). 
The problem of squaring the circle with straightedge and compass 
was proved to be insoluble by Lindemann in 1882. But for over two 
millenia prior to this date, philosophers, mathematicians, and 
laymen racked their brains in an attempt to solve the problem. The 
problem of squaring the circle was first posed, along with two others: 
doubling the cube and trisecting an angle under the same re-
strictions, by Greek mathematicians. Merriman indicates the 
historical context of these problems as follows: "Joined by its sister 
problems, that of trisecting an arbitrary angle and that of con-
structing a square equal in area to that of a given circle, the problem 
of duplicating a cube was food for centuries of thought, of experi-
ment, of frustration, of mystery - and of fruitfulness" (Gaylord M. 
Merriman, To Discover Mathematics, New York, 1942, p. 125). 
These problems came to be regarded as transcending the boundaries 
of human intelligence and hence were classified in the same category 
as the problems of finding the philosopher's stone or the elixir of 
life. For this reason, Novalis equates the question "Lasst sich ein 
Zirkel quadrieren?" with the fundamental question of Kant's 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft: "Sind synthetische Urteile a priori 
moglich?" (cf. III, 230-231; see also Chapter II, Section 3). 
Thus Novalis' fragments on geometry in general, and on the 
concept of circle in particular, reveal associations with mystical 
thought. Dietrich Mahnke and Maurice Besset take Novalis' 
cryptic note "mystische Geometrie" (III, 248) as a clue for their 
interpretation of some of Novalis' fragments on geometry in 
mystical contexts. 
3. ARITHMETIC AND ALGEBRA 
General Comments. Novalis seldom discusses details of arithmetic 
proper, but is usually concerned with this branch of mathematics in 
the extended sense of "arithmetica universalis." For example: 
"Unsere Buchstaben sollen Zahlen, unsere Sprache Arithmetik 
werden" (III, 18). "Philosophische Arithmetik - reine - hohere -
spezielle und angewandte Arithmetik" (III, 132). Similarly, algebra 
is generalized: "Die Basis aller Wissenschaften und Kiinste muss 
eine Wissenschaft und Kunst sein - die man der Algebra ver-
gleichen kann" (III, 76). Novalis advocates, or considers the 
possibility of, applying algebra to metaphysics (II, 188, 280), music 
(III, 127, 206), and poetry (III, 118). Algebra includes the theory 
of general relations: "Die Lehre von den Verhaltnissen gehort in die 
Algebra" (III, 241). Hence algebra is not confined to number only. 
In fact, pure algebra does not deal with number at all: "In der reinen 
Algeber kommen keine Zahlen vor" (III, 23). Novalis thought of 
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his universal mathematics as a system that would, through progres-
sive generalizations, include all knowledge and all spheres of mental, 
volitional, emotional, and aesthetic existence. One such stage of 
generalization had been achieved by the expansion of arithmetic 
into algebra, by the replacement of the distinct number by 
the unspecified algebraic letter. The next stage would be the 
transition from quantitative to qualitative relationships. In 
Section 3 of the preceding chapter we already discussed No-
valis' preoccupation with "Dbersetzung der Qualitat in Quan-
titat und umgekehrt" (III, 248) and "relative Mathematik" (III, 
22) in preparation of an extension of mathematics from Kant's 
mathematical categories of quantity and quality to the dynamical 
categories of relation and modality. Thus, in delimiting the range 
of mathematics, Novalis had gone beyond Kant, whereas Kant had 
gone beyond the leading mathematicians of his day by his designation 
of both quantity and quality as mathematical categories. Whereas 
Kant had extended mathematics beyond the category of quantity, 
and Novalis had said "Reine Mathematik hat nichts mit Grosse zu 
tun" (III, 325), the noted eighteenth-century mathematician Euler 
still confined mathematics to the realm of magnitude: " ... indem 
die Mathematik iiberhaupt nichts anderes ist als eine Wissenschaft 
der Grossen, und welche Mittel ausfindig macht, wie man dieselben 
ausmessen soll," although Euler's own work transcends this range 
(see Vollstandige Anleitung zur Algebra, Leonardi Eulera Opera 
Omnia, Series prima, Volumen primum, Lipsiae et Berolini, 1910, 
p. 9; first published in St. Petersburg in 1770). Modem mathe-
maticians disagree with such a narrow definition of mathe-
matics. Some branches of mathematics deal mainly with quality, 
not quantity. For example, B. v. Kerekjart6 defines topology, a 
branch of mathematics, as follows: "Die Topologie oder Analysis 
Situs ist derjenige Teil der Geometrie, der die bei stetigen Trans-
formationen ungeandert bleibenden Eigenschaften der Gebilde 
untersucht. Diese sind Zusammenhangs- und Lagenverhaltnisse, 
sozusagen Eigenschaften von qualitativer Natur" (Vorlesungen 
iiber Topologie, Die Grundlehren der mathematischen Wissen-
schaften, ed. R. Courant et al., VIII, Berlin, 1923, p. 1). 
In the light of these progressive generalizations of "arithmetica 
universalis" from numbers and figures through letters toward the 
most inclusive system of concepts we can read intelligently the 
following verses of N ovalis: 
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Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren 
Sind Schlussel aller Kreaturen, 
W enn die so sing en, oder kiissen 
Mehr als die Tiefgelehrten wissen, 
Wenn sich die Welt ins freie Leben, 
Und in die Welt wird zuruckbegeben, 
Wenn dann sich wieder Licht und Schatten 
Zu echter Klarheit werden gatten, 
U nd man in Marc hen und Gedichten 
Erkennt die ewgen W eltgeschichten, 
Dann fliegt vor einem geheimen Wort 
Das ganze verkehrte Wes en fort. 
These lines are found among the paralipomena to "Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen" (I, 244, 251). The continuation of this fragmentary 
novel was to include a sublimation of the sciences, including mathe-
matics. This intent is indicated by several of the paralipomena to 
the novel: "Allerhand Wissenschaften poetisiert, auch die Mathe-
matik im Wettstreit," "Klingsohr - Poesie der Wissenschaften" 
(I, 242). According to Tieck's report on the continuation of "Ofter-
dingen," Novalis intended to devote one of the six sequels to this 
novel to physics, i.e., to the physical sciences, which presumably 
includes mathematics: "Es war die Absicht des Dichters, nach 
Vollendung des "Ofterdingen" noch sechs Romane zu schreiben, in 
denen er seine Ansichten der Physik, des burgerlichen Lebens, der 
Handlung, der Geschichte, der Politik und der Liebe, so wie im 
"Ofterdingen" der Poesie niederlegen wollte" (I, 250). 
Novalis sometimes speaks of "kritische Algebcr" (III, 206): 
"Algeber und kombinatorische Analysis sind durchaus kritisch. 
Die unbekannten Glieder findet man <lurch Syllogistik - kombina-
torische Operationen der gegebenen Glieder. (Vide Kants Ver-
fahren)" (III, 229). In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft Kant had set 
the critical approach to problems of pure reason above dogmaticism 
and scepticism. In accordance with this method, N ovalis, in his 
turn, sifts, weighs, and combines his ideas critically, avoiding 
dogmaticism and scepticism, i.e., the convenient, uncritical ac-
ceptance of an idea on the one hand, and the equally convenient 
categorical denial of an idea on the other hand. The general algebra 
that N ovalis hoped to attain should also be critical. Pure algebra 
and pure philosophy would merge into a universal science:"All-
gemeine Satze sind nichts als algebraische Formeln. Die reine 
Philosophie ist daher gerade so etwas wie die Letternalgebra. So 
eine Formel kann ein Gattungs-, ein Klassen- und Lokalzeichen 
sein" (II, 383). 
N ovalis also expresses his views on the demarcation of the 
boundaries between algebra and other branches of mathematics. He 
is particularly concerned with a distinction between algebra and 
analysis. We find among his fragments a brief note specifying 
"Unterschied der Analysis und Algebra" (II, 333) as well as more 
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specific comments: "Die Differentialrechnung ist die K ri ti k -
die Integralrechnung - die Auflosung - jene lehrt die Daten 
ordnen - zu Gleichungen - diese die Gleichungen auflosen. Jene 
ist die Algeber - diese die Analysis - denn Algeber und Analysis 
verhalten sich auch so zueinander" (III, 236). However, more 
generally, algebra and analysis are one science: "Sie, die Algeber 
und die sogenannte Analysis machen eine Wissenschaft aus" 
(III, 99). 
The distinction between analysis and algebra was of some concern 
to the combinatorial school. Klugel writes in his essay in Hinden-
burg's collection Der polynomische Lehrsatz, p. 48: "Die Analysis 
endlicher Grossen besteht aus zwei Hauptteilen, die zwar <lurch 
gegenseitige Hilfsleistungen mit einander verbunden sind, aber 
nicht einer auf dem anderen beruhen ... Diese beiden Teile sind die 
Algebra und die Analysis im engeren Verstande. Jene be-
schaftigt sich mit den Eigenschaften der Gleichungen, der Zu-
sammensetzung und Entwicklung derselben... Die eigen tliche 
Analysis hat zum Gegenstand iiberhaupt die Formen der Grossen, 
namlich teils die Umwandlung einer Form in eine andere, teils die 
Darstellung der Glieder einer stetigen Fortschreitung <lurch die 
zugeordneten Glieder einer anderen Reihe nach irgend einem 
Gesetze ... " N ovalis' discussion of the boundaries between algebra 
and analysis are no doubt at least in part induced by the pre-
occupation of the combinatorial school with this problem. 
Number. Novalis probes into the origin of this concept. He be-
lieves that the basic function of human reason underlying the 
origin of the concept of number is counting: "Wer zuerst bis zwei 
zu zahlen verstand, sah, wenn ihm auch selbst das Fortzahlen noch 
schwer ward, doch die Moglichkeit einer unendlichen Fortzahlung 
nach denselben Gesetzen" (III, 347). Novalis' association of the 
origin of number with the mental process of enumeration parallels 
both the conception of the origin of number of some modern 
philosophers and historians of mathematics and the modern postu-
lational definition of number as part of a sequence with a given 
definition of the relation of one of its elements to its predecessor. 
In contemplating the origin of number, Novalis probes further into 
its mysterious aspects: "Merkwiirdige, geheimnisvolle Zah-
len. Wie das Zahlen noch neu war, so mussten oft vorkommende 
Zahlen beim Zahlen wirklicher Dinge - charakteristische bleibende 
Zahlen wie z. B. die 10 Finger etc. - und andere frappante Zahlen-
phanomene die Einbildungskraft der Menschen aufs lebhafteste 
beschaftigen und sie in der Wissenschaft der Zahlen einen tief-
verborgenen Schatz von Weisheit - einen Schlussel zu allen ver-
schlossenen Turen der Natur ahnden lassen" (III, 151). Novalis 
sometimes touches on the ontological aspect of number: "Der 
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Begriff des Zahlens bezieht sich nur auf das einfache Sein - es ist 
ein einfaches Fixieren dieses einfachen Zustandes" (II, 206). 
Counting may be homogeneous or heterogeneous: "Dber das homo-
gene und heterogene Zahlen - Zahlen des Gleichartigen - Zahlen des 
Ungleichartigen - Eins <lurch das andere "(III, 159). Numbers are 
abstracted in counting and are therefore, not unlike poetry, freely 
created: "Alles aus nichts erschaffene Reale, wie z. B. die Zahlen 
und die abstrakten Ausdriicke - hat eine wunderbare Verwandt-
schaft mit Dingen einer anderen Welt, mit unendlichen Reihen 
sonderbarer Kombinationen und Verhaltnisse, gleichsam mit einer 
(mathematischen und abstrakten Welt an sich, mit einer) poetischen, 
mathematischen und abstrakten Welt" (III, 167f.). 
Like Goethe, N ovalis regards both numbers, the mathematical 
elements, and words, the literary elements, as strata of an all-
inclusive symbolic language: "Die allgemeinen Ausdriicke der 
scholastischen Philosophie haben sehr viel Ahnlichkeit mit den 
Zahlen - daher ihr mystischer Gebrauch - ihre Personifikation -
ihr m usikalischer Genuss - ihre unendliche Kombination" 
(III, 167). Words and numbers are often discussed by Novalis 
under the same categories: "Zahlen und Wort Gestaltenlehre 
z. B. Reihen etc. Zahlen und Wort Mechanik - Geschwindigkeits-
lehre.)" (III, 172). "Zahlen sind wie Worte, Erscheinungen, Repra-
sentationen kat' exochen. Ihre Verhaltnisse sind Weltverhaltnisse" 
(III, 295). "Zahlen und Worte sind Zeitdimensionsfiguren und 
Zeichen. Wort- und Zahlfigurationen" (III, 260) (See also Chapter 
IV, Section "Mathematics and Language"). 
Magnitude. Novalis' discussion of "Grosse" (quantity, magnitude, 
or entity) is found mainly in the section entitled "Mathematische 
Fragmente" (III, 20-23). We cite one of his general formulations of 
the concept: "Der Begriff Grosse driickt das Verhaltnis zu einem 
gemeinschaftlichen Begriff, oder Ganzem, zu einer Einheit 
wenn man will, aus. Der Anteil am gemeinschaftlichen Begriff 
bestimmt die Grosse - Dieser gemeinschaftliche Begriff mag nun 
Zahl oder Kraft, oder Ausdehnung, oder Richtung, oder Stoff, 
oder Lage - oder Helligkeit oder sonst des etwas sein" (III, 21). 
Now according to Novalis, the task of mathematics is to determine 
the dissimilarities in similarities with reference to a common 
characteristic. But mathematics also determines the similarities in 
the peculiar characteristics: "Die Mathematik bestimmt den Unter-
schied im Gemeinschaf tlichen - die Ungleichheiten im Gleichen. 
Sie unterscheidet in Beziehung auf das gemeinschaftliche 
Merkmal. Und die Mathematik bestimmt auch (setzt) die Ahnlich-
keiten, die Gemeinheiten im eigentlimlichen Merkmal. Dort macht 
sie Unterschiede - hier hebt sie Unterschiede auf" (III, 22). Thus 
mathematics deals with various magnitudes and entities trans- , 
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cending the more restricted range of purely quantitative units. 
He also deals with quantitative magnitude. He points out that a 
quantity may be expressed or approximated by a series. For 
example, 3 is represented by the series 
" 2 + ½ + ! + ¼ + etc. " (III, 23) 
He specifies: "Ist die Reihe geschlossen, bestimmt, so ist auch die 
Grosse bestimmt - ist die Reihe unendlich, so ists auch die Grosse" 
(III, 23). "Infinite" here refers to the limit approached by the 
terms of the series, and not only to the number of terms, which is 
usually infinite anyhow, since an infinite series may approach a 
finite limit, as is exemplified by N ovalis' above-quoted own example 
of a convergent series. By a series that is "geschlossen und be-
stimmt" Novalis means a convergent series, by an infinite series, 
i.e., a series with an "infinite limit," a divergent series. The meaning 
of his fragment is, therefore, equivalent to saying that a quantity is 
finite or infinite according to the convergence or divergence, 
respectively, of the series representing the quantity. 
Novalis further denies the existence of absolute, indivisible, non-
decomposable magnitudes. A magnitude is either divisible into its 
component parts, or may be approximated by a series, or in some 
other way: "Jede Grosse ist ein Aggregat - ein Teilbares, eine Reihe, 
Kette - eine schlechthin einfache Grosse gibt es nicht" (III, 23). 
A magnitude is best comprehended with regard to its opposite, or as 
an unknown in terms of known magnitudes: "Ich verstehe eine 
Grosse, wenn ich in ihrer Aquation auf der anderen Seite eine 
Funktion der Gegengrosse habe. Eine Hauptantithese der Mathe-
matik ist, bekannte und unbekannte Grossen" (III, 79). 
Novalis' observations on the concept of "Grosse" again indicate 
his preoccupation with an extension of mathematics beyond its 
usual domain. On the one hand, mathematics is to be extended 
beyond the mere manipulation of quantitative magnitudes of 
entities. On the other hand, or rather, from the other end, this 
extension is to be effected by an expansion of the concept of 
"Grosse" itself. Thus he can state ideally: "Reine Mathematik hat 
nichts mit Grosse zu tun" (III, 325). 
Basic Operations. Novalis examines the interrelations of various 
basic operations: "Die Verhaltnisse der drei Rechnungsarten 
1. + und - 2. X und : 3. an und v versteh ich recht gut; wie 
verhalt sich aber das Differentiieren und Integrieren und das Ver-
wandeln in Reihen und Reduzieren der Reihen dazu? Das Loga-
rithmisieren ist ein Appendix zu Nr. 3. Die Bruchlogarithmen sind, 
wie die Bruchexponenten, nur Approximationen zu Rational-
logarithmen und Exponenten" (III, 21). Novalis points to the 
elementary facts of arithmetic and algebra that subtraction is the 
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inverse of addition, multiplication an abbreviation of repeated 
addition, division the inverse of multiplication, etc. However, he is 
uncertain about the classification of differentiation and integration 
within the same framework of distinctions, i.e., in terms of the other 
basic operations. A modern mathematician may feel that the very 
attempt to classify differentiation and integration in the same 
category as the traditionally basic arithmetical and algebraic 
operations is questionable from the outset. To meet such a possible 
objection we must again consider the state of mathematics toward 
the end of the eighteenth century. We could cite, in particular, 
Lagrange's Theorie des fonctions analytiques, where he attempted to 
reduce differential calculus to algebra by offering a purely algebraic 
process of finding the derivative (See Chapter II, Section 4). 
Lagrange's book was published in 1797. The German translation of 
this work, of which Novalis owned a copy, came out in 1798, and the 
fragment by N ovalis inquiring about the classification of differen-
tiation and integration in terms of algebraic or arithmetic operations 
was written during 1798-1799, according to the Havenstein-
Kluckhohn chronology of N ovalis' fragments. It is manifest that in 
the contexts of the history of mathematics Novalis' question was 
very timely. Moreover, Novalis' cautious formulation of the 
problem as a question proved prudent, because Lagrange's opinions 
on this matter, though highly authoritative, were soon discarded. 
Some of Novalis' fragments deal with mathematical operations 
with a view to their extension to more general philosophical 
problems: "Synthetische Kalklile z. B. Addieren und Subtrahieren 
- Addieren und Multiplizieren - etc .... Erschopfen der Arten des 
Kalki.il <lurch kombinatorische Kunst. Um das ordentlich zu 
bewerkstelligen, muss man aber erst die Begriffe der einzelnen 
Kalki.ile kritisch betrachtet haben. - Der gewohnliche arithmetische 
Kalki.il im ganzen ist ein kombinatorisches Addieren etc." (III, 25). 
Mathematical operations reveal the art of defining and combining 
definitions. The theory of numbers is a preparatory stage in the 
development of a philosophical calculus: "Kalki.il = Kunst, Be-
stimmungen zu verbinden, oder Kunst zu bestimmen iiber-
haupt, z. B. aus gegebenen Bestimmungen nicht gegebene Be-
stimmungen zu finden. Rechnungslehre - Bestimmungsver-
wandtschaftslehre. Die Zahlenlehre macht die Rechnungslehre 
moglich - bereitet sie vor" (III, 153). N ovalis contends that some 
day a calculus of philosophical abstraction will enable man to 
analyze satisfactorily empirical data. One is reminded of the extra-
ordinary ascendency of statistical method since Novalis' death. 
However, Novalis meant more than statistical analysis of data: 
"Man geht mit den Erfahrungen und Experimenten noch viel zu 
sorglos um - Man versteht sie nicht zu benutzen - Man betrachtet 
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zu wenig die Erfahrungen - als Data zur Auflosung und mannig-
faltigen Kombination zum Kalktil - ... Der Abstraktionskalktil der 
Philosophie ist vollkommen dem Infinitesimalkalktil zu vergleichen" 
(III, 156). Another fragment stresses the philosophical aspects of 
mathematical operations: "Mathematik. Allgemeiner Begriff der 
Multiplikation - nicht bloss der mathematischen - so der Division, 
Addition etc. Vorztiglich interessant ist diese philosophische Be-
trachtung der bisher bloss mathematischen Begriffe und Operatio-
nen - bei den Potenzen, Wurzeln, Differentialen, Integralen, 
Reihen - Kurven - und Direkten - Funktionen" (III, 79). In 
Chapter IV, Section "Mathematics and Philosophy," more analogies 
between mathematical and philosophical operations will be discus-
sed. 
4. ANALYSIS 
General Comments. Novalis' general discussion of the meaning and 
the origin of "Analyse" and "Analysis" is not restricted to mathe-
matical analysis. Analysis is diametrically opposed to synthesis, 
yet both are inseparably linked: "Der analytische Gang muss ein 
synthetischer sein et vice versa - es kommt nur darauf an, an 
welches Ende man sich stellt. Der analytische ist <lurch eine 
Synthese, der synthetische <lurch eine Analyse bedingt" (II' 74). 
Synthesis is subjective, analysis is objective and formal: "Synthe-
tisches V erfahren ist nach der Weise des reinen Ich - analytisches 
Verfahren nach der Weise der blossen Form" (II, 240). These 
opposites are reconciled in God: "Gott ist die Sphare aller Analyse 
und Synthese - ein theoretisch und praktisch notwendiger Begriff" 
(II, 268). Since synthesis is subjective and analysis is objective, 
pure science proceeds from analysis to synthesis: "Die reine Wissen-
schaft geht analytisch id est sie geht mittelst der Analyse auf 
Synthese" (II, 270). Reflections on analysis led Novalis to a con-
sideration of combinatorial analysis, one of his favorate subjects. 
Combinatorial analysis must be exhaustive: "In der Kombinations-
lehre liegt das Prinzip der Vollstandigkeit - so wie in der Analysis -
oder der Kunst, aus gegebenen Datis die unbekannten Glieder zu 
finden" (III, 209). The danger involved in striving for exhaustive 
thinking is getting entangled in a labyrinth of erratic speculation. 
The danger is diminished by the pursuit of a definite goal that 
unifies and directs our thought: "Die blosse Analyse - die blosse 
Experimentation und Beobachtung ftihrt in unabsehliche Raume 
und schlechthin in die Unendlichkeit. - 1st sie poetischer Natur und 
Absicht, so mags sein; sonst muss man absolut einen Zweck -
mit Recht einer genannt - haben oder setzen, damit man sich 
nicht in diese Spekulation, wie in ein Labyrinth - einem Wahn-
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witzigen vollig gleich, verliert. Hier ist der Sitz der so beriichtigten 
Spekulation - des verschrienen, falschen Mystizism - des Glaubens 
an die Ergriindung der Dinge an sich" (III, 169). The poetical 
analyst may be permitted to drift to infinity, but the ideal analyst 
must subject his divinatory powers to strict rules: "Die Analysis ist 
(die Divinations- oder) die Erfindungskunst auf Regeln ge-
bracht -- ihre mogliche Ausbreitung und Vervollkommnung" 
(III, 162). 
We shall now consider Novalis' meditations on analysis in the 
more restricted sense of mathematical analysis, in particular, 
infinitesimal calculus. 
Infinitesimal Calculus. Novalis compares the methods of Newton 
and Leibniz, the two inventors of calculus, and points to the diffi-
culties underlying the foundations of their methods: "Die Ver-
schiedenheit der Leibnizischen und Newtonschen Vorstellungsart 
von der Rechnung des Unendlichen beruht auf demselben Grunde 
als die Verschiedenheit der atomistischen und Vibrations- oder 
atherischen Theorie. Die Fluxion und das Differential sind die 
entgegengesetzten Anschauungen des mathematischen Elements -
beide zusammen machen die mathematische Substanz aus. Es 
beruht au£ dem Satze x + y = +. Dieses Plus ist das Differential 
oder die Fluxion der Funktionen von x und y. Die proportionelle 
Einteilung dieses Plus ist die Hauptschwierigkeit dieses Kalkiils. 
Leibniz nennt den Infinitesimalkalkiil auch die Analysis Indivisi-
bilium (Steter Grossen - stetig iibergehender Grossen). lnfinite-
simalkalkiil heisst eigentlich Rechnung, Einteilung oder Messung 
des Nichteingeteilten - Nichtvergleichbaren - Unermesslichen" 
(III, 229). The main difficulty in the foundation of calculus is, 
according to Novalis, the "proportional division of the plus," i.e., of 
the differential. In order to explain what he means by this, we 
consider Newton's definition of "fluxion" as contained in his treatise 
Quadrature of Curves (1704): "In the same time that x, by flowing, 
becomes x + 0, the power xn becomes (x + 0)n, i.e., by the method 
of infinite series 
n2 - n xn + nO X n-1 + 2 02xn-2 + etc. 
and the increments 
0 
n2 - n 
and nO X n-l + 2 02 X n-2 + etc. 
are to one another as 
1 
n2 -n 
to nxn-I + - 2- 0 X n-2 + etc. 
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Let now the increments vanish, and their last proportion will be 
1 to nxn-1: hence the fluxion of the quantity x is to the fluxion 
of the quantity xn as 1: nxn-1. The fluxion of lines, straight or 
curved, in all cases whatever, as also the fluxions of superficies, 
angles, and other quantities, can be obtained in the same manner 
by the method of prime and ultimate ratios. But to establish in this 
way the analysis of infinite quantities, and to investigate prime and 
ultimate ratios of finite quantities, nascent or evanescent, is in 
harmony with the geometry of the ancients; and I have endeavored 
to show that, in the method of fluxions, it is not necessary to 
introduce into geometry infinitely small quantities" (quoted in 
Cajori, op. cit., p. 198). Cajori points out that when O (which here 
is an infinitesimal) becomes nothing, the ratio 
0 - = nxn-1 
0 ' 
which needs further elucidation. This method had met with dif-
ficulties and objections (Cajori, pp. 198-199). For this reason, 
N ovalis claims that the main difficulty of this calculus resides in the 
"proportionelle Einteilung" of the differential, i.e., in the ratios and 
proportions involved in Newton's definition. The difficulty is 
further emphasized by George Berkeley's claim in the Analyst (1734) 
that the fundamental idea of supposing a finite ratio to exist between 
terms absolutely evanescent - "the ghosts of departed quantities," 
as he called them - was absurd and unintelligible (Cajori, p. 219). 
Leibniz failed to clarify the ratio of the infinitesimals, so did Euler 
in his Institutiones Calculi Differentialis. However, Euler's work 
further illuminates Novalis' assertion that the main difficulty of the 
calculus lies in the "proportionelle Einteilung" of the differential. 
Euler regards the infinitesimal calculus as the study of the ratios of 
infinitesimals: "In der Infinitesimalrechnung tut man aber nichts 
anderes, als dass man sich mit der Untersuchung des geometrischen 
Verhaltnisses zwischen verschiedenen unendlich kleinen Grossen 
beschaftigt, und dabei wiirde man in die grosste Verwirrung geraten, 
wofern man nicht diese unendlich kleinen Grossen mit verschiedenen 
Zeichen bezeichnete" (Inst. Cale.Di//., Michelsen's translation, 
p. 81). Euler equates infinitesimals to zero, but resists their desig-
nation by the symbol of zero, in order to be able to distinguish 
between various infinitesimals on the one hand, and between the 
infinitesimals and actual zeros. We quote Euler in greater detail: 
Eine unendlich kleine Grosse aber ist nichts anderes als eine verschwindende 
Grosse, und folglich in der Tat 0. Diese Erkliirung des unendlich Kleinen 
stimmt auch mit der iiberein, wenn man darunter Grossen versteht, die klei-
ner sind als jede Grosse, die sich angeben liisst. Denn wenn eine Grosse 
kleiner ist als jede Grosse, die sich angeben liisst, so muss sie notwendig 0 
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sein; weil sich, wenn sie es nicht ware, eine andere ihr gleiche Grosse angeben 
liesse, welches wider die Voraussetzung streitet. Wir beantworten daher die 
Frage, was eine unendlich kleine Grosse in der Tat sei, au£ die Art, dass wir 
sagen, sie sei in der Tat 0; und dieser Begriff enthalt keins von den grossen 
Geheimnissen, welche man gemeiniglich in ihm findet, und wodurch man 
, sich verleiten lasst, wider die ganze Rechnung des unendlich Kleinen einen 
Verdacht zu £assen. Sollten indes einige Zweifel stattfinden, so werden solche 
in der Falge, wenn wir die Rechnung vortragen werden, ganzlich gehoben 
werden. 
(Euler, Inst. Cale. Diff., Michelsen's transl., I, 79-80). 
Thus Euler is convinced in this work that equating infinitesimals to 
zero would solve the difficulties of calculus. However, regarding all 
infinitesimals as absolute zeros, and yet realizing the inequality of 
the infinitesimals relative to each other, compels Euler to introduce 
his famous distinction between various zeros: 
Da wir also gezeigt haben, dass eine unendlich kleine Grosse wirklich Null 
ist, so miissen wir vor allen Dingen dem Vorwurfe begegnen, warum wir die 
unendlich kleinen Grossen nicht bestandig mit dem Zeichen 0 bezeichnen, 
sondern dazu besondere Zeichen gebrauchen. Denn da alle Nullen einander 
gleich sind, so scheint es iiberfliissig, dass man sich zu ihrer Bezeichnung 
verschiedener Zeichen bedient. Allein obgleich jede zwei Nullen einander 
gleich sind, so dass sich zwischen ihnen gar keine Differenz findet: so gibt 
es <loch zwei Arten der Vergleichung der Grossen, wovon die eine die arith-
metische und die andere die geometrische ist. Bei jener sehen wir auf die 
Differenz, bei dieser auf den Quotienten, der aus der Vergleichung der 
Grossen entspringt; und obgleich das arithmetische Verhaltnis zwischen 
jeden zweien Nullen gleich ist, so ist es deswegen doch das geometrische 
nicht. Man sieht dies sehr deutlich an dieser geometrischen Proportion, 
2 : 1 = 0 : 0, worin <las vierte Glied eben sowohl 0 ist als das dritte. Aber 
wegen der Natur der Proportion muss, da das erste Glied doppelt so gross 
ist als das zweite, das dritte Glied auch doppelt so gross sein als das vierte. 
Dies ist auch selbst aus der gemeinen Arithmetik einleuchtend. Denn da, 
wie jeder weiss, die Null, mit irgendeiner Zahl multipliziert, wieder Null 
gibt, oder n.O = 0, und also n : 1 = 0 : 0 ist: so fallt daraus in die Augen, 
dass zwei Nullen, ob sie gleich, arithmetisch betrachtet, in dem Verhaltnisse 
der Gleichheit stehen, dennoch dieses geometrische Verhaltnis nicht gegen 
einander haben. Da also die Nullen jedes Verhaltnis zueinander haben 
konnen, so bedient man sich, um diese Verschiedenheit anzuzeigen, mit 
Recht verschiedener Zeichen, zumal, wenn man das geometrische Verhaltnis, 
welches zwischen ihnen statt findet, untersuchen soll. (Ibid., 80-81). 
Euler's discussion of proportions involving zeros already met with 
criticism toward the end of the eighteenth century. But since 
Euler, as we just saw, defined calculus as the study of the ratios of 
zeros, i.e., infinitesimals, it is understandable why Novalis regarded 
"die proportionelle Einteilung" of the differential as the principal 
puzzle of infinitesimal calculus. 
N ovalis' definition of calculus is semantic. In modern mathe-
matics this type of definition is looked upon with suspicion. Yet 
despite all formalization, streamlining, and re-defining of mathe-
matics in recent times, one cannot altogether deny the appro-
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priateness of the term "infinitesimal calculus." In a different 
context, we have already discussed the following sentence from 
Novalis' fragments: "Infinitesimalkalkiil heisst eigentlich Rech-
nung, Einteilung oder Messung des Nichteingeteilten - Nicht-
vergleichbaren - Unermesslichen." Infinitesimal calculus 
literally means calculus, subdividing or measuring of the in-
divisible, incommensurate, immeasurable. No matter how diligently 
Euler had tried to compare, subdivide, and measure the various 
zeros, Novalis had doubts about this procedure and felt impelled 
to investigate the relation between various proportions involving 
ill-defined entities like infinity and infinitesimals. Not unlike Euler, 
Novalis sets up proportions involving infinity (oo) and infinite-
simals(:): 
1 
(2 X oo) : l : : 2 : -
~
(III, 102) 
One of Euler's comments on such proportions may be regarded as 
a commentary on the specific proportions of Novalis just quoted: 
"Da sich also geometrisch die unendlich kleine Grosse zur endlichen 
verhalt, wie die endliche Grosse zur unendlich grossen: so muss die 
endliche Grosse eben so unendlichmal grosser sein als die unendlich 
kleine, wie die unendliche Grosse unendlich mal grosser ist als die 
endliche. An dergleichen Redensarten muss man sich nicht stossen, 
wie viele tun, denn sie beruhen auf den festesten Grunden" (Inst. 
Cale. Diff., Michelsen's transl., I, 86). It can be readily verified that 
the two proportions given by Novalis hold, if we operate with the 
sign oo as was done in the eighteenth century, and do not introduce 
various orders of infinity or apply the limiting process employed in 
modern mathematics. 
Then Novalis introduces what he calls the fundamental formula 
of infinitesimal calculus: "Die Grundformel des Infinitesimalkalkiils: 
a " -.oo=a 
00 
(III, 37). 
Haering (p. 551) interprets this formula as follows: "d. h. jede 
Grosse ist gleich einer unendlichen Summe unendlich kleiner Teile 
derselben." This interpretation is acceptable if we bear in mind that 
during Novalis' time no distinction was generally made between 
various orders of infinity. Novalis' formula 
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a 
= . ==a 
is a special case of the expression 
x:~(: .x), 
namely, the case, where both x's tend to infinity of the same order. 
The expression may also approach zero or infinity, depending on 
whether the first or the second x approaches infinity of a higher 
order. This fact is also partially confirmed by Euler: "Es lasst sich 
leicht zeigen, dass das Produkt aus einer unendlich grossen und 
einer unendlich kleinen Grosse nicht bloss eine endliche Grosse, wie 
schon vorher angemerkt worden ist, sondern auch eine unendlich 
grosse und eine unendlich kleine Grosse sein kann. W enn z. B. die 
unendliche Grosse ;x [note that to Euler dx equals zero] durch die 
unendlich kleine Grosse dx multipliziert wird, so ist das Produkt 
eine endliche Grosse = a; wenn aber ;x durch dx2 oder dx3 oder ein 
anderes unendlich kleines von einer hoheren Ordnung multipliziert 
wird, so ist das Produkt entweder adx, oder adx2, oder adx3 etc. 
und also unendlich klein" (Inst. Cale. Diff., Michelsen's transl., 
I, 90). Let us read another passage from Euler's Institutiones Calculi 
Diff erentialis in support of our claim that N ovalis' manipulation of 
zeros and infinity is in line with the mathematical procedures of 
some of the great, and many lesser, mathematicians of the eighteenth 
century: "Da also das Zeichen = eine unendlich grosse Grosse be-
deutet, so hat man daher die Gleichung, d: = =, deren Richtigkeit 
auch daraus erhellt, weil man durch die Umkehrung !!_ = dx = 0 = er halt" (Ibid., I, 84-85). 
In Chapter II, Section 3 we have already discussed Novalis' 
questions "Gibt es eine Erfindungskunst ohne Data, eine absolute 
Erfindungskunst?" and "Gibt es eine Rechnung des Unendlichen?" 
as variants of Kant's fundamental question of pure reason whether 
synthetic a priori judgments are possible. Novalis' latter question 
is also justified in view of the state of calculus in the eighteenth 
century. 
Novalis extends calculus beyond the strictly mathematical 
domain in a manner similar to his extension of geometry, arithmetic, 
and algebra: "Der Differentialkalkiil scheint mir die allgemeine 
Methode, das Unregelmassige auf das Regelmassige zu reduzieren 
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- es durch eine Funktion des Regelmassigen auszudriicken - es mit 
dem Regelmassigen zu verbinden - das Regelmassige zu dessen 
Meter zu machen - es mit demselben zu logarithmisieren" (III, 252). 
Using the predicate or attribute "infinite" in various associations, 
N ovalis gropes for a "philosophical calculus": "Der unendlich ver-
diinnten Kraft entspricht der unendlich einfache Stoff - und die 
unendlich lange Auflosungszeit. Der unendlich einfache Stoff ist 
auch der unendlich kleine Stoff - der Punkt - die unendlich diinne 
Kraft ist auch die unbegrenzte, das ist ungegliederte Kraft oder 
reine Bewegung - der Weltraum des Chaos - die unendlich lange 
Auflosungszeit ist die Ewigkeit ante - die Weltzeit des Chaos. 
Philosophischer Differential- und Integralkalkiil" (III, 
177-178). The entire method of abstraction, so common in philo-
sophy, bears a striking resemblance to calculus: "Der Abstrak-
tionskalkiil der Philosophie ist vollkommen dem Infinitesimalkalkiil 
zu vergleichen" (III, 156). Novalis is fully aware of his use of 
calculus in contexts deviating from the usual. For example, after 
applying some of the criteria of calculus to history, he remarks: 
"Integration und Differentiation nehme ich hier nicht ganz in der 
gewohnlichen Bedeutung" (III, 243). 
We must remember, as we read Novalis' reflections on calculus, 
that they are momentary flashes in his mind hastily jotted down, 
to be revised and partially discarded before using them in his 
universal encyclopedia. 
Function, Continuity, Infinity. Novalis' fragments on these con-
cepts are discussed in detail by Hamburger (128ff.). The reader is 
referred also to·the summary of her views in Chapter I, Section 3 of 
this book. We will therefore not take them up again in this section. 
Novalis' concept of infinity is touched upon throughout the present 
study. Its relevance in literary criticism is taken up in the next 
chapter, in the section entitled "Mathem_atics and Literature." 
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CHAPTER IV 
NOVALIS' FRAGMENTS ON MATHEMATICS, PART TWO 
MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS PROJECTED 
INTO FIELDS OF KNOWLEDGE 
OTHER THAN THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES 
Alle Wissenschaften sollen Mathematik 
werden. Die bisherige Math~matik ist 
nur die erste und leichteste Ausserung 
oder Offenbarung des wahrhaft wissen-
schaftlichen Geistes (III, 18). 
NO VALIS 
1. MATHEMATICS AS THE IDEAL SCIENCE AND THE BASIS 
FOR A UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF KNOWLEDGE 
In the preceding chapters wehavealreadyalluded to Novalis' grand 
aim of unifying all branches of knowledge in a universal encyclopedia 
using mathematics as a linking principle. We also saw how Novalis 
tries to give meaning to mathematical distinctions outside the 
proper realm of the various branches of mathematics. In this 
chapter, we shall first consider what properties of mathematics 
made Novalis set this science above all others. Then we will examine 
his application of mathematical concepts to various branches of 
knowledge. 
Novalis' preoccupation with an encyclopedia of knowledge is 
rooted in the period in which he lived. During the eighteenth 
century many encyclopedias were planned and published, notably 
the French Encyclopedie (see Haering, pp. 57ff.). This encyclopedia 
proclaimed the advent of the age of science and placed great 
emphasis on mathematics. In fact, one of its most prominent 
editors was the mathematician d' Alembert. 
Why did Novalis elect mathematics as the guiding and normative 
principle for his encyclopedia? Mathematicians were the only ones, 
Novalis contends, who had revealed a truly scientific spirit in their 
endeavors. "Echter wissenschaftlicher Geist hat vorziiglich bisher 
bei den Mathematikem geherrscht" (III, 248). Therefore all 
sciences are to become mathematics: "Alle Wissenschaften sollen 
Mathematik werden. Die bisherige Mathematik ist nur die erste 
und leichteste Ausserung oder Offenbarung des wahrhaft wissen-
schaftlichen Geistes" (III, 18). An essential requirement for a 
universal encyclopedia is an ordering principle. N ovalis holds that 
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the mathematical "force" is an ordering force: "Die mathematische 
Kraft ist die ordnende Kraft" (III, 257). To reduce to order is to 
classify, categorize, and organize. These activities require a capacity 
of acute discernment, which, in its turn, is based on a faculty of 
perceiving differences. This latter ability is, according to Novalis, 
mathematical: "Waren wir nicht von Grund auf mathematisch, so 
nahmen wir gar keine Unterschiede etc. wahr" (III, 160). Our 
very thinking process is mathematical: "Rechnen und Denken ist 
eins. Soviel Denkhandlungen - und soviel Zusammensetzungen 
derselben, soviel Rechnungsarten. Nur unvollkommenes Rechnen 
ist vom Denken iiberhaupt verschieden - so wie das unvollkommene 
und besondere Denken vom Denken iiberhaupt" (III, 24). The 
application of mathematics to our thinking process is further 
explored in the following fragment: "Mathematische Logik. An-
wendung der Mathematik auf die Denklehre - Schnelligkeit -
und Reichhaltigkeit des Denkens - nicht auch Starke des 
Denkens. Grade des Den kens. Die Sprache ist ein Gedanken-
meter. Scharfes Denken - eindringliches Denken" (III, 198). Or 
again: "Man bildet das Auge und die Denkkraft mathematisch - der 
Geist rechnet aus den durch das Auge ihm kritisch gegebenen Datis 
- nach Regeln der Reduktion der perspektivischen Ansicht - die 
wahre Grosse, Gestalt, Kraft etc. und die Entfernung des Gegen-
standes" (III, 195). 
Perhaps mathematics is not just a science in the usual sense, but a 
universal scientific tool, human reason objectified and embodied in 
an outward form: "Am Ende ist die ganze Mathematik gar keine 
besondere Wissenschaft, sondern nur ein allgemein wissenschaft-
liches Werkzeug - ein schones Werkzeug ist eine contradictio 
in adj e ct o . Sie ist vielleicht nich ts als die exoterisierte, zu einem 
ausseren Objekt und Organ gemachte Seelenkraft des Verstandes, 
ein realisierter und objektivisierter Verstand" (III, 71). 
Novalis' glorification of mathematics as a science culminates in 
some of his so-called "hymns to mathematics": 
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Die ganze Mathematik ist eigentlich eine Gleichung im 
grossen fiir die anderen Wissenschaften. 
Was ihr die Logarithmen sind, das ist sie den anderen Wissen-
schaften. 
Der Begriff der Mathematik ist der Begriff der Wissenschaft 
iiberhaupt. 
Alle Wissenschaften sollen daher Mathematik werden. 
Die jetzige Mathematik ist wenig mehr als ein speziell empiri-
sches Organon. 
Sie ist eine Substitution zur bequemeren Reduktion - ein 
Hiilfsmittel des Denkens. 
Ihre vollstandige Anwendbarkeit ist ein notwendiges Postulat 
ihres Begriffs. 
Die reine Mathematik ist die Anschauung des Verstandes als 
Universum. 
Die hohere Mathematik enthalt am Ende nur Abklirzungs-
methoden. (III, 295-296). 
Some of Novalis' fragments deal with the usual applications of 
mathematics to nature and the natural sciences. Nature constantly 
adds, subtracts, etc.: "Die Natur addiert, subtrahiert, multipliziert, 
potenziert etc. unaufhorlich. Die angew[andten] mathematischen 
Wissenschaften zeigen uns die Natur als Mathematiker. Die reale 
Mathematik ist die Physik" (II, 19). More specifically, he defines 
various branches of knowledge as specific types of mathematics: 
"Die Mathematik der Krafte ist die Mechanik. Die Mathematik der 
Gestalten ist die Geometrie. Die Mathematik des Lichts ist die 
Optik. Die Mathematik des Ohrs ist der Generalbass. Die Mathe-
matik des Gesichts - die Perspektive" (III, 17). 
Other fragments of Novalis deal with more unusual applications 
of mathematics. Mathematics is to him an axis, about which most 
branches of knowledge revolve. He writes: 
Poetik der Mathematik. 
Grammatik der Mathematik. 
Physik der Mathematik. 
Philosophie der Mathematik. 
Mathematik der Philosophie. 
Mathematik der Natur. 
Mathematik der Poesie. 
Mathematik der Geschichte. 
Mathematik der Mathematik. (III, 19). 
A possible order of the process of mathematization is suggested by 
the following fragments of Novalis: "Jede mathematische Wissen-
schaft strebt wieder philosophisch zu werden - animiert oder 
rationalisiert zu werden - dann poetisch - endlich moralisch -
zuletzt religios" (III, 257). 
2. MATHEMATICS AND PHILOSOPHY 
The basic idea in Novalis' thought on the interrelations of mathe-
matics and philosophy is that they should approximate each other. 
Conventional mathematics should be freed from the yoke of 
excessive rigor; conventional philosophy, from the extremes of 
arbitrariness and dogma. Of the non-physical fields of knowledge, 
philosophy is the first to be mathematized. Once philosophy has 
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been mathematized, the basic distinction between mathematics and 
philosophy will cease to exist; mathematics and philosophy merge 
into a universal science. If then the process of mathematizing other 
branches of knowledge is continued, it is no longer necessary to state 
explicitly whether the new branch of knowledge is to be mathe-
matized or philosophized. Hence there is no contradiction between 
those of Novalis' fragments, according to which all knowledge is to 
be mathematized, and those fragments, according to which it is to 
be philosophized. At the beginning of the process of mathematization 
the order of precedence is mathematics over philosophy, but as soon 
as mathematics and philosophy are one science, the next branch of 
knowledge is either philosophized or mathematized, or both. 
Novalis states: "Am Ende ist Mathematik nur gemeine, ein-
fache Philosophie und Philosophie hohere Mathematik im allge-
meinen" (III, 193). Perhaps mathematics is common philosophy, 
and philosophy higher mathematics, Novalis states. At any rate, 
many analogies between them may be pointed out: "Hohere Mathe-
matik und Philosophie (oder Theorie der Ideen, des Unendlichen 
etc.) haben sehr viel Analogie (Kurven - Reihen) Elemente. Drei 
Achsen" (II, 378). N ovalis continues to explore the various ways in 
which mathematics and philosophy overlap. Both philosophy and 
1:n~thematics are concerned with syntheses based on arbitrary 
assumptions: "Die Philosophie ist, wie alle synthetische Wissen-
schaft, wie die Mathematik, willkiirlich" (III, 342). Yet true philo-
sophy, and hence mathematics, must be a play of ideas of the utmost 
regularity: "Das regelmassigste Ideenspiel ist die wahre Philo-
sophie" (II, 131). Novalis considers all possible relations between 
philosophy and mathematics. Is philosophy the result of reflecting 
on mathematics? Is it the animating principle of mathematics, or, 
using the ancient Aristotelian distinction, is philosophy matter, and 
mathematics its form? "Sollte die Philosophie iiberhaupt aus der 
Reflexion iiber die Mathematik entstehen? - Philosophie ist die 
Universal- oder hohere Mathematik, das belebende Prinzip der 
Mathematik, die poetische Mathematik. Oder der Stoff, wenn die 
Mathematik die Form ist" (III, 137). General propositions of philo-
sophy correspond to algebraic formulae: "Allgemeine Satze sind 
nichts als algebraische Formeln. Die reine Philosophie ist daher 
gerade so etwas wie die Lettern-Algebra. So eine Formel kann ein 
Gattungs-, ein Klassen-, und Lokalzeichen sein" (II, 383). Some-
times N ovalis wonders whether there is such a thing as a concrete 
science of philosophy. Only mathematics and physics are concrete 
sciences, and philosophy is perhaps, like the philosopher's stone or 
the squaring of the circle, a "necessary" yet unattainable goal of 
scientists: "Es gibt keine Philosophie in concreto. Philosophie 
ist wie der Stein der Weisen, die Quadratur des Zirkels usw. eine 
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blosse notwendige Aufgabe der Szientifiker, das Ideal der Wissen-
schaf t tiberhaupt. . .. Es gibt, als konkrete Wissenschaften, nur 
Mathematik und Physik. Philosophie ist die Intelligenz selbst; 
vollendete Philosophie ist vollendete Intelligenz" (III, 228). An-
other possibility of associating mathematics and philosophy is given 
by the categories: "Mathematische Philosophie (Grammatik). Die 
Kategorien sind das Alphabet cogitationum humanarum - worin 
jeder Buchstabe eine Handlung begreift - eine philosophische 
Operation - einen hoheren (mathematischen) Kalktil. - Die 
Philosophie der Kategorien ist von der hochsten Wichtigkeit" 
(III, 98). 
Of the more specific philosophical problems, to which Novalis 
applies the critical apparatus of mathematics, we already discussed 
the dialectic method and the system of categories (see Chapter II). 
Hamburger (pp. 177££.) already dealt with Novalis' conception of 
time and space, in which she perceives an adumbration of the theory 
of relativity. 
Novalis deals with another important philosophical problem in 
the light of the combination of signs in ordinary algebra and 
arithmetic: the problem of the interrelations of truth and falsity. 
"Wahrhafte Darstellung des Irrtums ist indirekte Darstellung 
der Wahrheit. Wahrhafte Darstellung der Wahrheit ist allein 
wahrhaft. Wahrhafte Darstellung des Irrtums ist zum Teil selbst 
Irrtum. Entgegengesetzte irrige Darstellung des Irrtums gibt 
Wahrheit. 
-x-=+ l+x+=+ 
+ X - = - I - X + = - ." (III, 225). 
The minus sign here stands for falsity or error, the plus sign for 
truth, the multiplication sign, for "representation of." In this 
manner N ovalis translates the rules of signs successively into the 
following propositions: (1) an erroneous representation of error may 
give rise to a true statement; (2) a true representation of error or 
falsity reveals this error or falsity; (3) a true representation of truth 
yields truth; (4) a false representation of truth is a falsity. 
3. MATHEMATICS AND MAGIC 
Since Heinrich Simon's study Der magische Idealismus (see Chapter 
I, Section 3) literary critics have designated Novalis' philosophy as 
"magic idealism," a designation regarded as paradoxical by Nikolai 
Hartmann (Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, Berlin & 
Leipzig, 1923, I, 225), and as misleading by Haering (p. 364). The 
term was introduced by Novalis himself (III, 110, 227). 
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Magic idealism, as Novalis conceives it, strives for the primacy 
and dominion of the spiritual over the physical world. The magic 
idealist is not content with merely according to the world of the 
spirit a higher valuation than the world of matter. The spiritual 
world is created by the Ego in the Fichtean sense. The physical 
world may, through the magic idealism, not only be subjected to, 
but re-shaped and molded to fit into the ideal, spiritual universe. 
The human body is part of the physical world. Themasteryoverthe 
former is the initial stage of the mastery over the latter. In some 
future epoch of magic, body will be subservient to the soul: "In 
dieser Periode der Magie dient der Korper der Seele, oder der 
Geisterwelt" (II, 336). Thus the physical world is subjected to the 
spiritual. The spiritual, in its turn, is guided by the human will: 
"Die Welt hat eine urspriingliche Fahigkeit <lurch mich belebt zu 
werden - Sie ist iiberhaupt a priori von mir belebt - eins mit mir. 
Ich habe eine urspriingliche Tendenz und Fahigkeit die Welt zu 
beleben - Nun kann ich aber mit nichts in Verhaltnis treten - was 
sich nicht nach meinem Willen richtet oder ihm gemass ist - Mithin 
muss die Welt die urspriingliche Anlage haben sich nach mir zu 
richten - meinem Willen gemass zu sein" (II, 343). In short, magic 
is to Novalis the art of the arbitrary use of the world of sense 
perception: "Magie ist = Kunst, die Sinnenwelt willkiirlich zu ge-
brauchen" (II, 336). 
Thus physical nature is to be subjected to the spirit by magic. 
But all branches of knowledge dealing with the spiritual and 
physical universe are to be mathematized. Hence mathematics and 
magic shall, N ovalis contends, ultimately serve the same purpose: 
"Echte Mathematik ist das eigentliche Element des Magiers" 
(III, 295). For this reason Novalis regards the question "Ist Magie 
moglich?" (III, 231) as a valid variant of Kant's question whether 
pure mathematics is possible (see Chapter II, Section 3). 
4. MATHEMATICS AND RELIGION 
Novalis seeks a "coincidentia oppositorum" of science and dogma. 
These extremes must not exclude, but should supplement each other: 
"Wissenschaft ist nur eine Halfte, Glauben ist die andere" (II, 217). 
Belief, or dogma, is the beginning and end of knowledge, or science: 
"Alles Wissen endigt und fangt im Glauben an" (III, 216). Science 
is embedded in the realm of belief. Hence an extension of science 
would widen the realm of belief: "Vor- und Riickerweiterung des 
Wissens ist Hinausschiebung - Erweiterung des Glaubensgebiets" 
(III, 217). The purest form of science is mathematics. The purest 
form of dogma is religion. Consequently, a reconciliation of science 
and dogma could best be achieved by a fusion of mathematics and 
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religion. In anticipation of such a fusion, N ovalis calls his intended 
universal encyclopedia of knowledge a "szientifische Bibel" (III, 
208) and boldly links various religious concepts with mathematics 
in his hymns to mathematics: 
Das Leben der Gotter ist Mathematik. 
Alle gottlichen Gesandten miissen Mathematiker sein. 
Reine Mathematik ist Religion. 
Zur Mathematik gelangt man nur durch eine Theophanie. 
Wer ein mathematisches Buch nicht mit Andacht ergreift, und 
es wie Gottes Wort liest, der versteht es nicht. (III, 296). 
In fact, according to Novalis, there is no reason why God could not 
manifest himself through mathematics: "Kann sich Gott nicht auch 
in der Mathematik offenbaren wie in jeder anderen Wissenschaft?" 
(III, 337). 
5. MATHEMATICS AND LANGUAGE 
In three spheres of meaning N ovalis points out analogies between 
mathematics and language: (1) symbolism, (2) grammar, (3) logic. 
Before analyzing the meaning of linguistic and mathematical 
symbols, Novalis dwells rhapsodically on their self-sufficient, 
abstract form, on the complete independence of the latter from their 
content. "Wenn man den Leuten nur begreiflich machen konnte, 
dass es mit der Sprache wie mit den mathematischen Formeln sei -
Sie machen eine Welt fiir sich aus - Sie spielen nur mit sich selbst, 
driicken nichts als ihre wunderbare Natur aus, und eben darum sind 
sie so ausdrucksvoll - eben darum spiegelt sich in ihnen das seltsame 
Verhaltnisspiel der Dinge" (II, 230-231). Pure, abstract language 
and mathematics are mere symbols and thought processes. These 
symbols are arbitrarily selected, then dogmatically used as in-
struments for our mental operations: "Reine Mathematik hat nichts 
mit Grosse zu tun. Sie ist blosse Bezeichnungslehre - mechanisch 
gewordener, in Verhaltnissen geordneter Gedankenoperationen. Sie 
muss lediglich willkiirlich-dogmatisch instrumental sein. -
So auf ahnliche Weise ist es auch mit der abstrakten Sprache" 
(III, 325). Kant holds that a body of empirical knowledge may be 
elevated to a science only if this knowledge may be reconstructed 
a priori from arbitrary assumptions. Realizing that mathematics is 
based on arbitrary assumptions, N ovalis wishes to satisfy himself 
that language is of similar origin. The more analogies between 
mathematics and language he is able to discover, the easier it will 
be for him to mathematize language for his projected encyclopedia. 
He notes in one of his fragments: "Erfindung der Sprache a priori" 
(III, 246), but is more explicit in another fragment: "Die Sprache 
und die Sprachzeichen sind a priori aus der menschlichen N atur 
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entsprungen, und die urspriingliche Sprache war echt wissen-
schaftlich - Sie wiederaufzufinden ist der Zweck des Grammatikers" 
(III, 259). In the beginning, men agreed that certain symbols 
would stand for certain things. In this manner, language was 
constructed, not unlike mathematics: "Die ganze Sprache ist ein 
Postulat., Sie ist positiven, freien Ursprungs. Man musste sich ein-
verstehen, bei gewissen Zeichen gewisse Dinge zu denken, mit 
Absicht etwas Bestimmtes in sich zu konstruieren" (II, 347). 
Having considered the similarities of mathematical and linguistic 
symbols, Novalis proceeds to point out the analogies between the 
respective systems of these symbols. The system of numbers is a 
model for a genuine system of linguistic symbols. Numbers shall 
become letters, and language is to become arithmetic: "Das Zahlen-
system ist Muster eines echten Sprachzeichensystems - Unsere 
Buchstaben sollen Zahlen, unsere Sprache Arithmetik werden" 
(III, 18). A further comparison of the structure of mathematics and 
language inevitably leads to a consideration of grammar and logic. 
One of N ovalis' fragments, bearing the heading "Mathematik und 
Grammatik," reads: "Ober die Logarithmen - die eigentliche Sprache 
ist ein Logarithmensystem" (III, 228). Logarithms had been 
invented by Napier about two hundred years before Novalis studied 
mathematics. Logarithms had enabled mathematicians to carry out 
elementary arithmetical operations much quicker than by the usual 
processes. In the fragment just quoted Novalis suggests that the 
ideal, proper language would resemble a system of logarithms in its 
capacity of simplifying and accelerating mental processes. An 
indirect approach to the mathematization of language is indicated 
by Novalis' note "Grammatik der Mathematik" (III, 19). 
The final union of mathematics and language is to be effected 
through logic. We already saw that to Novalis mathematics is the 
objectification and embodiment of human reason (cf. Section 1). 
By describing logic as the grammar of our thought, the functions of 
mathematics and logic coincide: "Die gewohnliche Logik ist die 
Grammatik der hoheren Sprache oder des Denkens. Sie enthalt 
bloss die Verhaltnisse der Begriffe untereinander" (II, 321). An-
other fragment confirms this argument: "M athematische Logik. 
Anwendung der Mathematik auf die Denklehre - Schnelligkeit 
- und Reichhaltigkeit des Denkens - nicht auch Starke des 
Denkens. Grade des Denkens. Die Sprache ist ein Gedanken-
meter" (III, 198). 
It should be noted, although it cannot be dealt with, here that 
N ovalis' preoccupation with mathematics is reflected in his fragments 
by a metaphorical use of mathematical concepts and symbols (see 
also H. Fauteck, Die Sprachtheorie Friedrich von Hardenbergs, 
Berlin, 1940). 
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6. MATHEMATICS AND LITERATURE 
Like other early German Romanticists, as for example, Friedrich 
Schlegel, and, to a lesser extent, August Wilhelm Schlegel, Novalis 
employs mathematical concepts and symbols in his fragments 
dealing with literary criticism. As a German Romanticist, he 
concerns himself frequently with the novel, i.e., the literary genre 
which was elevated by the Romanticists from the level of second-
rate literature to that of the lofty precincts of poetry and drama. 
The novel is usually regarded as the successor to the epic. In this 
connection Novalis states in the following fragment: "Das epische 
Gedicht ist das veredelte primitive Gedicht. Im wesentlichen ganz 
dasselbe. Der Roman steht schon weit hoher - jenes dauert fort -
dieser wachst fort - in jenem ist arithmetische, im Roman geometri-
sche Progression" (II, 326). The essential difference between the 
epic and the novel lies in the pace. The epic is characterized by a 
steady pace, by duration; the novel, by a quickened pace, or, 
inversely, a retarded pace, by development and growth. The steady 
pace may be very adequately represented by an arithmetical 
progression, in which the difference between any two adjacent terms 
is the same, i.e., " 
a, a + d, a + 2d, a + 3d, ... 
or, using numbers, 
3, 5, 7, 9, 11, ... 
The accelerated, or retarded, pace may be best illustrated by a 
geometric progression, in which the difference between any two 
adjacent terms varies with the position of the terms in the pro-
gression, in which, however, the ratio of any two adjacent terms is 
constant. For example, 
a, ac, ac2, ac 3, ac4, ... 
If the factor c is an improper fraction, or greater than 1, the terms 
increase, i.e., the pace is accelerated. If the factor c is a proper 
fraction, or less than 1, the terms decrease, i.e., the pace is slowed. 
As an example of an epic one is reminded of the Iliad with its 
steady flow of events. An example of a novel with a slowed pace is 
Thomas Mann's Zauberberg, in which each of the seven chapters is 
longer than the preceding, both in duration and page length. 
Acceleration and retardation are thus associated with the crucial 
early Romantic concept of progression. A number of other fragments 
of N ovalis deal with progression as a basic characteristic of the novel. 
For example: "Darstellung eines Gegenstandes in Reihen (Varia-
tionsreihen - A banderungen, etc.) So z.B. die Personendar-
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stellung in 'Meister,' die schone Seele und Natalie - bei der Selbst-
reflexion - bei den Dingen der ersten, zweiten, dritten Hand etc. 
So ist z. B. eine historische Reihe, eine Sammlung Kupferstiche 
vom rohsten Anfang der Kunst bis zur Vollendung und so fort - der 
Formen vom Frosch bis zum Apollo etc." (II, 410-411). In another 
fragment the novel is compared to an infinite series: "Alle Zufiille 
unseres Lebens sind Materialien, aus denen wir machen konnen, 
was wir wollen. vVer viel Geist hat, macht viel aus seinem Leben. 
Jede Bekanntschaft, jeder Vorfall, ware fur den durchaus Geistigen 
erstes Glied einer unendlichen Reihe, Anfang eines unendlichen 
Romans" (II, 25). By saying "im Roman ist geometrische Pro-
gression" Novalis touches on several important interrelated concepts 
of the early Romantic theory of literature, namely, "Reihe," infinity, 
"Potenz." These terms are conceptually linked in two frames of 
reference: (1) in early Romantic theory of literature; (2) mathe-
matically, since each may mathematically be defined in terms of the 
other two. The concept of progression, "Reihe," is intimately 
associated with the concept "progressiv." The mathematical 
concept of progression is reflected in the following fragment: 
"Roman - wohlgeordnete, gesetzmiissige Reihe" (II, 366). In 
another fragment progression is linked with variation, a notion 
with which the combinatorial school of mathematics was obsessed: 
"Darstellung eines Gegenstandes in Reihen (Variationsreihen -
Abiinderungen etc.) So z. B. die Personendarstellung im 'Meister,' 
die schone Seele und Natalie - bei der Selbstreflexion - bei den 
Dingen der ersten, zweiten, dritten Hand etc." (II, 410f.). The 
term and concept of "progressiv" appears also in Friedrich Schlegel's 
definitive pronouncement on the nature of Romantic literature: 
"Die romantische Poesie ist eine progressive Universalpoesie" 
(Athenaum, 1. Bd., 2. St., p. 28). 
In mathematics, infinity is, in general, regarded as the limit of 
an unending series or sequence, something that may be approached 
progressively, but may never be reached. Thus one never says 
"equals infinity,'' but rather "tends to infinity." Similarly, the 
concept of progression yields the concept of infinity in early 
Romantic literary criticism. N ovalis' fragments reveal the mathe-
matical basis of the conceptual interrelation of "Reihe" and "Unend-
lichkeit." We read in one of the fragments: "Jede Grosse kann 
durch eine Reihe ausgedriickt werden. Ist die Reihe geschlossen, 
bestimmt, so ist die Grosse bestimmt; ist die Reihe unendlich, so 
ists auch die Grosse" (III, 23). If we now look again at a fragment 
already quoted above, we will see the equivalence of the idea of 
progression toward infinity in mathematics and in the Romantic 
conception of the novel: "Alle Zufalle unseres Lebens sind Materia-
lien, aus denen wir machen konnen, was wir wollen. Wer viel Geist 
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hat, macht viel aus seinem Leben. Jede Bekanntschaft, jeder 
Vorfall, ware fur den durchaus Geistigen erstes Glied einer unend-
lichen Reihe, Anfang eines unendlichen Romans" (II, 25). Progres-
sion tending to infinity expresses the Romantic idea of growth and 
development, "das Werdende." Again, the latter term is employed 
by Novalis in a more strictly mathematical context: "Unendliche 
Grossen sind werdende Grossen, Approximationen an Grossen" 
(III, 21). We recall in this connection Friedrich Schlegel's obser-
vation: "Die romantische Dichtkunst ist noch im Werden; ja, das 
ist ihr eigentlichstes W esen, dass sie ewig nur werden, nie vollendet 
sein kann" (Athenaum, 1. Bd., 2. St., p. 70). The synonymity, at 
least partial, of "W erden" and "progressiv" is confirmed, for 
example, by Kluckhohn's interpretation of the latter as "dauernd 
fortschreitend in der Annaherung an das Unendliche" (Das I deengut 
der deutschen Romantik, 3. Aufl., Tiibingen, 1953, p. 184). 
The third term in the closely linked triad, of which "Reihe" and 
infinity formed the first two, is "Potenz." Not only may a progres-
sion approach infinity horizontally, as it were, in an unending 
sequence of terms, but each term itself tends to infinity through 
"Potenz," in a vertical direction, as you go on in the progression. 
If we recall Novalis' formulation "Romanist geometrische Reihe" 
and bear in mind that a geometric progression is a sequence of 
"Potenzen," i.e., of terms with ascending powers, the connection 
becomes clear. Friedrich Schlegel says of Romantic poetry: 
" ... [sie kann] ... frei von allem realen und idealen Interesse auf den 
Fliigeln der poetischen Reflexion in der Mitte schweben, diese 
Reflexion immer wieder potenzieren und wie in einer endlosen 
Reihe von Spiegeln vervielfachen" (Ath., 1. Bd., 2. St., p. 29). Thus 
the term "Potenzreihe" and other associated terms become more 
comprehensible in N ovalis' definitive pronouncement on Romantic 
literature: "Die Welt muss romantisiert werden. So findet man den 
urspriinglichen Sinn wieder. Romantisieren ist nichts als eine 
qualitative Potenzierung. Das niedre Selbst wird mit einem 
bessern Selbst in dieser Operation identifiziert. So wie wir selbst 
eine solche qualitative Potenzreihe sind. Diese Operation ist noch 
ganz unbekannt. Indem ich dem Gemeinen einen hohen Sinn, dem 
Gewohnlichen ein geheimnisvolles Ansehn, dem Bekannten die 
Wiirde des Unbekannten, dem Endlichen einen unendlichen Schein 
gebe, so romantisiere ich es. - Umgekehrt ist die Operation fur das 
Hohe:r:e, Unbekannte, Mystische, Unendliche - dies wird durch diese 
Verknupfung logarithmisiert.. . Wechselerhohung und Erniedri-
gung" (II, 335). The terms "Potenzierung," "Potenzreihe," "be-
kannt" and "unbekannt," "endlich" and "unendlich," "Operation," 
and "logarithmisieren" are all mathematical and suggest Novalis' 
projection of mathematical thought patterns into literary criticism. 
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It is significant that the two principal definitions of early German 
Romantic literature revolve about terms of mathematical origin. 
Friedrich Schlegel's frequent use of mathematical symbols, in 
particular, of power exponents, and their inverse, radical signs, 
makes the mathematical origin of the terms discussed above un-
questionable (see Friedrich Schlegel, Literary Notebooks 1797-1801, 
ed. Hans Eichner, London & Toronto, 1957). 
The close relation of Novalis' and Friedrich Schlegel's theories 
of literary criticism to the combinatorial analysis of the Leipzig 
mathematician Hindenburg becomes apparent also from other 
fragments. For example: "Romantisieren, ahnlich dem Alge-
braisieren" (III, 63). Like the combinatorial analyst, the Roman-
ticist varies and combines ideas. The very skill of Romantic 
exploration of ideas is tantamount to a capacity for variation and 
combination, the chief operations of the combinatorial school of 
mathematics: "Gelehrsamkeit entspricht dem Gedachtnis. Fahig-
keit oder Geschicklichkeit dem Geist. Beides verbinden heisst beides 
als ein Binomium ansehn und dieses potenzieren. (Romantische 
Gelehrsamkeit - und romantische Geschicklichkeit - Kombina-
tions- und Variationsfertigkeit)" (III, 94). The binomial 
theorem mentioned in this fragment was much discussed by the 
adherents of the combinatorial school and regarded by some of 
them as the most important theorem of mathematical analysis. 
Next we shall discuss the relation of fragment as a literary genre 
to the concepts of progression and infinity. Novalis states: "Wenige 
bekannte Glieder, durch die man instand gesetzt wird, eine unend-
liche Menge unbekannter Glieder zu finden, machen die Kon-
struktionsformel einer Reihe aus" (III, 38). If a few terms of a 
mathematical series or sequence are known, it is possible to produce 
more and more terms, and it is not necessary, or possible, to write 
down the entire sequence, since the latter is infinite. Thus a few 
finite terms, i.e., a fragmentary sequence, indicate the path toward 
infinity. Similarly, early Romantic fragments are, according to 
N ovalis, "Anfange interessanter Gedankenfolgen,'' "literarische 
Samereien," "Texte zum Denken," capable of infinite expansion, 
yet remaining finite, and hence fragmentary. The intentional 
finiteness manifest in the completeness and conclusiveness of the 
classical work of literature or art is undesirable to the early German 
Romanticist, because completion and perfection is achieved at the 
price of voluntary renunciation of infinity. 
A number of N ovalis' fragments deal with the affinities of the 
mathematical and literary creative processes. One of these fragments 
reads: "Der poetische Philosoph ist en etat de Createur absolu. Ein 
Kreis, ein Triangel werden schon auf diese Art kreiert. Es kommt 
ihnen nichts zu, als was der Verfertiger ihnen zukommen lasst etc. 
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Man muss iiberhaupt immer bedenken, dass das Hochste, zwar nicht 
in der wirklichen, aber in der idealischen Geschichte, vor dem 
Niedrigeren etc. kommt - also auch, wenn der Mathematiker 
wirklich etwas Richtiges tut, so tut ers als poeta philosophus" 
(III, 145). As in his fragments on definition (Chapter III, Section 1), 
Novalis here emphasizes the freedom of mathematical creation. 
Like the poet, the "maker," the mathematician freely associates 
elements in accordance with freely chosen rules, and generates 
structures that may incidentally resemble, but do not essentially 
represent physical or historical reality. In fact, Novalis even goes 
so far as to claim: "Die Mathematik ist echte Wissenschaft, weil sie 
gemachte Kenntnisse enthalt" (III, 270). Great mathematicians, 
when reflecting on the nature of mathematics, have always 
attested to this. The well-known distichon of the mathematician 
L. Kronecker may be adduced here in confirmation of our argument: 
"Wir l\fathematiker auch sind echte, berufene Dichter; / Uns liegt 
noch der Beweis fiir das Gedichtete ob!" (see the collection by 
W. Ahrens, Scherz und Ernst in der Mathematik. Gefliigelte und 
ungefliigelte Worte, Leipzig, 1904, p. 226). 
The question arises whether, beyond his literary criticism, 
Novalis' meditations on mathematics are reflected in his literary 
works proper. Indeed, they are, significantly so, though peripherally 
and indirectly. All of Novalis' prose works are fragmentary, with 
the exception of the essay Die Christenheit oder Eur,opa. Yet all 
these fragments, the philosophical as well as novelistic, show an 
orientation toward a Utopian resolution of the conflicts of life, the 
antitheses of art, the dichotomies of thought. The philosophical 
fragments adumbrate an ideal union of mathematics, magic, 
religion, language, literature, the sciences, and all other branches of 
knowledge in a pattern governed by "arithmetica universalis." His 
projected universal encyclopedia of knowledge is to be conceived as 
a step toward that final state of "coincidentia oppositorum." The 
two novelistic fragments Die Lehrlinge zu Sais and Heinrich van 
Ofterdingen mysteriously allude to a higher symbolism in a visionary 
realm of fairy tale, with the laws of nature rescinded, the law of 
contradiction repealed, with man and animal, spirits and matter 
communicating in a universal symbolic language, in short, a golden 
age, ruled by the poet-priest-magician-musician-mathematician. 
Thus the teleological vectors of the philosophical and novelistic 
fragments of N ovalis are parallels that meet at infinity. 
Die Lehrlinge zu Sais abounds in configurations of universal 
mathematics. Music and mathematics are linked in the spirit of 
Pythagoras and Chladni, as music of the spheresandmusicalfigures. 
"Arithmetica universalis" appears in the following passage: 
"Dankbar legt der Priester diese neue, erhabene Messkunst auf den 
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Altar ... " (I, 34). In his study Novalis, Die Lehrlinge zu Sais. Ver-
such einer Erlauterung (Winthertur, 1954), Heinz Bollinger re-
cognizes the mathematical echoes in this work of Novalis. Of the 
"erhabene Messkunst" he correctly says in the light of Novalis' 
fragments, "die sowohl mit der Mathematik als mit der Dichtkunst 
wesensverwandt sein muss" (p. 49). A number of other mathe-
matical allusions are established by Bollinger (pp. 2, 12, 13, 15, 19, 
42, 44, 53). 
Numbers and figures, "Zahlen und Figuren," appear symbolically 
in all major works of Novalis. The process of transmuting reality 
into symbols, poetical and mathematical, is depicted in the fairy 
tale in Heinrich von Ofterdingen. The crucial passage is quoted here: 
"Die Frau wandte sich zuzeiten gegen Ginnistan und die Kinder, 
tauchte den Finger in die Schale, und spriitzte einige Tropfen auf 
sie hin, die, sobald sie die Amme, das Kind, oder die Wiege be-
riihrten, in einen blauen Dunst zerrannen, der tausend seltsame 
Bilder zeigte, und bestandig um sie herzog und sich veranderte. Traf 
einer davon zufallig auf den Schreiber, so fielen eine Menge Zahlen 
und geometrische Figuren nieder, die er mit vieler Emsigkeit auf 
einen Faden zog" (I, 198). There is a contrast in this passage 
between the more concrete "Bilder" and the more abstract "Zahlen 
und Figuren." In Novalis' ultimate magical mathematics the two 
would merge. "Zahlen und Figuren" is frequently employed by 
Novalis as a stage of mathematics preliminary to higher stages of 
magical mathematics. In Section 3 of Chapter III we already saw 
that Novalis regarded algebraic letters as a stage of mathematics 
closer to "arithmetica universalis," due to the abandonment of 
"Zahlen und Figuren" for the algebraic letters, which were more 
inclusive and more universal than the former. A similar inter-
pretation applies to the verses, already quoted in Chapter III, 
Section 3: 
Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren 
Sind Schlussel aller Kreaturen, 
W enn die, so sing en oder kussen, 
Mehr als die Tiefgelehrten wissen, 
W enn sich die Welt ins freie Leben, 
Und in die Welt wird zuruckbegeben, 
Wenn dann sich wieder Licht und Schatten 
Zu echter Klarheit werden gatten, 
U nd man in M archen und Gedichten 
Erkennt die ewgen W eltgeschichten, 
Dann fliegt vor einem geheimen Wort 
Das ganze verkehrte Wesen fort. (I, 251). 
In the progression from ordinary mathematics to magical mathe-
88 
matics, the higher symbolism, the mathematical number yields to 
the magical numeral, the magic word. An even more arid variant 
of "Zahlen und Figuren" appears in the gloomy vision of the post-
and antemagical state of man in the fifth hymn to the night. It is a 
vision of the domination of "diirre Zahl und das strenge Mass," 
and even words cannot conjure up a coherent image, but disintegrate 
like dust: "Zu Ende neigte die alte Welt sich. Des jungen Ge-
schlechts Lustgarten verwelkte - hinauf in den freieren, wiisten 
Raum strebten die unkindlichen, wachsenden Menschen. Die Gotter 
verschwanden mit ihrem Gefolge - Einsam und leblos stand die 
Natur. Mit eiserner Kette band sie die diirre Zahl und das strenge 
Mass. Wie in Staub und Liifte zerfiel in dunkle Worte die uner-
messliche Blute des Lebens. Entflohn war der beschw6rende 
Glauben, und die allverwandelnde, allverschwisternde Himmels-
genossin, die Phantasie" (I, 61). It is significant that "diirre Zahl" 
and "dunkle Worte" are here alike in their symbolic power, or 
rather, in their lack of it with regard to "die unermessliche Blute des 
Lebens." We see in this passage also, albeit negatively, Novalis' 
conception of mathematics and language as symbolic media of the 
same kind, but of varying degrees of application. Thus, mathe-
matical symbols and words of literature are strata of an all-inclusive 
symbolical medium. Like Descartes' and Leibniz', Novalis' thought 
and effort was directed toward a universal medium of representation. 
These endeavors are revealed both in his philosophical fragments 
and in his strictly literary works. 
7. MATHEMATICS AND MUSIC 
May not Music be described as the 
Mathematic of sense, Mathematic as 
the Music of the reason? The soul of 
each the same! Thus the musician 
feels Mathematic, the mathematician 
thinks Music, - Music the dream, 
Mathematic the working life - each to 
receive its consummation from the 
other when the human intelligence, 
elevated to its perfect type, shall shine 
forth glorified in some future Mozart-
Dirichlet or Beethoven-Gauss - a 
union already not indistinctly fore-
shadowed in the genius and labours of 
a Helmholtz! ("Trilogy," Philos. 
Transact., CLIV (1864), Part III, p. 
613). 
J. J. SYLVESTER, 1864 
In Western civilization there is an ancient tradition of various 
associations of mathematics and music. Many great mathematicians 
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felt impelled to treat music mathematically. Euclid is reported to 
have written a study on music which has not been preserved. 
Descartes wrote a Compendium musicae (1650). Kepler in his work 
Harmonices mundi (1619) perceives a subconscious mingling of 
music and mathematics in the human mind. Leibniz comments on 
this subconscious process as follows: "Die Musik ist eine verborgene 
arithmetische Dbung der Seele, welche dabei nicht weiss, dass sie 
mit Zahlen umgeht. Die Seele vollbringt namlich vieles in unklarer 
und unbemerkter Erkenntnistatigkeit, was sie mittels deutlicher 
Wahrnehmung nicht bemerken kann. Denn diejenigen sind im 
Irrtum, welche meinen, es konne nichts in der Seele geschehen, 
dessen sie selbst sich nicht bewusst werde. Wenn daher die Seele 
auch nicht merkt, dass sie rechnet, so fiihlt sie doch die Wirkung 
dieser unbemerkten Rechnung, sei es als Freude am Zusammen-
klang oder als Bedriickung am Missklang" (as translated from the 
original Latin and quoted by Louis Locher-Ernst, "Mathematik und 
Musik," Mathematik als Vorschule der Geist-Erkenntnis, Zurich, 
1944, p. 64). Euler wrote a mathematical treatise on music entitled 
T entamen novae theoriae musicae ex certissimis principiis dilucide 
expositae (1739), in which he propounded his idea that musical in-
tervals correspond to simple ratios of numbers (see Leonardi Eulera 
Opera Omnia, Lipsiae et Berolini, 1926, Series tertia, Volumen 
primum, P. xv). Novalis had among his books a copy of Chladni's 
Entdeckung iiber die Theorie des Klang es (Leipzig, 1787). In this 
book Chladni had recorded the results of his research on the vibra-
tions of round and square plates, and of bells and rings. The French 
mathematician Joseph Fourier, another contemporary of Novalis, 
was able to demonstrate that all sounds, vocal or instrumental, are 
completely describable in mathematical terms. He represented 
sounds by sine and cosine functions whose graphs indicated loudness, 
pitch, and quality of a musical sound by the amplitude, frequency, 
and shape of the graph, respectively (see Kline, op. cit., p. 287). 
After Novalis' time, the physicist and mathematician Helmholtz 
offered for the first time a physiological explanation of dissonance 
and other musical phenomena in his Lehre von den Tonempfindungen 
als physiologische Grundlage fiir die Theorie der M usik (1862). In our 
age, the late American mathematician George D. Birkhoff in his 
study Aesthetic Measure (Cambridge, Mass., 1933) and the Swiss 
mathematician Andreas Speiser in his work Die mathematische 
Denkweise, 3rd ed. (Basel, 1952) have seriously devoted themselves 
to the investigation of the interrelationships and analogies between 
music and mathematics. 
One origin of this traditional association of music and mathematics 
is usually seen in the discovery of Pythagoras that the pitch of a 
sound from a plucked string depends on the length of the string and 
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that harmonious sounds are given off by strings, the ratios of whose 
lengths are simple integers (Kline, p. 287). To the Pythagoreans, 
therefore, music was a manifestation of mathematical laws. They 
believed in the harmony of the spheres in the universe, i.e., a musical 
harmony, dependent on mathematical number, hence also a mathe-
matical harmony, the latter invisible, the former inaudible to the 
human organs of sense perception. The Pythagorean alliance of 
music, mathematics, and astronomy, re-emerged in the Middle 
Ages in the quadrivium of the curriculum in artes liberales: arith-
metic, geometry, astronomy, and music. 
Viewed against this long tradition of musical-mathematical 
relations, Novalis' fragments on music and mathematics no longer 
appear to be out of the ordinary. Moreover, most German Roman-
ticists were preoccupied with music, although only Novalis devoted 
himself seriously to the more specific aspect of music in the Pytha-
gorean and Chladnian sphere of meaning. The claim of Fritz Strich 
that "von alien Kiinsten liebte die Romantik jene am meisten, 
welche eine tonende Offenbarung der reinen Mathematik ist: die 
Musik" (Deutsche Klassik und Romantik, oder Vollendung und 
Unendlichkeit. Ein Vergleich, Miinchen, 1928, p. 250) is, in its 
mathematical implication, valid with regard to Novalis, and pos-
sibly Friedrich Schlegel and Kleist (see Silz, op. cit., pp. 16, 135), 
but not with regard to the conception of music of all Romanticists. 
The analogies between music and mathematics that have been 
pointed out at various times fall roughly into two categories: 
acoustical and structural. Andreas Speiser remarks in this connec-
tion: "In friiheren Zeiten ist der arithmetische Charakter der Musik 
unbestritten gewesen, weil jedermann bei den Zahlen unmittelbar 
an Tone dachte. Heute denkt man unter dem Einfluss der ana-
lytischen Geometrie an raumliche, visuelle Dinge, nicht an akusti-
sche" (p. 23). 
N ovalis' fragments on music and mathematics reveal the time-
honored themes linking these fields of endeavor. Leibniz' conception 
of music as a hidden arithmetic exercise of the human soul is 
reflected in the following of N ovalis' fragments: "U nsere Seele weiss 
von Musik und hat daran Gefallen" (III, 158). "Das Gedachtnis 
treibt prophetischen - musikalischen Kalkiil. . . Alie Erinnerung 
beruht auf indirektem Kalkiil - auf Musik etc." (III, 251). The 
ancient Pythagorean idea of the harmony of the spheres is in-
distinctly yet recognizably manifested in another fragment: "Die 
musikalischen Verhaltnisse scheinen mir recht eigentlich die Grund-
verhaltnisse der Natur zu sein" (III, 291). "Musik als Bildnerin und 
Besanftigerin des Weltalls" (III, 117). The various themes on the 
relations of music and mathematics, with a reference to Pythagoras 
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and Leibniz, are combined in the following fragment entitled 
"Musik. Mathematik:" 
Hat die Musik nicht etwas von der kombinatorischen Analysis und umge-
kehrt? Zahlenharmonien - Zahlenakustik - gehort zur kombinatorischen 
Analysis. 
Die Zahler sind die mathematischen Vokale - alle Zahlen sind Zahler. 
Die kombinatorische Analysis fiihrt auf das Zahlenphantasieren - und 
lehrt die Zahlenkomposi tionskunst - den mathematischen Generalbass. 
(Pythagoras, Leibniz). Die Sprache ist ein musikalisches Ideeninstrument. 
Der Dichter, Rhetor und Philosoph spielen und komponieren grammatisch. 
Eine Fuge ist durchaus logisch oder wissenschaftlich. - Sie kann auch 
poetisch behandelt werden. Der Generalbass enthalt die musikalische 
Algeber und Analysis. Die kombinatorische Analysis ist die kritische 
Algeber und Analysis - und die musikalische Kompositionslehre verhalt sich 
zum Generalbass wie die kombinatorische Analysis zur einfachen Am1lysis. 
(III, 205£.). 
In this fragment we perceive reverberations of Leibniz' Ars combi-
natoria and the combinatorial school of mathematics. Novalis 
manipulates kaleidoscopically music, grammar, and mathematics in 
the search for the best method of integrating them into his universal 
encyclopedia. He regards a fugue as a structure both logical and 
scientific. This view is shared by Speiser, who systematically 
explored the structural analogies of fugues and mathematical 
systems (see Speiser, pp. 23-36). 
Finally, music and mathematics are enthusiastically fused by 
Novalis in his hymns to mathematics: "Echte Mathematik ist das 
eigentliche Element des Magiers. In der Musik erscheint sie form-
lich als Offenbarung, als schaffender Idealism. Hier legitimiert sie 
sich als himmlische Gesandtin, kat' anthropon .... Aller Genuss ist 
musikalisch, mithin mathematisch" (III, 295f). 
In the preceding section we already discussed the reflections of 
the associations of music and mathematics in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais. 
For further discussion of the relation of Novalis to music see 
especially Karl Theodor Bluth, Philosophische Probleme in den 
Aphorismen Hardenbergs (Jena, 1914) and A. J.M. Bus, Der Mythus 
der Musik in Novalis' Heinrich von Ofterdingen (Alkmaar, 1947). 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In his fragments on mathematics N ovalis is concerned with an 
extension of this science beyond its usual domain and with its 
elucidation in broad contexts of art, life, and thought, and not with 
strict mathematical research. He regards mathematics as the ideal 
science and intends to use it as a unifying principle in his con-
templated universal encyclopedia of knowledge. Besides the physical 
sciences, all other branches of knowledge are to be mathematized. 
Many of his fragments on mathematics, accordingly, deal with the 
mathematical features of various branches of knowledge and with 
the projection of mathematical concepts and symbols into these 
fields. In the spirit of irrational rationalism, many eighteenth 
century philosophers, and even mathematicians, linked mathematics 
with a number of non-physical branches of knowledge. The second 
half of the eighteenth century, and, in particular, the last decade, 
was not only a time of political upheavals (the French Revolution), 
of landmarks in philosophy (Kant's Critiques) and in German 
literature, but also of bold hypotheses and great discoveries in the 
natural sciences (oxygen, phenomena of electricity), and of lively 
fluctuations in the foundations of mathematics. Novalis took a 
vital interest in these developments. He was fascinated by dis-
coveries that had turned alchemy into chemistry. If, in the spirit of 
mathematics, mere philosophical speculation on the nature of the 
universe had developed into physics, alchemy into chemistry, 
quackery into medicine, astrology into astronomy, and, more 
generally, speculative branches of knowledge into systematic 
sciences with logical structures and empirical bases, why should it 
not be possible to continue this process and mathematize religion, 
magic, music, or even poetry? In the process of mathematization, 
however, mathematics itself was to be broadened and deepened 
along the lines of Descartes' search for a "mathesis universalis" and 
Leibniz' search for an "arithmetica universalis." The universal 
arithmetic was to include all mental operations, volitional and 
aesthetic experiences, and all knowledge. 
Both in the philosophical and novelistic fragments, as well as in 
his poetry, there is a vision of a future realm of final and absolute 
synthesis, a state of "coincidentia oppositorum," with mathematics 
elevated to a higher symbolism embracing language, music, magic, 
and religious rites, with man communicating in this symbolic 
language with nature, as in a fairy tale, with the laws of nature 
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rescinded, and the law of contradiction repealed, a realm ruled by 
the poet-priest-musician-magician-mathematician. 
Throughout his brief adult life of about ten years, Novalis was 
concerned with mathematics. In the earlier stages conventional 
mathematics predominated; in the later stages magical mathematics 
prevailed. At the University at Leipzig and the Mining Academy at 
Freiberg, and through continuous self-study, Novalis had acquired 
a thorough grounding in mathematics, grasping this subject both in 
its formal aspects and its philosophical implications. During 
Sophie's illness he clung to mathematics as to a firm prop. In 
intensity and continuity, Novalis' preoccupation with mathematics, 
and philosophy, is surpassed by no other intellectual pursuit of his. 
Evaluated in terms of his contributions, it is surpassed by his 
literary achievement. Judged by the effect of Novalis' works and 
thought on posterity, the fragments and strictly literary works are 
about equal. 
Our image of N ovalis needs to be modified. He was not an anemic 
aesthete, even after Sophie's death, immersed only in night and 
death, but rather a universal mind, embryonic, yet potentially of 
the order of Goethe. His activities and pursuits embraced the 
whole range designated by the extremes, no extremes to Novalis 
at that, of religious fervor and earthly sensuality, of music and 
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Grandi, G., 23. 
Gruson, J.P., 21. 
Haering, Th., 18, 19, 30, 35, 38, 72, 75, 
79. 
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Hamburger, K., preface, 9, 14-16, 17, 
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Harden berg, Erasmus von (N ovalis' 
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Hartmann, N., 79. 
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Hayrn, R., l0f., 19. 
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Helmholtz, H. L. F. von, 89, 90. 
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Herder, J. G. von, 25. 
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Husserl, E., 15. 
"Hyrnnen an die Nacht," fifth, 89. 
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progression. 
intuition (Anschauung), 15, 41, 42, 77; 
a priori i., 44. 
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Jani, D. C., 25. 
Jena, University at, 21, 26. 
Journal de l' Ecole Polytechnique, 21. 
Journal fur reine und angewandte 
Mathematik, 21. 
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possible?, 39, 40, 44. 
Just, A. C., 31, 37. 
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Kant, I., 10, 12, 14, 26, 31, 33, 38-44, 
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Kastner, A. G., 20, 25, 27£., 46, 47, 
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Kepler, J ., 90. 
Kerekjart6, B. von, 62. 
Kleeberg, L., 13. 
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Kline, M., 10, 23, 90, 91. 
Kluckhohn, P. 3, 5, 17, 19, 25, 67, 85. 
Kliigel, G. S., 50, 64. 
knowledge, 42, 43, 57, 62, 87; a priori 
k., 43£., 81; extrasensory k., 43; 
science of k., 45, 58. 
known & unknown, 66, 85. 
Kronecker, L., 87. 
Kiihn, Sophie von, 4, 5, 32ff., 94. 
The Ladies Diary ... , 21. 
Lagrange, J. L., 20, 21, 22, 46, 47, 67. 
L'Hospital, G. F. A. de, 47. 
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1. as "Gedankenmeter," 76, 82; 1. & 
life, 89; 1. like math. formulae, 81; 
object & syntax 1. in math., 52f. 
La Mettrie, J. 0. de, 24. 
Laplace, P. S., marquis de, 20, 21, 46. 
Lavoisier, A. L., 34. 
law, 26. 
Die Lehrlinge zu Sais, 87, 88, 92. 
Leibniz, G. W. von, 15, 22, 23, 28, 39, 
40, 47, 48, 50, 57, 59, 69, 70, 89, 90, 
91, 92, 93. 
Leipzig, University at, 21, 26, 27f., 
37, 94. 
Leipzig er M agazin fur reine und ange-
wandte Mathematik, 21. 
Lempe, J. F., 36. 
Lichtenberg, G. C., 25. 
life & math., 24, 46, 58, 60, 61, 89; 
1. & death, 94; elixir of 1. & math., 
61. 
Lindemann, F. von, 61. 
line, straight, 48, 55, 60; skew 1., 48, 60. 
limit, 47, 66, 73, 84. 
Linnaeus (Karl von Linne), 59. 
literature, 16, 35, 62, 63, 65, 74, 83-89; 
see also epic, fragment, novel, poetry, 
Romanticism, and individual works 
of Novalis. 
Lobachevsky, N.I., 55. 
Lobkowitz, C. de, 24. 
logarithms, 26, 46, 74, 76, 82, 85. 
logic, 35, 52, 76, 81, 82, 92. 
Lorey, W., 21, 27. 
Locher-Ernst, L., 17, 90. 
Lull, Ramon, 28. 
magic, 11, 13, 14, 17, 21, 40, 41, 89, 
93; m. & math., 34, 79/., m. idealism, 
12; m. i. & definition, 54, 79f., m. is 
genuine math., 80. 
magnitude, 7, 42, 48, 62, 65/., 70, 71, 
73, 81. 
Mahnke, D., 16, 61. 
Malfatti, G., 11. 
Mann, Th., Der Zauberberg, 83. 
mathematical texts, 46. 
mathematical training, 25ff., 37, 46, 
94. 
"mathesis universalis," 22, 93. 
mathematics, math. of math., 77; see 
Table of Contents and specific terms 
and concepts. 
matter, 58; m. & form, 78. 
Maupertuis, P. M. L. de, 24. 
mechanics & math., 58, 77. 
medicine & math., 24, 34. 
Meissner, C., 6. 
"Messkunst," 87f. 
metaphor, mathematical, 82. 
metaphysics & math., 8, 24, 39, 61. 
method, mathematical, 15, 44, 52, 53, 
60, 69, 73, 76, 77, 78, 82; m. & 
madness, 40, 68; scientific m., 53; 
statistical m., 67. 
Merriman, G. M., 61. 
Michelsen, J. A. C., 50, 70, 71, 72, 73. 
mineralogy, 34. 
mining engineering, 34. 
Minor, J., 5, 6, 7. 
modality & math., 41, 45, 62. 
Mollweide, K. B., 27. 
Monch, K., 50. 
Montucla, J. F., 23f. 
Mozart, W. A., 89. 
Muller, A., 9. 
Miiller, M., 42. 
music & math., 13, 16, 17, 18, 34, 
43, 58, 61, 65, 89-92, 93, 94; m. & al-
gebra, 92; m. & calculus, 91; m. & 
nature, 91; m. & universe, 91; "m. 
is an arithmetic exercise of the soul," 
90, 91; fugue, 92. 
mysticism & math., 16, 17, 21, 33, 45, 
48, 53, 61, 64, 65, 69, 85. 
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nature & math., 6, 77, 87, 93; see also 
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Neo-Kantian School, 16. 
Newton, I., 22, 23, 50, 69. 
novel, 83, 84, 85. 
number, 6, 11, 23, 61, 62, 64/., 82, 88, 
89, 91, 92. 
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